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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is recovering from the most severe growth slowdown in two 
decades. Yet, the recovery is expected to remain uneven across countries, and while the 
region’s growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has been positive since 2017, it 
will remain insufficient to significantly reduce poverty. The recovery remains vulnerable. 
Rising public debt burdens are fuelling debt sustainability risks, while tighter global financing 
conditions and weaker than expected commodity prices pose additional downside risks. In 
some countries, lending to the public sector is crowding out private credit, which could hold 
back growth, while the declining number of correspondent bank relationships is becoming a 
cause for concern as it could complicate international transactions required in cross-border 
trade. 
North African countries are currently undergoing a prominent economic transformation. 
The macroeconomic situation should continue to benefit from the implementation of 
economic and social reforms and ongoing efforts towards regional integration. The 
geographical position also gives the region a considerable advantage in attracting foreign 
direct investment. Many countries also see this transformation as an opportunity to make 
economic growth more inclusive. Constituting the vast majority of firms in North Africa, 
microenterprises and SMEs still need to have better access to financial products and services, 
despite the notable progress already made. Non-bank financial institutions are still at an early 
stage of development, limiting the choice of financial instruments available for small firms.  
In many SSA banking markets, the last two years saw a pause in financial deepening but 
systemic crises have been successfully averted, demonstrating the improved resilience of 
SSA’s financial systems. However, non-performing loans are on the rise and capital adequacy 
and asset quality have deteriorated since the last full edition of this study in 2016. Advanced 
economies’ banks have been withdrawing from the region, and regional banking groups have 
consolidated their presence. Smaller domestic banks have been too preoccupied by the 
difficult economic situation to take advantage. 
Despite more than a decade and a half of financial deepening in nearly all SSA countries, 
banking sectors still have a long way to go to catch up with other regions. Indeed, access to 
finance still tops the list of constraints for SMEs in SSA, according to the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Survey. One reason for the limited access to finance of SMEs is that banks have 
increased their lending to the public sector in recent years. Higher issuance of public debt 
reduces lending to the private sector by providing a potentially attractive alternative 
investment, and, as observed throughout Africa, offering higher lending rates. Based on our 
analysis, crowding out has increased throughout Africa during 2014-18, and its prevalence is 
elevated in Ghana, Niger, Tanzania and Zambia. When growth picks up further, demand for 
loans from SMEs will rise while crowding out by public debt could reach elevated levels in 
several more countries. Banking groups that we surveyed report that the lack of adequate 
  
collateral and high default rates are reported by banking groups to be the most important 
obstacles to SME lending in SSA. IFIs have developed programmes to offer portfolio 
guarantees to commercial banks for SME lending, but a significant portion of banks’ needs for 
portfolio guarantees is still unmet. 
On the supply side, however, the 2018 EIB Survey of banking groups in SSA reveals a push 
for new technologies. A rising share of banks plan a structural expansion of their operations 
in SSA in the longer term. In the short run no banking group plans to consolidate operations 
in SSA any more. Half of the banking groups report being fully deployed in terms of general IT 
infrastructure but the majority of them are in deployment and planning deployment in terms 
of internet-banking technology, mobile banking and FinTech. 
The importance of strengthening the legal, regulatory and supervisory super-structure of 
SSA’s and North Africa’s financial sectors to promote financial intermediation cannot be 
overstated. Working out NPLs and resolving banks that cannot return to profitability will be 
key to underpinning the confidence that is necessary for private investment in SSA. Improving 
recovery and resolution laws in Africa would help to bring down funding costs and facilitate 
financial intermediation. Requiring banks to prepare recovery and resolution plans, which 
would subsequently need to be approved by regulators and maintained would be an 
important step forward. Similarly, introducing a well-defined recovery floor would also reduce 
uncertainty for investors as they would have a clear understanding of how their investment 
may be affected in a crisis management scenario. 
As financial inclusion for individuals and microenterprises advances, new challenges will 
emerge that will need to be addressed to ensure that financial deepening is fair, broad-
based and sustainable. Consumer protection will be key to maintaining the confidence of first-
time depositors and financial service users and to ensuring a level-playing field with regulated 
players.  
As SSA economies continue to recover, the opportunity to deepen the region’s financial 
sectors should not be missed even though some of the lowest hanging fruit have already 
been picked. Bringing down the financing needs of governments through fiscal consolidation 
and structural reform is key to freeing up space on banks’ balance sheets. In addition, 
continuing the broadening of the investor base for government paper through, for instance, 
developing local bond markets, would also reduce pressure on banks to hold large amounts 
of public debt. Enhancing banks’ capacity to assess risk and monitor their clients would reduce 
the perceived risks and facilitate financial intermediation. Helping clients to identify and 
present bankable projects would also raise lending to the private sector. 
Private sector development will require technical assistance and knowledge transfers, not 
just financing. This is a long-term investment that banking groups will ultimately find to their 
economic and financial advantage as they groom tomorrow’s larger and stronger clients - but 
the work needs to begin now. Development partners could help to crowd-in capital and 
support private sector development by offering innovative financial and policy instruments. 
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Moreover, financial sector sophistication can help to address the continent’s important 
infrastructure bottlenecks. Infrastructure needs are particularly high in energy and transport 
and new needs arise from rapid urbanisation, population and economic growth. Private 
investors can play an important role in financing vital infrastructure in Africa. Many African 
countries have made progress on removing regulatory barriers to infrastructure investment 
by institutional investors. Yet, many needs still need to be structured into bankable 
investment opportunities and financial markets still have to be developed. Financial 
instruments that seem particularly promising for attracting private investors include risk 
mitigation instruments and debentures. 
 
Debora Revoltella 
Director 
Economics Department 
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Introduction 
An Uneven Recovery Amid Concerns Over Rising Debt 
While moderate growth is forecast for 2018 and subsequent years for sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), the region’s recovery is expected to be uneven. Rising oil and mining output combined 
with stable oil and commodity prices are projected to lift economic activity in some countries, 
but growth will be moderate in the region. In some oil exporters, the recovery will be slower 
than previously expected, due to the need for continued fiscal consolidation, as they adjust to 
high debt levels and low external buffers. Correspondingly, while growth is forecast to 
accelerate from 4.4% in 2017 to 4.7% in 2019 in oil-importing countries, it is expected to rise 
from 0.5% to only 2.1% in oil-exporting countries over the same period (IMF, 2018). 
The pace of recovery varies significantly across Africa’s regions. East Africa remains one of 
the best economic performing regions in SSA. Regional economic growth is projected to pick 
up to 5.8% in 2018 and to accelerate further to 6.2% in 2019, assuming a more stable political 
environment and a gradual increase in oil prices. Economic activity in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) remained robust, expanding by 6% for the sixth 
consecutive year in 2017. Meanwhile in Southern Africa, annual growth has fallen from around 
5% during 2010-14 to around 2.5% in recent years, as the many commodity exporters in the 
region have been hit by falling international demand and the subsequent decline in prices. 
The recovery is expected to be slow. Overall, the macroeconomic situation in the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) is improving after the marked 
slowdown under the combined effect of the fall in the prices of raw materials and security 
threats. In 2018, these economies are starting to recover, with growth reaching 1.7% thanks 
to rising oil prices and production combined with reforms. GDP growth in North Africa reached 
3.4% in 2017, moderately higher than in earlier years. The economic outlook remains positive, 
thanks to considerable structural and macroeconomic reforms, although GDP growth is 
expected to moderate to below 3% in 2018. 
Even within regions, recent economic performance has reflected the diversity in economic 
structures and the differing dependence on oil and mineral exports. In West Africa, Nigeria 
exited recession in 2017 thanks mainly to rising oil prices, growing by 0.8%, whereas Ghana 
registered a significant pickup in real GDP growth (to 8.4%) after the slowdown experienced 
two years before. In the CEMAC, all countries except Equatorial Guinea are projected to enjoy 
positive growth in 2018 but projected growth ranges from 4.0% in Cameroon to a meagre 
0.7% in the Republic of Congo. In East Africa, Kenya (4.8%) and Uganda (4.5%) will 
underperform their regional peers both in 2018 and 2019, albeit less than in 2017. In Southern 
Africa, only Madagascar (4.1%) and Mauritius (3.9%) recorded higher growth in recent years 
than during 2010-14. 
While risks to the outlook have become more balanced, downside risks predominate, 
particularly because rising public debt burdens are fuelling debt sustainability risks. Public 
debt accumulation started to outpace economic growth in 2008 and public debt-to-GDP ratios 
deteriorated substantially in 2015 and 2016. The earlier fall in commodity prices in particular 
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affected the debt position of commodity exporters, but also that of many other countries in 
the region. More than 80% of African countries recorded an increase in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio during 2014-17, and the increase was more than 10% of GDP for more than half of 
those countries. About 37% of African countries have high or distressed public debt levels 
according to the IMF and the World Bank as of June 2018, and rating agencies have 
downgraded many of them over the past few years. Other downside risks to Africa’s recovery 
include tighter global financing conditions and a slowdown of the commodity price recovery 
on the back of a trade war. 
Generally Resilient Financial Sectors and Improving Financial Inclusion, 
but Emerging Pockets of Risk in Some Banking Sectors 
The diversity of stages of financial market development and market potential mirror the 
diversity of economic structures and performances across the region. A few of SSA’s and 
North Africa’s banking sectors have reached a depth approaching that of Upper Middle 
Income Countries (UMICs). South Africa, Mauritius, Morocco and Tunisia are a case in point, 
Cape Verde and Namibia as well - albeit to a lesser extent. Several markets are nearing a level 
of development characteristic of Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs), such as Kenya and 
Côte d’Ivoire. Yet many countries still struggle with some of the shallowest banking sectors in 
the world, such as the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Sudan, while some other 
countries are punching below their income categories. Countries like Cameroon and Nigeria, 
both LMICs, and Gabon, a UMIC, are still below the average financial depth for Low Income 
Countries (LICs) globally, despite experiencing financial deepening over the last decade. 
Financial inclusion of individuals has kept on improving throughout the recent economic 
slowdown, thanks to a rethink by banking sector players and their regulatory authorities. 
Digital financial inclusion is on the march: it has clearly spilled out of Eastern Africa and is 
improving access to finance in all of Africa’s regions now. While a large part of the population 
in SSA remains unbanked, notable progress has been achieved since 2011. SSA has the largest 
deployment of mobile payment services in the world, but the use of financial services has not 
evolved as fast as account ownership. Most success stories highlight the importance of 
strategic partnerships between banks and telecoms, and of an accommodating regulator. 
Banks dominate the financial sector and therefore financial intermediation in SSA and North 
Africa, with the exception of South Africa. The size of stock markets remains small even in 
the most advanced financial markets in SSA and North Africa. South Africa is a notable 
exception: relative to the size of its economy, the value of stocks traded on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) is above that of its peer UMICs and not far from that of advanced country 
markets. In contrast, even in Mauritius, Kenya and Nigeria, the next most developed capital 
markets in SSA, the volume of traded stock did not reach 3% of GDP in 2017, even though 
Mauritius is a UMIC and Kenya and Nigeria are LMICs. Since 2007, the volume of traded stocks 
has decreased in all three countries as a share of their respective GDP, casting doubt that 
significant progress is being made with stock market deepening in SSA. With the exception of 
a handful of countries, bond markets are also under-developed in the region. 
Banking in Africa: Delivering on Financial Inclusion, Supporting Financial Stability 
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SSA’s banking markets are typically oligopolistic and are characterised by high lending rates 
and low deposit rates, or, in other words, wide lending margins. However, thanks to 
intensifying competition, these margins have generally been trending down since 2000. For 
instance, in Kenya, the interest margin came down from 14% in 2000 to 6% in 2017, and in 
Mauritius, down from 11% in 2000 to 5% in 2017. Still, the DRC, Mozambique, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone saw double-digit interest margins in 2017. Banks tend to invest deposits in “risk-
free” government bonds paying a relatively high yield, contributing to crowding out private 
sector credit and SME financing in particular.  
High issuance of public debt at attractive rates provides a favourable alternative investment 
for banks vs lending to the private sector, leading to a substantial crowding out. In Africa, as 
a share of GDP, banks’ holdings of public debt increased on average from 8% in 2008 to 12% 
in 2017. In almost 80% of the countries, banks increased their holdings during the last three 
years. Banks’ holdings of public debt have increased faster than their balance sheets, and they 
now account for around 19% of banks’ assets compared to some 14% in 2008. During the last 
three years, this share has increased in around three-quarters of the countries, and in a 
quarter government paper now accounts for more than 25% of banks’ assets.  
In most SSA countries, capitalisation levels and profitability remain comfortable but in 
recent years, NPLs have increased and returns on assets (RoA) have been under pressure in 
some markets. The median capital-asset ratio stands around 12%, whereas the median return 
on equity is 21%. Yet, the median non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loan ratio has risen 
above 10% in recent quarters.  In North Africa, NPLs are above 10% in Algeria and Tunisia. 
Banks in the region have experienced an improvement in their profitability, reflecting a 
strengthening of economic growth in recent years.  
Indeed, banks’ capacity to support private sector activity is crucial for a sustainable 
recovery. In Africa, bank credit to the private sector peaked around 2009 when it reached 
some 37% of GDP. The subsequent decline was modest in North Africa and has been more 
than offset by recent credit growth. In SSA, however, the drop in bank lending to the private 
sector was more pronounced. Notwithstanding some recent improvement during 2014-16, it 
remains about a quarter below its 2009 level. In both regions, the volume of bank loans to the 
private sector is smaller than in Latin America and the Caribbean and in South Asia, where it 
stands at 45% of GDP. Economic growth typically goes hand-in-hand with an expanding 
banking sector, but, crucially, depressed bank lending holds back growth. Hence, to support 
the economic recovery, banks need the capacity to step up lending to the private sector, SMEs 
in particular. 
Access to finance still tops the list of constraints for SMEs, and most SME investment is self-
financed, resulting in an SME financing gap (World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys). Banking 
groups report that the lack of adequate collateral and the fear of high default rates are the 
most important obstacles to SME lending in SSA. In that context, International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) have developed programmes to offer portfolio guarantees to commercial 
banks for SME lending, but a significant portion of banking groups’ needs for SME portfolio 
guarantees is still unmet. 
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The good news from the EIB survey of banking groups in SSA is that a rising share of banking 
groups plan a structural expansion of their operations in SSA and that no banking group 
plans to consolidate operations in SSA any more. There is growing optimism with respect to 
overall access to funding. Banks principally plan to raise funds in local currency, with the 
emphasis on deposits and long-term funding, such as subordinated debt. Half of banking 
groups report being fully deployed in terms of general IT infrastructure. The majority of them 
are in deployment and planning deployment in terms of internet-banking technology, mobile 
banking and FinTech. 
Banking groups report improving market conditions in terms of origination accompanied by 
rising NPLs and declining margins. Rising competition amongst banks is prodding banking 
groups to move out of their comfort zone and to seek growth by financing more and different 
types of SMEs and professionals. Accordingly, banks are investing in their IT infrastructure, 
digital and bricks-and-mortar networks, and strengthening their risk management and credit 
origination processes. The share of banking groups compliant with Basel II and Basel III 
standards has risen since the last edition of our survey, but the overhaul of risk management 
and compliance capacity is still in progress. 
Ultimately, SMEs are the only employers that can deliver Africa’s much needed 
demographic dividend. All stakeholders need to remain fully engaged. They should 
coordinate on the private sector development agenda or risk counting tomorrow the 
hundreds of millions of young Africans whose opportunity to make a contribution to their 
country goes to waste for lack of decent and productive employment opportunities. The 
stakes are high and require the attention of all development partners.  
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About This Report 
This fourth full edition of the EIB’s study of banking sectors in SSA casts light on recent 
developments in the region’s banking sectors and the policy options for all stakeholders. 
Indeed, the chapters devoted to banking sector development in each sub-region have been 
enhanced, with an augmented focus being placed on MSME financing and financial inclusion. 
In addition, the joint West and Central Africa chapter of earlier editions has been split so as to 
cover both regions in more detail and pay due respect to the rich variety of challenges and 
opportunities of their respective banking sectors. 
Another objective of the 2018 edition of this study is to contribute to the EIB’s Africa Day on 
22 November 2018, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in partnership with UNIDO. A chapter on North 
Africa has been included, to match the continental approach to Africa of our partner. The rest 
of this study is organised as follows. 
The first part of this study is devoted to the study of banking sectors across SSA per se. The 
first chapter examines recent trends in the SSA banking sectors, relying on a survey of banking 
groups operating in the region. Chapters 2-5 respectively analyse recent trends in banking 
sectors in Western Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. 
The second part of this study consists of thematic chapters that address transversal 
challenges and opportunities with regard to financing investment in SSA. Chapter 7 analyses 
how crowding out by public debt affects lending to the private sector across Africa. Chapter 8 
portrays the state of bank recovery and resolution laws in Africa. Chapter 9 maps out policy 
options on how infrastructure development can be financed and what the most appropriate 
contribution by development partners can be, with a particular focus on development finance 
institutions. The study ends with a section explaining the type of financial support and 
technical assistance offered by the EIB to financial sectors in SSA. 
 
  
 12   © European Investment Bank, October 2018 
 
 
Banking in Africa: Delivering on Financial Inclusion, Supporting Financial Stability 
© European Investment Bank, October 2018  13 
1. Sub-Saharan African Banking Sectors: Results from a 
Survey of Banking Groups 
Adeline Pelletier1 and Jean-Philippe Stijns2,3 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
• This chapter takes stock of trends and strategic issues affecting banking groups 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Besides publicly available data, including from the 
IMF and the World Bank, this chapters relies on the results of the third edition 
of the EIB’s survey of banking groups in SSA. 
 
• Despite more than a decade and a half of financial deepening in nearly all SSA 
countries, banking sectors still have a remarkably long way to go in terms of 
depth, breath and sophistication. The share of banking groups compliant with 
Basel II and Basel III standards has improved since the last edition of our survey 
but the overhaul of risk management and compliance capacity is still in progress. 
 
• In many SSA countries, the last two years have been characterised by a pause in 
financial deepening. In contrast, a rising share of banking groups are planning a 
structural expansion of their operations in SSA in the longer term. In the short 
run, no banking group is planning to consolidate operations in SSA anymore. Half 
of banking groups report being fully deployed in terms of General IT 
infrastructure but the majority of them are in deployment and planning 
deployment in terms of internet-banking technology, mobile banking and 
FinTech. 
 
• Banking groups report improving market conditions in terms of origination but 
also rising NPLs and declining margins. There is growing optimism with respect 
to overall access to funding in general but less so in terms of pricing and maturity. 
Banks are mainly planning to raise funds in local currency, with emphasis on 
deposits and long-term funding, such as subordinated debt and bond issuance. 
 
• On the demand side, access to finance still tops the list of constraints for SMEs, 
and most SME investment is self-financed, resulting in an SME financing gap. On 
the supply side, banking groups report that the lack of adequate collateral and 
the high default rates are the most important obstacles to SME lending in SSA. 
In that context, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have developed 
programmes to offer portfolio guarantees to commercial banks for SME lending, 
                                                          
1 Lecturer, Institute of Management Studies, Goldsmiths, University of London; Research Associate, London School of Economics. 
2 Senior Economist, European Investment Bank. 
3 The authors gratefully acknowledge that this chapter has benefited from feedback from EIB colleagues. However, the views 
expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment Bank. All remaining 
errors remain the authors’. 
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but a significant portion of banking groups’ needs for SME portfolio guarantees 
is still unmet. 
 
• While a large part of the population in SSA remains unbanked, notable progress 
has been achieved since 2011. SSA has the largest deployment of mobile 
payment services in the world, but the use of financial services has not evolved 
as fast as account ownership. Most success stories highlight the importance of 
strategic partnerships between banks and telecom companies. 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter takes stock of trends and strategic issues affecting banking groups operating in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), relying on the results of the third edition of the EIB’s survey of 
banking groups in SSA (annexed)4. A first pilot edition of the survey was launched in 2015. 
The second edition of the survey was conducted in 2016 and was expanded in two ways. First, 
the sample of banking groups that accepted to participate in the survey grew from 10 to 17 
banks and it included some global banks with a wide footprint in SSA. Second, the set of 
questions put to banking groups was expanded from 10 to 20 questions, covering an enhanced 
set of strategic issues, including demand and supply of local currency loans and technological 
deployment. 
For this third edition, the sample of banks and the questionnaire were expanded. Eight 
banking groups dropped out from the sample while 16 joined, with therefore a net gain of 
eight banks. An effort was also made to broaden the sample to cover more local regional 
banks. The result is a sample comprising 25 banking groups. The number of questions 
increased from 20 to 25, with new questions focusing on SME lending, FinTech, collaboration 
between banks and telecom companies, banks’ competitors, regulatory capital, subordinated 
debt and strategic sectors for lending. 
This introduction discusses the macroeconomic context characterising SSA economies, as it 
affects directly the landscape of banking groups operating across the region. The rest of 
chapter is organised as follows.  The second section takes stock of the medium-term trends in 
the financial sectors in SSA. The third illustrates the strategic positioning of banking groups 
operating in SSA. The fourth analyses market and funding conditions for banking groups in 
SSA. In the fifth, access to finance in SSA is discussed. The sixth section provides a conclusion 
and an appendix documents the questionnaire behind the EIB survey in detail. 
  
                                                          
4 IT support from Tomasz Olejnik and Rafal Banaszek is gratefully acknowledged. The authors are also grateful to Sanja Blatt from 
the EIB’s Transaction, Monitoring and Restructuring Directorate and to colleagues based in the EIB’s Dakar, Pretoria and Nairobi 
regional offices for their valuable comments and feedback. 
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Figure 1.1. - GDP Growth in SSA (1997-2023) 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook (April 2018). 
SSA is recovering from a growth slowdown, a development that it had not experienced in 
almost two decades (Figure 1.1.). It is necessary to go back as far as 1999 to find a year when 
real income per capita decreased in the region. The 2016 slump acts a stark reminder of how 
dependent on commodity prices many of SSA economies still are. At constant prices, 
economic growth in SSA is estimated to have picked up to 2.8% in 2017 from 1.5% in 2016 
(IMF, 2018). This upturn is due to firming commodity prices and improving agricultural 
production following droughts (World Bank, 2018). There has also been a recovery in fixed 
investment for oil and metal exporters. Moderate inflation has also supported growth through 
a rebound in consumer spending. Economic growth is projected to accelerate to 3.4% in 2018 
and to 4.0% by 2023, reflecting a gradual pick-up in growth in Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola 
- the region’s largest economies. 
Yet, the current recovery comes with significant caveats and downside risks: 
1. First, while moderate growth is projected for the region, there is considerable 
variation across the countries and an uneven recovery is under way. Rising mining 
output combined with stable commodity prices are expected to lift growth in some 
countries, but growth will be moderate elsewhere in the region. In some oil exporters, 
the recovery will be slower than previously expected, due to the need for continued 
fiscal consolidation, as they adjust to high debt levels and low external buffers. 
Correspondingly, growth is forecast to increase from 4.4% in 2017 to 4.7% in 2019 in 
oil-importing countries and from 0.5% to only 2.1% in oil-exporting countries over the 
same period (IMF, 2018). 
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2. Second, the region’s growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) will remain 
insufficient to reduce poverty significantly. Policy looks set to remain tight, 
constrained by the need to tackle rising debt levels and rebuild buffers to enhance 
resilience. Growth in real GDP per capita is estimated at 0.11% in 2017 and is expected 
to rise to only 1.42% by 2023. 
3. Third, while risks to the outlook have become more balanced, downside risks 
prevail. Rising debt sustainability heads the list of domestic risks. The main external 
risks include tighter global financing conditions and weaker-than-expected 
commodity prices, while the incipient trade war between the US and its trade partners 
spells uncertainty for the global economy and would eventually affect SSA through 
trade and investment channels. 
1.2. Trends in Financial Sectors in SSA 
In many SSA countries, the last two years have been characterised by a pause in financial 
deepening (Figure 1.2. below). This retrenchment is noticeable for both the median and some 
of the less developed countries. In contrast, the more developed markets generally continued 
to deepen in 2017.  
Figure 1.2. - Credit to the Private Sector by Groups of Countries (1996-2017) 
(share of GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Bank FINDEX. 
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Figure 1.3. - Credit to the Private Sector 
(2017/2015/1997) 
 
 
Source: World Bank.   
Note: Upper-Middle-Income Countries (UMICs), Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), and Low-Income 
Countries (LICs) figures refer to the average for the corresponding income categories at the global level. For the 
current 2019 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the 
World Bank Atlas method, of USD 995 or less in 2017; lower-middle-income economies are those with a GNI per 
capita between USD 996 and USD 3 895; upper-middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between 
USD 3 896 and USD 12 055; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of USD 12 056 or more. 
The diversity of stages in financial market development and market trends remains a 
striking structural characteristic of SSA and several banking markets display financial depth 
that is still below the level implied by their income level (Figure 1.3.). Banking sectors in SSA 
can be roughly sorted into three types. First, there are a few outliers with a banking sector of 
the depth approaching that expected from an Upper-Middle-Income Country (UMIC). South 
Africa and Mauritius clearly fall within this category, and Cape Verde and Namibia to a lesser 
extent. Second, roughly half of the rest of the distribution is made up of banking markets with 
depth ranging from that of an LMIC to that of a LIC. For instance, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire fall 
into this intermediate category. Third, the last category is made up of countries with some of 
the shallowest banking sectors in world. The DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Sudan fall 
into this category. Cameroon, an LMIC, and Gabon, a UMIC, are still below the average 
financial depth for LICs globally, despite experiencing financial deepening over the last 
decade. 
 18   © European Investment Bank, October 2018 
Figure 1.4. - Interest Rate Spread 
(1997-2017) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators / International Monetary Fund.  
Note: Interest rate spread is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to private sector customers minus the 
interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. The median, second and 
fourth quartile are reported across countries of SSA for which data is available (between 19 and 37 countries 
depending on the year). A similar pattern is observed if a constant panel of 15 countries is considered over 2007-
2017. 
 
Banking markets are characterised by high lending rates and low deposit rates. Interest 
margins across the region are thus generally high though on a downtrend (Figure 1.4.). For 
instance, DRC, Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone were characterised by double-digit 
interest margins in 2017. However, these margins have generally been trending down since 
2000. In Kenya, the interest margin came down from 14% in 2000 to 6% in 2017 and, in 
Mauritius, it was down from 11% in 2000 to 5% in 2017. 
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Table 1.1. - Financial Soundness Indicators in Selected SSA Banking Markets 
(as percentage, latest available date) 
Country Date Capital to Assets 
NPLs to Total 
Gross Loans 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Angola 2015A1 8.42 10.61 2.11 21.6 
Botswana 2017Q4 8.77 5.28 1.93 16.28 
Burundi 2017Q3 12.21 13.61 2.9 20.51 
Cameroon 2018M2 8.28 12.14   
Central African Republic 2017M11 18.9 22.65 8.63 45.85 
Chad 2017M11 11.99 25.1 1.87 17.22 
Congo, Republic of 2017M11 17.79 13.4 8.33 52.52 
Djibouti 2018Q1 5.77 14.09 0.35 5.29 
Equatorial Guinea 2017M11 15.46 27.33 5.32 35.2 
eSwatini 2017Q4 13.45 7.92 0.01 0.04 
Gabon 2017M11 9.15 10.04 13.04 134.64 
Gambia, The 2016Q2 15.04 7.6 3.46 20.62 
Ghana 2017A1 13.11 21.59 4.29 18.58 
Guinea 2017Q4 11.86 10.68 2.05 16.74 
Kenya 2017Q4 15.28 10.08 3.24 21.38 
Lesotho 2018Q1 12.12 4.16 3.92 31.06 
Madagascar 2018Q1 10.72 7.9 4.5 43.16 
Malawi 2017Q4 15.6 8.55 5.06 31.11 
Mauritius 2017Q4 10.08 7.03 1.55 15.16 
Namibia 2017A1 11.73 2.49 3.02 28.01 
Nigeria 2017Q3 7.43 15.13 2.43 20.54 
Rwanda 2017Q1 14.28 7.73 2.71 14.88 
Seychelles 2017M1 12.11 7.03 3.37 27.85 
South Africa 2018M2 8.77 3.10 1.70 19.78 
Tanzania 2018Q1 12.72 11.13 1.71 11.37 
Uganda 2017Q4 13.81 5.51 3.85 22.84 
Zambia 2017Q4 11.23 11.98 2.64 22.68 
Median  12.11 10.08 2.96 21.00 
Source: IMF/Financial Soundness Indicators. Countries selected according to data availability. 
Given the market concentration, weak - though rising - competition and low levels of 
intermediation, it is not surprising that banks are generally well capitalised, liquid and 
profitable (Table 1.1.). The median capital-to-assets ratio stands around 12% whereas the 
median return on equity is a towering 21%. In most SSA countries, capitalisation levels remain 
above regulatory floors. Profitability is high because banks tend to invest relatively cheap 
deposits in “risk-free” government bonds paying a relatively high yield, thereby crowding 
credit to the private sector5. However, in recent years capital buffers have been somewhat 
eroded and returns on assets (RoA) have come down in some markets. The median ratio of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans has risen above 10% in recent quarters. 
                                                          
5 Cf. Schmidt and Zwart (2018), Chapter 7 in this study. 
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Figure 1.5. - State of Basel Standard Compliance 
(share of survey respondents) 
 
 
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA.  
Note: Question 20 (see Appendix). 
The share of respondents to our survey reporting to be compliant with Basel II and Basel III 
standards has risen since the last edition of our survey (Figure 1.5.). Practically all banking 
groups consider themselves to be compliant with Basel I, although there is a perception that 
single exposure limits/concentration ratios are not always respected. With respect to Basel II 
standards, two thirds of banking groups consider themselves compliant, with the rest 
reporting that they are working towards compliance. That is an improvement compared with 
the 2016 edition of our survey where only 46% of banking groups reported being 
Basel II-compliant. When it comes to Basel III standards, around one banking group out of 
three reports being compliant, while two out of five are working towards compliance and less 
than one in three does not consider Basel III a priority. In other words, the responses to our 
survey illustrate the efforts by regulatory and supervisory authorities to apply more rigorous 
standards and by banking groups in Africa to increasingly align with global best practices. 
1.3. Recent Trends in Strategic Positioning of Banking Groups in SSA 
Market potential is now considered much lower than in 2015 although relative market 
potential as reported by banking groups has been fairly stable despite the diverse way the 
last economic downturn has affected economies in the region (Map 1.1. below). There is high 
correlation in rankings between market potential scores reported by banking groups across 
the three editions of our survey. This correlation is as high as 86.5% between 2018 and 2016, 
69.0% between 2016 and 2015 and 70.4% between 2018 and 2015. As at 2018, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire are regarded by respondents as the markets with the highest 
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potential. In the 2016 edition of our survey, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola and South Africa 
topped  the  rankings,  while  in  the  2015  edition,  banking  groups  considered  Côte  d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria to be the top potential markets. 
Map 1.1. ‐ Market Potential Perceived by Banking Groups in SSA 
 
a. 2015   b. 2016  c. 2018 
     
Source: 2015, 2016 and 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA.   
Note: Question 1, perceived market potential (high, medium, low). 
 
Figure 1.6. ‐ Current and Prospective Positioning of Banking Groups in SSA 
(share of survey respondents) 
a. Long‐term strategic approach 
(beyond 12 months)  
b. Short‐term strategic approach 
   
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA.   
Note: Panel a refers to Question 4.a; panel b refers to Question 16 (see Appendix). 
Banking groups have stabilised internally and are contemplating expanding their operations 
anew. Close to four banking groups out of five still report planning a structural expansion of 
their operations in SSA in the long term (Figure 1.6.a.), whereas in the short run no banking 
groups are planning to consolidate their operations in SSA (Figure 1.6.b.). 14% report that they 
consolidated their activities during the previous 12 months, but no banking groups project this 
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for the following 12 months. More than half of the banking groups are planning to expand 
organically. A growing share, more than a quarter, are planning some brownfield and 
greenfield investments. A constant share, about one fifth, are planning some acquisitions. 
Figure 1.7. - Strategic Focus and TA Needs 
(share of survey respondents) 
a. Long-Term Market Focus b. Technical Assistance Needs 
  
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Panel a refers to Question 4 (market focus); panel b refers to Question 18 (see Appendix). 
A growing share of the surveyed banking groups reports a long-term focus on SMEs and on 
retail clients. As shown in Figure 1.7., 60% of banking groups now report a long-term focus on 
SMEs. 30% of groups report a focus on retail clients, compared to 8% in 2016. In our 2018 
sample, groups do not report a focus on large multinationals, while the share of groups 
focusing on local large companies declined from one in four to one in ten. Groups also report 
that their main medium-term need in terms of technical assistance (TA) relate to credit risk 
management (37%) and credit monitoring (21%). This is consistent with a growing focus on 
SMEs and with rising NPLs. 
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1.4. Recent Trends in Market and Funding Conditions for Banking Groups in 
SSA 
Figure 1.8. - Banking Groups’ Assessment of Ongoing and Prospective Market Conditions 
(share of survey respondents - as %) 
 
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Question 2 (see Appendix).  
Banking groups report improving market conditions in terms of origination and market 
share but also rising NPLs and declining margins (Figure 1.8.). The vast majority (89%) of 
respondents expect assets to grow in the short run. They also expect a pickup in their loans 
and deposits market shares, which is indicative of sharpening market competition. Expanding 
market shares for large banking groups, if they materialise, will come at the expense of smaller 
banks that are not covered by the survey. Indeed, close to two banking groups out of five 
expect their net profit margins to fall in the short run and half-expect a rising cost-to-income 
ratio. Three quarters of banking groups are planning an expansion of their loan-to-deposit 
ratio and a slowdown in capital adequacy. Only about a third of banking groups are planning 
to raise capital on the market. 
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Figure 1.9. - Group Access to Funding in SSA 
(share of survey respondents) 
 
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Question 3 (see Appendix).  
The majority of banking groups expect rising access to funding at group level with the 
emphasis on deposits and long-term funding (Figure 1.9.). Only a quarter of respondents 
intend to tap the interbank market and less than a fifth credit from the Central Bank. One 
group out of four is planning to curb the use of Central Bank funding. However, two groups 
out of five are planning to tap short-term funding. A third of groups are planning to use 
wholesale debt securities, roughly the same proportion as for funding by IFIs. An uptick is 
reported in terms of intentions to turn to IFIs for funding but this proportion is, however, 
lower than in 2016 (50%). 
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Figure 1.10. - Subsidiary Access to Funding 
(share of survey respondents) 
 
Source: 2018 and 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Question 8 (see Appendix).  
The funding structure at the subsidiary level is still heavily reliant on deposit collection but 
less so than two years earlier (Figure 1.10.). Back in 2015, 60% of banking groups reported 
and expected deposits to be the main source of funding for their subsidiaries. In the 2016 
edition, this share rose to 75%. In 2017, this share decreased to 63% but is set to increase to 
68% in the short term. In other words, reliance on deposits at subsidiary level seems to be 
returning to the pre-crisis level - dominant but no longer overwhelming. A rising share of 
banking groups (16%) are planning to finance their subsidiaries. Other marginal sources of 
funding in the short run include IFIs, and other short and long-term funding sources. 
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Figure 1.11. - Trends in Funding Conditions at Subsidiary Level 
(share of survey respondents) 
 
 
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Question 9 (see Appendix).  
Banking groups report growing optimism with respect to overall access to funding 
conditions but they are less hopeful in terms of pricing and maturity (Figure 1.11.). In the 
short run, the majority of banking groups (55%) expect an improvement in overall funding 
conditions at subsidiary level. A growing share of banking groups expect an improvement in 
pricing and maturity conditions for funding at subsidiary level but the majority of banking 
groups expect pricing and maturity conditions either to remain stable or to deteriorate. 
Nevertheless, while, in the recent past more banking groups expected pricing and maturity 
conditions to deteriorate than to improve, going forward, more banking groups expect an 
improvement than a deterioration. Although banking groups are not as sanguine about the 
funding situation as even two years ago, their opinion indicates that the worst seems to be 
over given the improving outlook. 
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Figure 1.12. - Local Currency and Foreign Exchange Funding and Lending 
(share of survey respondents) 
a. Plans to raise funds 
 
b. Perceived demand for loans 
 
 
 
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Question 11 (see Appendix).  
Banking groups are mainly planning to raise funds in local currency (Figure 1.12.a.) and 
correspondingly they perceive demand for loans in local currency to be either stronger (30%) 
than or in line (70%) with market trends (Figure 1.12.b.). Banking groups also report plans to 
raise funds in USD, albeit with less certainty than in local currency. They also perceive loans in 
USD to be in demand although less so than those in local currency. Two banking groups out of 
five indicate that they are probably more inclined to raise funds in EUR and the majority (55%) 
of them report that demand for loans in EUR is in line with market trends. Four banking groups 
out of five are not planning to raise funds in other currencies and three groups out of five 
consider demand for loans in other currencies to be below market trends. 
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Figure 1.13. - Capital, Subordinated Debt and Bond Issuance 
(share of survey respondents) 
a. Tier 1 vs. subordinated debt 
 
b. Bond issuance 
 
 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Panel a refers to Question 14; panel b refers to Question 15 (see Appendix). 
While no banking groups are considering raising Tier 1 capital over the next 12 months, 
subordinated debt issuance is prominent (64%) and, to a lesser extent, bond issuance (41%) 
also (Figure 1.13.). While two groups out of five declare they have issued regulatory capital in 
the past 12 months, the share falls to zero for the next 12 months, suggesting groups have 
exhausted their needs for Tier 1 capital per se. In contrast, subordinated debt issuance is 
reported to have been undertaken recently by all banking groups and the majority of them 
are planning to issue some more in the near future. Two groups out of five are planning to 
issue a bond in the near future, compared to 27% in the 2016 edition of the survey. 
1.5. Medium-Term Trends in Access to Finance in SSA 
While a large part of the population in SSA remains unbanked, notable progress has been 
achieved in terms of financial access since 2011 and even the formal banking sector is 
showing signs of progression. However, the use of financial services and active financial 
inclusion has not evolved as fast as account ownership, and access to finance is still limited for 
SMEs in SSA. There is a real opportunity for mobile money services to fill the gap by offering 
financial services at low cost. Many existing success stories highlight the importance of 
strategic partnerships between banks and telecom companies. 
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1.5.A. FINANCIAL INCLUSION INDICATORS 
Table 1.2. - Financial Access in sub-Saharan Africa 
(as %) 
Financial access Sub-Saharan Africa Developing countries 
(as % of population, age 15+) 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 
Account* 23 34 43 42 55 63 
Financial institution account  23 29 33 42 54 61 
Saved at a financial institution  14 16 15 17 22 21 
Debit card ownership 15 18 18 24 32 40 
Credit card ownership  3 3 3 7 10 10 
Borrowed from a financial institution  5 6 7 8 9 9 
Borrowed from family or friends  40 42 31 26 29 29 
 
Source: Global Findex.  
*Note: The Global Findex defines account ownership as having an individual or jointly owned account either at a 
financial institution (accounts at a bank or another type of formal, regulated financial institution, such as a credit 
union, a cooperative or a microfinance institution) or through a mobile money provider (mobile phone-based 
services, not linked to a financial institution, that are used to pay bills or to send or receive money). 
In 2017, 43% of the adult population was estimated to have an account6 compared to only 
23% in 2011 (Table 1.2.). This rapid evolution is partly due to the fast penetration of mobile 
payment services. When looking only at the figure for financial institution accounts, the 
progression has been much slower: 33% of the adult population had an account at a financial 
institution in 2017, up 10 percentage points from 2011 (compared to a 20-percentage point 
increase for all accounts). Bank account ownership in SSA is still much lower than in developing 
countries on average, where 61% held a financial institution account in 2017 (63% including 
mobile money accounts). 
However, SSA still has a long way to go in terms of use of financial services, and active 
financial inclusion has not evolved as fast as account ownership. The percentage of adults 
with savings at financial institutions remains low, as does the percentage of individuals with a 
debit card (Table 1.4.). Improvements have also been very limited since 2011. It is possible, 
though, that the rapid penetration of mobile banking services has limited the need for more 
traditional banking products, such as debit card and saving accounts at banks, given the 
limited access of the population to these products and the fact that some of these services 
are accessible through a mobile money account. Only 7% of the population in SSA has 
borrowed from a financial institution. This is only slightly lower than the average for 
developing countries, which stood at 9% in 2017. In contrast, over a third of the population in 
SSA has borrowed from family or friends but, notably, this share has fallen since 2011 when it 
was 40%. In any case, informal borrowing mechanisms are still predominant in SSA. 
  
                                                          
6 Global Findex defines account ownership as having an individual account at a financial institution or through a mobile money 
provider. 
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Table 1.3. - The State of the Banking Sector in SSA 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Commercial bank branches (per 100 000 adults) 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.9 5.3 . 
Borrowers from commercial banks (per 1 000 adults) 21.5 23.3 34.2 34.7 . . 
Depositors with commercial banks (per 1 000 adults) 206.9 245.0 242.6 292.1 . . 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 29.3 27.9 27.7 28.8 28.9 31.8 
Firms using banks to finance investment (% of firms) . . . . 20.8 22.9 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Despite the low percentage of formally banked individuals, even the formal banking sector 
is showing signs of progression (Table 1.3.). The number of commercial bank branches has 
increased slightly from 3.7 to 4.9 per 100 000 adults. For comparison, the group composed of 
low and middle-income countries recorded 9.8 branches per 100 000 adults in 2016. Given 
the cost of opening brick-and-mortar branches in countries with limited transport 
infrastructure and sparsely populated areas, it is not surprising that banks are reluctant to 
develop their branch network in many SSA markets, particularly outside large urban centres. 
The number of borrowers and depositors also increased over the 2012-2015 period but is still 
below the low and middle-income countries’ average, with 292.1 depositors per 1 000 adults 
in 2015 compared to 742.6 for low and middle-income countries on average, and 34.7 
borrowers per 1 000 adults in 2015 compared to 105.9 for low and middle-income countries 
on average. 
There is a real opportunity for mobile money services, including those provided by banks, 
to fill the gap by offering financial services at low cost. Domestic credit to the private sector 
by banks stood at 31.8% of GDP in 2017, compared to 104.9% for the low and middle-income 
group. In fact, only 22.9% of firms reported using banks to finance their investment in 2017, 
compared to 29.1% for low and middle-income countries. 
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1.5.B. ADVANCES IN FINANCING SMES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
Figure 1.14. - Biggest Business Obstacles for SME firms in SSA 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise surveys. N=13 722 (number of enterprise-years). Survey years: 2011-2017 in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Bank financing of the private sector is still insufficient. 26% of SME firms in SSA surveyed 
over the period 2011-2017 declared that access to finance was the biggest obstacle to their 
business (Figure 1.14.). Electricity comes second with 17% of firms considering it as their 
biggest obstacle, illustrating the fact that infrastructure issues and power cuts are also making 
business operations more difficult on the continent. Informality, and in particular the practices 
of competitors in the informal sector, is also an obstacle that was reported by 11% of the firms 
surveyed. This is not surprising given that the share of the informal economy in SSA is among 
the largest in the world, reaching almost 38% of GDP over 2010-2014, only surpassed by Latin 
America, at 40% of GDP (Medina et all, 2017). On average, 49% of the firms surveyed in SSA 
considered that access to finance was a major constraint, along with corruption (37% of firms), 
political instability (33% of firms) and business licensing and permits (15%). On average, 
surveyed firms in SSA reported operating for a year without formal registration, indicating the 
difficulties faced by firms to start a formal business in the region. 
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Figure 1.15. - Source of Financing for SMEs 
 
Source: Enterprise surveys. N=4 779 (number of enterprise-years). Survey years: 2011-2017. 
Access to finance is still limited for SMEs in SSA and most SME investment is self-financed, 
resulting in a large SME financing gap (Figure 1.15.). Given the difficulty in accessing bank 
finance, 73% of the investments made by the SMEs surveyed by the World Bank in its 
Enterprise Survey were financed by internal funds, and only 10% by banks, the rest being 
financed by supplier credit (4%), equity or stock sales (6%) and other financing sources (7%). 
The SME Finance Forum (2018) estimates that 20% of SMEs in SSA are fully constrained by 
financing and 26% partially constrained, implying that close to one SME out of two is partially 
or fully constrained by access to finance. 
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Figure 1.16. - Portfolio Guarantees 
(share of survey respondents) 
a. Needs b. Products 
 
 
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA.  
Note: Panels a and b refer to Question 12 (see Appendix). 
In that context, IFIs have developed programmes to offer portfolio guarantees to 
commercial banks when lending to SMEs, but a significant portion of the needs for portfolio 
guarantees is still unmet (Figure 1.16.). 45% of banking groups report their portfolio needs 
are met, and 32% partially met. In addition, 80% consider that portfolio guarantees are 
important or very important. This suggests that more has to be done as the majority of 
banking groups report that their need for guarantees are either largely or partially unmet - in 
fact as many as one out of five respondents indicate their needs are largely unmet. The supply 
of guarantees represents, however, only one side of the equation, as there are also constraints 
on the demand side, from the SMEs themselves. In fact, 35% of banking groups in our survey 
consider that the lack of demand for bank loans from bankable SMEs was a key factor in 
limiting lending, and another 35% responded that it was partially a key factor7. Indeed, 
identifying which SMEs are bankable to begin with is already a challenge. 
                                                          
7 Question 22 (see Appendix). 
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Figure 1.17. - Main Obstacle to SME Lending 
(share of survey respondents) 
 
 
Source: 2018 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA.  
Note: Question 23 (see Appendix). 
According to banking groups, the lack of adequate collateral (33%) and high default rate 
(33%) constitute the largest obstacles to SME lending in SSA (Figure 1.17.). Lack of managerial 
capacity within SMEs comes third (17%) and lack of information (8%) fourth. This suggests that 
managerial capacity building for SMEs is an important tool for development partners. With 
firms often operating informally and lacking proper accounting and financial reporting 
documents, it is difficult for banks to assess credit risk and to monitor borrowing entities (4%). 
Credit bureau deficiencies (4%) also play a role and highlight the important role technical 
assistance can play in this area. Credit reference bureaus help mitigate the asymmetry of 
information and increase transparency in the system. In addition, for good borrowers, positive 
information from credit reference bureaus can help them negotiate their borrowing rate, 
which is often in the two-digit bracket. However, only a handful of countries in SSA have fully 
functioning credit bureaus. The lack of branch networks and regulatory and legal barriers are 
not cited by banking groups as important obstacles. 
1.5.C. THE ADVENT OF FINTECH AND ITS IMPACT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE BANKING 
SECTOR  
Cheap and easily accessible financial services through a mobile phone is providing access to 
finance to a broad range of clients across an increasing number of developing countries. 
Historically, lack of customer information, small transaction size, and higher risks have led 
financial organisations in developing economies either to refrain from offering formal financial 
services to large segments of the population or to charge high fees for the services they do 
offer (Claessens 2006, Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Consequently, more than half of the world’s 
Banking in Africa: Delivering on Financial Inclusion, Supporting Financial Stability 
 
© European Investment Bank, October 2018  35 
population is not integrated in the formal financial system (Beck et al. 2008, Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. 2015). While people in developing countries have limited access to banking services, the 
penetration rate of mobile phones has grown rapidly, nearing 80% in Africa8. This is facilitated 
by the availability of cheap feature phones and smartphones that are affordable even to low-
income populations. 
Table 1.4. - Deployment of Mobile Payment Services by Region 
Deployment by region (# MPS)    
East Asia and Pacific 41 Middle East and North Africa 18 
Europe and Central Asia 8 South Asia 39 
Latin America and the Caribbean 34 Sub-Saharan Africa 135 
 
Source: GSMA, March 2018. 
Note: figures include payment services offered by banks. 
The success story of M-Pesa in Kenya is now well known, but the market has evolved far 
beyond this initial success story. Providers are now extending their services to micro-loans 
and saving products. SSA has the largest deployment of mobile payment services in the world. 
As of March 20189, 135 companies were offering mobile payment services in SSA (Table 1.4.). 
A good example is M-Shwari, which offers a combination of savings and loan products and 
was launched in 2012 through a strategic partnership between Commercial Bank of Africa 
(CBA) and Safaricom. In 2015, it was estimated that one in five Kenyans were active M-Shwari 
customers10. 
Many existing success stories highlight the importance of strategic partnerships between 
banks and telecom companies. 78% of the banks in our survey consider that telcos can usually 
form effective partnerships with banks to provide mobile money services, and only 17% of the 
banks consider telcos to be direct competitors to banks in the mobile money sector11. Even 
though regulations tend to be open to telecom groups offering mobile payment services in 
SSA, these groups may still not offer products such as loans and savings without partnering 
with a bank, due to the fact that they do not have a bank licence allowing them to provide 
these services directly. Another advantage of telecom-bank partnerships is that, by integrating 
more economic activities within the formal financial system and providing financial services 
to formerly unbanked people, major benefits may be generated in terms of national economic 
growth and development (Levine 1997 and Raj 2015). The high cost for brick-and-mortar bank 
branches is another reason why telcos and banks cooperate (EIB, 2017). 
  
                                                          
8 The GSMA estimated a penetration rate (in terms of SIM connection) of 77% in 2017. 
https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/archive/GSMA_ME_SubSaharanAfrica_2015.pdf 
9 Source: GSMA database, Mobile Money around the World. 
10 Source: http://www.cgap.org/blog/top-10-things-know-about-m-shwari. 
11 Question 25 (see Appendix). 
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Table 1.5. - Use of Digital Payments 
Financial access SSA Developing countries 
(as % of population, age 15+) 2014 2017 2014 2017 
Made or received digital payments in the past year  27% 34% 32% 44% 
Made digital payments in the past year  23% 29% 26% 36% 
Received digital payments in the past year 21% 25% 25% 27% 
 
Source: Global Findex.  
There is growing and widening use of digital and mobile payment services in SSA (Table 1.5.). 
In 2017, over a third of the population made or received a digital payment in the preceding 
year, a 7-percentage points increase compared to 27% in 2014 (Table 1.5.). In 2017, 23% of 
the adult population paying utility bills used a mobile phone to do so compared to 10% in 
2014. Similarly, 19% of adult wage recipients received their wages through a mobile phone in 
2017, compared to only 8% in 201412. As a result, the use of mobile payments is having a 
profound impact on the economic lives of both the unbanked and banked populations in SSA, 
by offering an affordable and efficient way of conducting transactions and receiving money. 
While airtime top-up, cash in/cash out and peer-to-peer transfers are the dominant services 
offered by mobile payment providers, 84% of the providers in SSA also offered international 
bill payment services, 79% had merchant payment facilities, and 45% allowed customers to 
conduct international remittance operations. 
With a few notable exceptions, banks have taken a backseat when it comes to the provision 
of mobile money services in SSA. This is due partly to the fact that they do not have the retail 
agent networks that telcos have and that their typical business model is based on fees from 
intermediation, not on small commission/large transaction business. Some banking groups 
can be found among the top mobile payment providers, such as FirstRand Bank (South Africa), 
which offers mobile payment services in Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia, and 
in its home country South Africa. However, generally speaking, banking groups tend rather to 
offer mobile payments on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the French group Société 
Générale, which operates as a bank in 18 African countries, only offers mobile payment 
services in two of them (Cameroon and Senegal). Banks are focusing both on internet-banking 
technology for their existing clients and on mobile banking technology. Indeed, 42% of 
surveyed banks report that their internet-banking technology is fully deployed and another 
42% that they are in the process of deploying it. As regards mobile banking technology, 25% 
report that it is fully deployed and 63% that it is in deployment13. 
1.6. Conclusion 
This study comes at a time when most SSA economies are still recovering from a severe 
slowdown in 2016. Wounds to many of the region’s financial sectors are noticeable, especially 
in terms of rising NPLs and diminishing returns on assets. Financial development has been on 
the rise in SSA since the early 1990s but has paused in several of the region’s countries over 
the past two years. This pause has a lot to do with the 2016 slowdown and sluggish recovery 
                                                          
12 Source: Global Findex, World Bank. 
13 Question 19 (see Appendix). 
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in 2017. Many banking groups in SSA are either directly exposed to the minerals and energy 
sectors or indirectly via loans to the Government or its suppliers. Yet, SSA cannot afford such 
a pause given the need for shared and sustainable growth to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). 
The good news from the EIB survey of banking groups in SSA is that a rising share of banking 
groups are planning a structural expansion of their operations in SSA and that no banking 
group is planning to consolidate operations in SSA anymore. There is growing optimism with 
respect to overall access to funding. Banks are mainly planning to raise funds in local currency, 
with emphasis on deposits and long-term funding, such as subordinated debt. Half of banking 
groups report being fully deployed in terms of general IT infrastructure. The majority of them 
are in deployment and planning deployment in terms of internet-banking technology, mobile 
banking and FinTech. The share of banking groups compliant with Basel II and Basel III 
standards has risen since the last edition of our survey, but the overhaul of risk management 
and compliance capacity is still in progress. 
The importance of sustaining efforts to strengthen the legal, regulatory and supervisory 
superstructure of SSA’s financial sector cannot be overstated. Working out NPLs and 
resolving banks that cannot return to profitability will be key to underpinning the confidence 
that is necessary for private investment in SSA. In order to attract risk-friendly capital, banking 
sectors and their players will need to demonstrate credibly that capital is put wisely to work 
and that, if investors wish to do so, they can retrieve their investment in normal conditions 
and be treated fairly in case of resolution. 
In a subtle way, fortunately, it is remarkable how financial intermediation has kept on 
improving throughout the recent economic slowdown, thanks to a rethink by banking sector 
players and their regulatory authorities. Digital financial inclusion in on the march: it has 
clearly spilled-out of Eastern Africa and is now improving access to finance in all of Africa’s 
regions. Even SME financing, while still representing an enormous gap, is beginning to 
improve. Rising competition amongst banks is prodding banking groups to move out of their 
comfort zone and to seek growth and returns by financing more SMEs and professionals. 
Accordingly, banks are investing in their IT infrastructure, digital and brick-and-mortar 
networks, and strengthening their risk management and credit origination processes. 
As SSA economies continue to recover, the opportunity to deepen the region’s financial 
sectors should not be missed even though the lowest hanging fruit have probably been 
already picked. Outside of banking sectors per se, financial markets are still shallow, with a 
few notable exceptions. Step-by-step capital market development is the necessary pre-
condition for channelling the region’s long-term domestic savings towards long-term 
investments, not just short-term commerce. IFIs and DFIs can and should provide local 
currency resources and de-risk long-term investment but ultimately, it is the region’s own 
local currency resources that need to be mobilised in order to ensure the region’s economic 
future sustainably, and not just plug gaping fiscal deficits. 
As financial inclusion advances, new challenges will emerge that will have to be addressed 
sooner than later. Consumer protection will be key to maintaining the confidence of first-time 
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depositors and financial service users and ensuring a level playing field with regulated players. 
Private sector development will require technical assistance and knowledge transfers, not just 
financing. This is a long-term investment that banking groups will ultimately find to their 
economic and financial advantage as they groom tomorrow’s larger and stronger clients but 
the work needs to begin now. 
Meanwhile, rising competition should result in improved financing conditions for SMEs, 
which will increase the share of SMEs that finance their growth through bank financing rather 
than retained income. Ultimately, SMEs are the only employers that can deliver SSA’s much-
needed demographic dividend. All stakeholders need to remain fully engaged and coordinated 
on the private sector development agenda or risk counting tomorrow the hundreds of millions 
of young Africans whose opportunity to make a contribution to their country go to waste, due 
to the shortage of decent and productive employment opportunities. Nothing less is at stake. 
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Appendix 1: The Survey Questionnaire, 2016 Extended Edition 
Q1 | What is your bank's positioning in each country14… 
    … current positioning 
… perceived 
market potential 
… strategic 
positioning 
1  Angola    
2  Benin    
 …    
49  Zimbabwe    
 
In Q1, for current positioning, the following answers are possible: a. active with subsidiary or 
branch - with significant market share (among top 3 market players); b. active with subsidiary 
or branch - with medium market share; c. active with subsidiary or branch - with niche market 
presence; d. active with representative office; e. inactive. For perceived market potential, the 
following answers are possible: a. low; b. medium; c. high. The corresponding map illustrates 
the weighted sum of the answers of African banking groups for a specific country with a weight 
of one for answer a, two for answer b, and three for answer c. For strategic positioning, the 
following answers are possible: a. increase presence with new acquisition; b. increase 
presence with new capital provided by parent company/reinvested earnings; c. increase 
presence with new funding from parent company; d. increase presence via cross-border 
lending activity; e. remain stable; f. decrease presence via reduced cross-border lending 
activities; g. decrease presence with lower funding from parent company; h. decrease 
presence by selling assets/subsidiaries.  
 
Q2 | In sub-Saharan Africa, key indicators have been/are expected to be … 
 LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
Assets   
Loan applications   
Loans market share   
Deposits market share   
Loans/deposits ratio   
Return on assets   
Cost-to-income ratio   
Net profit margin   
Non-performing loans (as % of portfolio of assets)   
Provisions (as % of portfolio of assets)   
Capital adequacy   
Raising capital on the market   
 
  
                                                          
14 The full list of countries covered by the survey is: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, eSwatini, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Q3 | In sub-Saharan Africa, group's access to funding... 
 
…How has it changed 
over the LAST twelve 
 
…How do you expect it to 
change 
    
 
Total   
Deposits   
Interbank market   
IFIs   
Wholesale debt securities   
Loans or credit lines 
    
  
Short-term funding (<=1 year)   
Long-term funding (>1 year)   
For each variable in Q2 and Q3, the following answers are possible: a. rising; b. stable; c. 
decreasing. 
 
Q4 | Longer-term strategic approach (beyond 12 months): looking at operations in sub-
Saharan Africa, your group intends to… 
Overall  
To which of the following new products/services does 
your group give the highest priority for the next 12 
months? 
 
Market segment focus  
 
For Q4, overall, the following answers are possible: a. expand operations overall; b. maintain 
the same level of operations overall; c. scale down operations overall. The corresponding 
figure illustrates the net sum of the answers of all African banking groups with a weight of +1 
for answer a, 0 for answer b, and -1 for answer c. As for new product and service focus, the 
following answers are possible: a. by rolling out mobile banking; b. by rolling out mortgage 
financing; c. by rolling out consumer credit/credit cards; d. by rolling out leasing products; e. 
by rolling out e-banking services; f. other, please specify below. The following answers are 
possible with respect to market segment focus: a. by focusing on large multinationals; b. by 
focusing on large local companies; c. by focusing on SMEs; d. by focusing on retail clients. 
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Q5 | Group total medium-term exposure to sub-Saharan Africa: concerning cross-border 
operations to SSA countries, your group has/intends to… 
 
LAST 12 
months 
NEXT 12 
months 
Total Exposure   
Exposure to subsidiaries - intra-group debt funding   
Exposure to subsidiaries - capital   
Direct cross-border lending booked in the balance sheet 
of the parent company    
Funding to banks and other financial institutions (e.g. 
MFIs) not part of the group, booked in the BS of the 
parent  
  
 
For Q5, the following answers are possible: a. expand(ed) exposure; b. maintain(ed) the same 
level of exposure; c. reduce(d) exposure.  
 
Q6 | Profitability of operations in SAA region: the contribution of activities in SSA in total 
ROA of the group has/is expected to… 
 LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q6, the following answers are possible: a. increase(d); b. be(en) stable; c. decrease(d). 
 
Q7 | Compared to the overall group and corrected for the cost of risk, profitability of 
operations in SSA region: ROA of your SSA operations has been/is expected to be … 
 LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q7, the following answers were possible: a. lower; b. equal; c. higher. 
 
Q8 | What has been/is expected to be the most relevant form of funding for your subsidiaries 
in SSA… 
 LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q8, the following answers are possible: a. deposits; b. credit from the parent bank; c. 
interbank market; d. IFIs; e. wholesale debt securities; f. loans or credit lines from the Central 
Bank; g. other short-term funding; h. other long-term funding.  
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Q9 | Funding conditions in your own subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa have been/are 
expected to be… 
 LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
Overall   
Pricing   
Maturity   
 
For Q9, overall, the following answers were possible: a. improving; b. deteriorating; c. stable. 
For Q9, pricing, the following answers were possible: a. less pricey; b. pricier; c. stable. For Q9, 
maturity, the following answers were possible: a. longer; b. shorter; c. stable. 
 
Q10 | What share of your operations in SSA lie outside your base country… 
  ...assets ...revenues 
    
 
For Q10, the following answers are possible: a. below 10%; b. 10 - 25%; c. 25 - 50%; d. 50 - 
75%; e. above 75%.  
 
Q11 | In SSA, in which currency do you... 
 … plan to raise funds … perceive demand for 
 Local currency   
USD   
EUR   
Other foreign currency 
(specify currencies below)   
Other foreign currency 
(specify currencies below)   
 
For Q11, plan to raise funds, the following answers are possible: a. certainly; b. probably; c. 
perhaps; d. probably not. For Q11, perception of loan demand, the following answers are 
possible: a. stronger than market trends; b. in line with market growth; c. below market 
trends. 
 
Q12 | With respect to the development of your SME lending business,  
   ... to be 
do you consider your portfolio guarantee needs …  
do you consider portfolio guarantee products …  
 
For Q12, portfolio guarantee needs, the following answers are possible: a. met; b. partially 
met; c. largely unmet; d. irrelevant. For Q12, portfolio guarantee products, the following 
answers are possible: a. very important; b. important; c. somewhat important; d. irrelevant. 
 
  
 44   © European Investment Bank, October 2018 
Q13 | In SSA, who was/were typically your strongest competitor(s) over the last 12 months 
for lending to… 
  ... SMEs ... mid-caps 
    
Specify other if applicable:   
 
For Q13, the following answers are possible: a. domestic state-owned bank(s; b. domestic 
private bank(s); c. foreign bank(s); d. cross-border lender(s); e. other. 
 
Q14 | Group funding strategy: has your group raised/is planning to raise…  
   ... during the next 12 months? 
Tier 1/regulatory capital?  
Subordinated debt?  
 
For Q14, about Tier 1 and regulatory capital, the following answers are possible: a. yes; b. no. 
For Q14, subordinated debt, the following answers are possible: a. certainly; b. probably; c. 
perhaps; d. probably not. 
 
Q15 | Have you/do you plan to issue(d) bonds? 
 LAST 12 
 
NEXT 12 
     
If no: why is it the case? Too expensive, no need, no capacity? 
Local capital market constraints? Lack of access to capital market?   
If yes: what is the strategy? Diversify sources of funding? 
Lengthen the maturity of funding?   
 
For Q15, the following answers are possible: a. yes; b. no.  
 
Q16 | In SSA, how are you/how do you plan to expand(ing) mainly? 
 
 LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q16, the following answers are possible: a. organically; b. acquisitions; c. greenfield / 
brownfield investment; d. no plan to expand; e. consolidating.  
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Q17 | In SSA, which sector of the economy do you most value for lending? 
 
  
 
For Q17, the following answers are possible: a. Agriculture, forestry and fishing; b. Mining and 
quarrying; c. manufacturing; d. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; e. Water 
supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; f. Construction; g. 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; h. Transportation and 
storage; i. Accommodation and food service activities; j. Information and communication; k. 
Financial and insurance activities; l. Real estate activities; m. Professional, scientific and 
technical activities; n. Administrative and support service activities; o. Public administration 
and defence; compulsory social security; p. Education; q. Human health and social work 
activities; r. Arts, entertainment and recreation; s Other service activities; t. Activities of 
households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of 
households for own use; u. Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies. 
 
Q18 | With respect to lending in SSA, what are your main medium-term technical assistance 
(TA) needs seen from HQ level? 
 
 
                      Specify other needs if applicable:  
 
For Q18, the following answers are possible: a. marketing; b. IT; c. operational risk 
management; d. credit risk management; e. lending technology; f monitoring; g. other (please 
specify). 
 
Q19 |  Where does your group stand … 
 
  … with respect to: 
a. investing in general IT infrastructure?  
b. deploying internet-banking technology?  
c. deploying mobile banking technology?  
d. deploying FinTech to streamline credit decisions?  
e. deploying gender-inclusive products and services?  
f. deploying islamic finance products and services?  
 
For Q19, the following answers are possible: a. fully deployed; b. in deployment; c. planning 
development; d. not an immediate priority. 
 
Q20 | Do you consider your banking group … 
 
  … to be: 
Basel I  
Basel II  
Basel III  
 
For Q20, the following answers are possible: a. compliant; b. working towards compliance; c. 
not an immediate priority. The corresponding figure illustrates the breakdown of the 
percentages of answers in each category. 
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Q21 | To what extent is SME lending a priority for your business in SSA? 
 
  
 
For Q21, the following answers are possible: a. high priority; b. moderate priority; c. low 
priority; d. not a priority. 
 
Q22 | Do you perceive that (lack of) demand for bank loans by bankable SMEs plays a key 
factor (to explain lending)? 
 
  
 
For Q22, the following answers are possible: a. Absolutely; b. Partially; c. Not so much; d. Not 
at all.  
 
Q23 | What do you perceive as the main obstacles to SME lending in SSA? 
 
Please choose the most important:  
Please choose the second most important:  
Please choose the third most important:  
                      Specify other obstacles if applicable: 
 
 
 
For Q23, the following answers are possible: a. lack of collateral; b. high default rate; c. lack of 
credit reference bureaus; d. lack of managerial capacity of SMEs; e. lack of branch network; f. 
costly monitoring; g. lack of information (financial or ID); h. high competition; i. 
regulatory/legal barriers; j. quality of asset portfolio; k. other. 
 
Q24 | In which area of Fintech are you currently investing the most in SSA? 
 
   
Specify other area if applicable:  
 
For Q24, the following answers are possible: a. Cybersecurity; b. Blockchain; c. Data analytics; 
d. Personal finance; e. Financial services software; f. Lending; g. Payment and settlements; h. 
Regulatory technology; i. Virtual currencies; j. Cross-border payments; k. Mobile money/e-
transfers; i. Other. 
 
Q25 | In general, what is your perception of telcos in the mobile money space (please choose 
the most important)? 
 
   
Specify other perception if applicable:  
 
For Q25, the following answers are possible: a. telcos are typically direct competitors to banks 
in the mobile money area; b. telcos can usually form effective partnerships with banks to 
provide mobile money services; c. telcos are often better positioned than banks to offer 
mobile money services; d. other.  
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2. Banking Sector Trends in West Africa 
Claudio CALI1, Emmanouil DAVRADAKIS1, Nina FENTON1,2 and Amine EL KOURCHI3 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
• West Africa is a diverse region consisting of four middle-income and twelve low-
income countries. Some are natural resource-rich: Nigeria, the region’s largest 
economy, has the eighth-largest proven oil reserve in the world and Ghana is 
one of the largest gold producers in the world. Others are major agricultural 
markets: Côte d’Ivoire, for example, is the world’s largest supplier of cocoa 
beans. 
 
• Recent economic performance has reflected the diversity in economic structures 
and particularly the differing dependence on oil. In 2017, Nigeria exited 
recession thanks mainly to rising oil prices, while Ghana registered a significant 
pickup in real GDP growth after the slowdown experienced two years before. 
Economic activity in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 
of which Côte d’Ivoire is a member, remained robust, expanding by more than 
6% for the sixth consecutive year in 2017. 
 
• Buoyant economic activity and a strong presence of pan-African and foreign 
banks are supporting a sound and growing banking sector in WAEMU. The 
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) is implementing an accommodative 
policy, while the Basel III standards introduced in January 2018 are expected to 
boost the banking system’s soundness.  
 
• Banks in Nigeria and Ghana, though, are still challenged by the consequences of 
the economic slowdowns experienced in 2014-2016 and by spillovers from 
difficult fiscal situations. A systemic crisis was successfully averted, indicating the 
significant resilience of the financial systems. However, financial soundness 
indicators related to capital adequacy and asset quality have deteriorated on 
average in both markets since 2014. In addition, the financial sectors are failing 
to effectively intermediate finance to the real economies. 
 
• Access to finance is either the biggest or the second biggest challenge to firms’ 
growth in West Africa, with smaller enterprises most likely to encounter 
insufficient external funding. 
                                                          
1 European Investment Bank. 
2 Responsible for inputs on Ghana and Nigeria. 
3 Economist, Institute of Africa - Launched in 2016, Institute of Africa was designed to meet the increased information needs 
regarding Africa and the will to better understand economic evolution and development opportunities on the continent. 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment Bank or 
Institute of Africa. All remaining errors remain the authors’. 
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2.1. Recent Macroeconomic Trends 
West Africa is a diverse region, home to around 366 million people. Average GDP per capita 
stood at USD 5,130 in 2017 (Purchasing Power Parity, PPP) and ranged from less than 
USD 1,200 in Niger to almost USD 6,000 in Nigeria. The countries of the French-speaking 
WAEMU zone (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo) have a common currency, with the exchange rate pegged to the euro, and an average 
per capita GDP of USD 2,716 (PPP). The countries outside the WAEMU zone are mainly English-
speaking. The analysis that follows treats the WAEMU zone as a sub-region and adds detailed 
discussion of Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire as the major markets in the region.  
While the region has significant economic potential, human development is still low: the 
average country ranking on the UN’s Human Development Index was 155 in 2016 out of the 
188 countries covered. This includes the wealthier countries (Nigeria ranked 152). Besides, 
several countries are well endowed with natural resources (Nigeria, Ghana, Niger, Burkina 
Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Mali) and gold (Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea). Other commodities 
produced include cocoa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana). 
The region is not wholly dependent on commodities, however. For example, Lagos, Nigeria 
is rapidly becoming an important tech hub, and “Nollywood” is recognised as the world’s 
second largest producer of films. The region also has a young and growing population, 
presenting the opportunity to benefit from a “demographic dividend”. However, sustained 
economic diversification and private sector development are challenged by numerous 
difficulties, including registering property, dealing with construction permits, getting credit 
and electricity, paying taxes, and protecting minority investors. The West African economies 
ranked 143 on average in 2017, out of 189 countries, on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business Index.  
Real GDP growth in West Africa increased to 2.6% in 2017, from 0.4% in 2016. This upturn 
was driven by the largest economy in the region, Nigeria, which slowly exited recession. Ghana 
bounced back from a slowdown in 2014-16 with growth of 8.4% in 2017, while Côte d’Ivoire 
and Senegal also grew by over 7%. Growth in the other economies was either moderate (2.5% 
in Liberia and 3.5% in Sierra Leone) or strong. The average growth rate for the WAEMU 
economies in 2017 was 6.6%: above 6% for the sixth consecutive year, despite the adverse 
terms of trade shocks in the agricultural sector and security concerns. West Africa’s economic 
growth is expected to accelerate to 3.3% in 2018 with WAEMU’s economic activity expanding 
by 6.4% and that of the other countries by 2.7% on average.  
Inflation in the WAEMU zone accelerated to 1% in 2017 from 0.1% in the previous year. 
Outside the WAEMU zone, inflation averaged 15.7% in 2017, up from 15.4% in the previous 
year mainly due to the inflation pass-through of past currency depreciation in Nigeria. The low 
and stable rate of inflation in the WAEMU zone reflects the success of the fixed exchange rate 
arrangement in safeguarding price stability. The average fiscal deficit in the West African 
economies was 5.3% of GDP in 2017, rising from 4.4% in the previous year.  
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Box 2.1. - Economic Convergence in West Africa 
Economic convergence, also known as catching up, is the phenomenon whereby 
economies with a low per capita income will tend to grow at faster rates than richer 
economies. Economic activity in emerging markets, for example, expanded by 5.3% 
annually in 2010-2017 while the GDP of advanced economies grew by 1.9% on average. 
West African economies were growing at a rate of 4.7% per year on average over the period 
2010-2017, with economies in WAEMU leading the pack with 5.5% average annual growth. 
Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), growth rates were even higher: countries were 
growing at annual rates of 6.9% on average with non-WAEMU members leading the way in 
the region.  
Figure 2.1. - Real GDP Growth Decomposition in West Africa 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Penn World Tables.  
Note: The chart does not include the 2008-2009 period of global recession in order to avoid biasing the results. 
A significant drop in the contribution of productivity explains weaker growth in West 
Africa after the GFC. Decomposing economic growth into its principal long-term inputs 
reveals that productivity contributed almost 5pp to real GDP growth pre-GFC, before 
dropping to 0.1pp during 2010-2014 (Figure 2.1.)4. Higher capital stock contribution to 
economic growth during 2010-2014 relative to the pre-crisis period was not sufficient to 
offset the drop in productivity’s contribution to economic growth. There are significant 
differences between countries, with some countries registering a negative productivity 
contribution to growth (Senegal, Mauritania and Benin) while others recorded a significant 
improvement (Togo and Côte d’Ivoire).  
The drop in productivity’s contribution to growth, however, did not prevent West African 
economies from growing faster and catching up with advanced economy peers amidst 
                                                          
4 The latest available data point in Penn World Tables is 2014. 
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declining productivity in the advanced world. US productivity growth stood at 0.9% in 
2017, up from -0.6% in 20165 as part of a long-term trend. Economist Robert Gordon6 has 
shown that US productivity growth slowed from a pace of about 3% per year over 1930-
1970 to an average of about 1% since then -  excluding a brief spurt in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  
Figure 2.2. - West Africa, Percentage Change in GDP Per Capita (Advanced 
Economies = 100) and Change in the Coefficient of Variation between 2006 and 2017 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and IMF.  
Note: Benin: BJ; Burkina Faso: BF; Cape Verde: CV; Côte d’Ivoire: CI; Gambia: GM; Ghana: GH; Guinea: GN; 
Guinea-Bissau: GW; Liberia: LR; Mali: ML; Mauritania: MR; Niger: NE; Nigeria: NG; Senegal: SN; Sierra Leone: 
SL, and Togo: TG. 
WAEMU economies converged faster to advanced economies in 2017 relative to a decade 
before and in a less volatile manner, attributed to the significant efforts the economies 
took in macroeconomic management. Growth in per capita GDP (in USD PPP) relative to 
advanced economies increased, while volatility in the growth of per capita GDP relative to 
advanced economies, proxied by the coefficient of variation7, dropped between 2006 and 
2017 (Figure 2.2.). There are differences, though, between countries with regard to the 
improvement in growth towards advanced economies and the drop in volatility. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Latest data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
6 Gordon R. (2010), “Revisiting US productivity growth over the past century with a view of the future”, NBER Working Paper 
15834, March.  
7 The coefficient of variation of a variable is the ratio of its standard deviation to its mean. 
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Econometric analysis confirms that the speed with which the West African economies 
converged to their advanced peers has accelerated significantly since 2005 and is 
currently at its highest level since 1980 (Figure 2.3.)8. The improvement in convergence 
towards advanced economies witnessed between 2005-2010 and 2010-2017 was the 
highest since 1980. 
Figure 2.3. - Speed of Convergence Relative to Advanced Economies 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and IMF. 
 
 
The increase in WAEMU’s fiscal deficit was relatively small (increase to 4.6% of GDP from 
4.5% in 2016) and was caused mainly by public investment in infrastructure under multi-
annual development programmes. The increase in the average deficit was driven by a 
continued rise in Nigeria’s deficit, while Ghana successfully consolidated. Nigeria’s public 
debt is relatively low as a percentage of GDP, but it is on an upward trajectory, rising to 23% 
in 2017. This drove an increase in the regional average for public debt, from 27% of GDP in 
2016 to 34% of GDP in 2017. West Africa’s fiscal deficit is expected to be 4.6% of GDP in 
2018 with WAEMU’s deficit at 4% of GDP and that of non-WAEMU economies averaging 
4.7% on the back of a planned fiscal consolidation. 
Higher commodity prices in 2017 boosted the current account for oil exporters, including 
Nigeria, and this brought the average current account deficit in the region to 0.5% of GDP 
in 2017, down from 1.9% in the previous year. The significant import component in 
                                                          
8 We estimate the following model ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
� =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖) is the GDP per capita in USD PPP of 
West African (advanced economies) at time t; ∆ is the first difference operator; ln is the natural logarithm; 𝛼𝛼  and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are constant 
and country fixed effects respectively, and 𝜀𝜀 is the error term. i = Benin; Burkina Faso; Cape Verde; Côte d’Ivoire; Gambia; Ghana; 
Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; Sierra Leone; and Togo. Annual data were retrieved 
from the IMF spanning 1980-2017, while a panel data estimation with country fixed effects was performed. Figure 2.3 illustrates 
the estimated coefficient −𝛾𝛾 when the panel estimation was performed in the time periods in the x-axis of the chart. 
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WAEMU’s capital expenditure contributed to an increase in the average current account 
deficit to 6.1% of GDP in 2017 from 5.7% in the previous year.  
2.1.A. SPECIAL FOCUS: CÔTE D’IVOIRE, GHANA AND NIGERIA 
Côte d’Ivoire’s real GDP growth is expected to be 7.3% in 2018, down from 7.8% in 2017 and 
8.3% in 2016 with the economy expanding faster than its regional peers (Figure 2.4.). Yet, 
the past downturn in the cocoa sector, which employs a quarter of the population, will weigh 
on the outlook. The fiscal deficit widened to 4.3% of GDP in 2017 from 3.9% in the previous 
year and is expected to drop to 3.7% in 2018 and converge to the WAEMU regional norm of 
3% of GDP by 2019. Public debt inched down to 46% of GDP in 2017 from 47% in 2016 with 
the IMF9 assessing the risk of debt distress as moderate. State-owned enterprises’ debt, 
estimated to amount to around 3-6% of GDP, is not included in the debt calculation. The low 
cost of refinancing the operations of the WAEMU zone´s central bank (Banque Centrale des 
Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest - BCEAO) and the high profitability of government bonds attracted 
WAEMU banks into the primary government bond market. Yet, BCEAO decided at the end of 
2016 to tighten monetary policy, raised its main policy rate to 4.5% and limited the refinancing 
of banks to twice their own funds. These measures reduced the attractiveness of government 
bonds for commercial banks and challenged the ability of governments to issue debt. Côte 
d’Ivoire’s current account deficit widened to 1.2% of GDP in 2017 from 1.1% in 2016 due to 
the fall in cocoa proceeds and high investment-related imports, but remains comfortably 
financed by foreign direct and portfolio investment. 
Figure 2.4. - Annual Real GDP Growth 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and IMF 
                                                          
9 The IMF approved in December 2016 two three-year arrangements totalling USD 674.4m under an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) 
and an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) that was topped up by USD 224.8m in June 2017. 
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Nigeria and Ghana experienced slowdowns or recessions between 2015 and 2016. The 
slowdowns were triggered by the international fall in commodity prices. However, they were 
exacerbated by domestic issues (including security problems and disrupted oil production in 
Nigeria and a domestic energy crisis and uncertainty related to the political cycle in Ghana), 
and by the nature of the policy response. In particular, the government of Nigeria stopped 
short of full liberalisation of the exchange rate when the naira came under increasing pressure 
in 2016, which resulted in the emergence of a multiple exchange rates regime, capital controls 
and a shortage of foreign exchange. Nigeria entered recession in 2016. Growth in Ghana 
dropped to around 4% in 2014-2016, from over 7% in 2013. 
Recoveries are underway in both countries, but at very different paces. In Nigeria, the 
availability of foreign currency has improved since early 2017, with the introduction of new 
foreign exchange measures as well as higher inflows thanks to the recovery in oil prices and 
production. However, there are still numerous distortions in the foreign exchange market, 
combined with other underlying challenges facing the private sector. Recovery has been slow, 
with growth just below 1% in 2017, and the non-oil sector has yet to register a significant 
recovery. Ghana’s recovery has been faster: GDP growth was over 8% in 2017. Growth in 
Nigeria is expected to remain relatively weak, at around 2%, in 2018-2019 while the Ghanaian 
economy is expected to expand by over 6% yearly during the same period.  
In both Ghana and Nigeria, underlying weaknesses in domestic resource mobilisation 
became obvious during the slowdowns, with fiscal deficits rising to 9.5% and 3.9% in Ghana 
and Nigeria respectively. Although Nigeria’s public gross debt is relatively low, at 23% of GDP 
in 2017, it is on an upward trajectory. Interest payments on federal government debt already 
account for around 72% of revenues and the IMF warns that they will rise to unsustainable 
levels on the current path. Ghana is already assessed as being at high risk of debt distress, 
with gross government debt of around 72% of GDP, although on a downward trajectory. In 
both countries, the fiscal situation has major spillover effects for the financial sector and the 
real economy, including the crowding out of the private sector via high yields on government 
paper. Ghana achieved significant fiscal consolidation in 2017, and the deficit is expected to 
shrink to 3.6% by the end of 2019. In Nigeria, by contrast, the deficit has continued to rise 
(5.8% of GDP in 2017) and prospects for consolidation are unclear, with elections scheduled 
for early 2019: the IMF expects the deficit to fall only slightly in 2018-2019. 
2.2. Access to Finance and Financial Inclusion 
Companies in the region face a number of obstacles to their growth, including access to 
financial resources. According to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (various editions), the 
majority of surveyed companies in West Africa ranked financing as their biggest or second 
biggest obstacle, out of a list of fifteen challenges ranging from transport to taxes. Ghanaian 
companies were the most likely to perceive finance as their biggest constraint (Figure 2.5.) 
(49.5% of companies surveyed) but rates were high in all countries. Typically, smaller 
enterprises are more likely to report a lack of external funding (Figure 2.6.): for example, in 
Côte d’Ivoire almost 30% of small companies with 5-19 employees identified access to finance 
as a severe or major bottleneck, compared to 20% of medium-sized companies and 9% of 
companies with more than 100 employees. 
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Most banks recognise the importance of SMEs in West African economies and understand 
that extending loans to SMEs can help the banks diversify the risk of their portfolios. An 
increasing number are putting SMEs at the heart of their strategies. However, inefficiencies in 
both demand and supply of credit make it difficult in practice for banks to increase credit to 
SMEs. On the supply side, smaller firms tend to be perceived, often wrongly, as riskier. This 
perception is heightened and exacerbated by, for example, high levels of informality, lack of 
collateral and the low ability to bring forward bankable projects. This means that many banks 
end up lending either to a few high-quality corporates or to the government via Treasury bills 
and bonds (which are usually issued at attractive rates). In addition, as described in Chapter 7, 
overexposure to sovereign debt can further hamper lending to the private sector. When banks 
do provide loan products to SMEs, the value of collateral is usually twice the amount of the 
requested loan, reaching almost three times in countries such as Senegal. This makes loans 
inaccessible for many companies. 
As a result, only 22% of enterprises in Western Africa have an outstanding bank loan and/or 
line of credit. Many companies, including larger firms that manage to access financial markets, 
are unable to cover all their needs. Generally, banks in West Africa provide lending primarily 
to cover shorter-term working capital expenditures rather than investments in fixed assets 
(25% vs 10%), with 75% of companies declaring they have to use internal resources to cover 
costs associated with the latter (Table 2.1.). 
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Figure 2.5. - Firms that Consider Access to Finance to be the Biggest Obstacle 
(% of total surveyed companies) 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys, various editions 
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Figure 2.6. - Percentage of Firms Identifying Access to Finance as a Major Constraint 
(by company size) 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys, various years 
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Table 2.1. - Main Indicators of Financial Access for Enterprises 
 
Firms with 
a bank 
loan/credit 
line (%) 
Loans 
requiring 
collateral 
(%) 
Value of 
collateral 
needed 
(% of loan 
amount) 
Firms using 
banks to 
finance 
investments 
(%) 
Investments 
financed 
internally 
(%) 
Investments 
financed by 
banks (%) 
Firms using 
banks to 
finance 
working 
capital (%) 
Firms 
identifying 
access to 
finance as 
a major 
constraint 
(%) 
Benin 24 79 231 12 91 4 26 43 
Cape Verde 42 90 176 35 57 24 50 37 
Côte d’Ivoire  21 86 157 24 72 15 15 69 
Gambia, The 17 86 193 8 79 10 14 40 
Ghana 23 80 240 21 76 13 25 62 
Guinea 4 100 n/a 9 92 3 11 30 
Guinea-Bissau 3 n/a n/a 1 85 1 1 72 
Liberia 19 83 172 19 72 11 20 39 
Mali 26 86 233 55 75 19 52 64 
Mauritania 33 76 111 13 77 9 29 52 
Niger 28 88 160 22 73 14 29 27 
Nigeria 11 89 228 7 53 3 17 33 
Senegal 23 79 272 19 72 7 20 52 
Sierra Leone 9 87 356 7 91 1 9 65 
Togo 42 91 226 26 65 18 40 51 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa (average) 
22 85 215 21 74 10 23 38 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
 
Financial inclusion of individuals remains a challenge, despite improvement over recent 
years. Approximately 75% of individuals remain financially excluded, although the population 
covered by formal financial institutions in the region increased by almost 10% between 2011 
and 2017. All countries in West Africa face major challenges in extending financial services to 
the bulk of the population. However, the situation varies by country. In Nigeria almost half of 
the adult population has an account at a bank or other institution, but in countries such as 
Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Senegal levels of financial inclusion are below 20%. Financial exclusion 
affects women and the poor in particular: average inclusion rates among these groups are 
13% and 9% respectively in the region10. As a result of lack of access to formal institutions, 
                                                          
10 Data source: World Bank Financial Inclusion Database. 
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credit behaviours in the region are in line with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of 
individuals borrow money from family and friends (35%) and only 4% borrow via a financial 
institution. 
 
Box 2.2. - E-Money: a Promising Future in WAEMU 
E-money related activities – provision of mobile payment services – are booming in 
WAEMU. At end-2016, there were seven e-money institutions (EMIs) active in four countries: 
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal.  
EMIs have only recently been approved in the region and preliminary data show that there 
were over 36.5 million subscribers in the Union in 2016 compared to 25.6 million in 2015. 
Nevertheless, the provision of mobile phone-based financial services also serves to 
substantially increase the overall rate of use of financial services. According to available data, 
this rate was 50.2% in 2015 and the rate of bank account penetration was 16.1%. Furthermore, 
e-money helped to increase the rate of financial inclusion to 65% compared to 60.4% one year 
before. 
Developed as part of a participatory approach in accordance with BCEAO (Central Bank of 
West African States) Instructions, e-money activities continue to be regulated and subject 
to various conditions. Accordingly, in March 2017 the Central Bank prohibited Orange 
Telecom from transferring money between WAEMU and France: unless it is in a partnership 
with an approved credit institution a telecommunications company is not allowed to issue e-
money without first requesting permission to do so. This activity is reserved for banks, 
decentralised financial systems and EMIs with a minimum share capital of FCFA 300m.  
 
2.3. THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN WAEMU 
2.3.A. A CONSTANTLY EVOLVING BANKING ENVIRONMENT, DRIVEN BY INCREASED INTEREST 
FROM INTERNATIONAL AND PAN-AFRICAN PLAYERS 
At end-2016, the number of credit institutions in WAEMU was 138 compared to 132 in 2014, 
broken down into 123 banks and 15 financial institutions specialising in banking. Thanks to the 
economic environment, which is conducive to the expansion of the internal banking network, 
there are also 2,542 branches, offices and retail outlets and 3,010 ATMs in the eight member 
countries. Total assets in the sector amount to EUR 49.8bn, i.e. 56% of GDP (compared to an 
average of 58% in sub-Saharan Africa and a median of 44%).  
In business terms, 27 banking groups are active in WAEMU. Among the key players, the 
Ecobank (14.9% of total assets) and BMCE Bank of Africa groups (11.4%) play leading roles 
(Table 2.2.). The microfinance sector, whose total assets are valued at EUR 1.9bn, numbers 
130 institutions operating principally in Senegal (41 institutions) and Burkina Faso (25). 
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Table 2.2. - Leading Banking Groups in WAEMU at End-2016 
 
Number of banks 
 
Market share Counters 
ATMs/cash 
dispensers* 
Ecobank 8 14.9% 252 626 
BMCE Bank of Africa 8 11.4% 269 304 
Atlantic Business 
International (ABI) 
8 9.4% 216 217 
Société Générale 5 9.2% 150 259 
Attijariwafa Bank 9 8% 254 259 
BNP Paribas 4 4.4% 99 166 
Coris Bank 
International 
4 4.1% 66 45 
Oragroup 8 3.9% 99 90 
Diamond Bank 4 3.8% 46 51 
United Bank for 
Africa (UBA) 
4 2.7% 64 81 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission  
* Automated teller machines (ATMs) and cash dispensers 
Analysis of the geographical origin of active banking operators illustrates the interest shown 
by Maghreb banking groups (Figure 2.7.) - more specifically Moroccan groups - towards the 
region. These groups have the largest market share (29%) and hold 28% of customer deposits 
and 29.3% of loans granted. Local banking groups account for 27% of market share and 25.6% 
of both customer deposits and loans granted. 
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Figure 2.7. - WAEMU: Breakdown of Banking Operators by Geographical Origin 
 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
2.3.B. BALANCE SHEET ANALYSIS: CREDIT INSTITUTIONS INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN 
FINANCING THE ECONOMY  
2.3.B.1. A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN BANKS’ SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS 
The banking sector in WAEMU is developing at a faster pace. Data from the last five years 
shows that the aggregate balance sheet total more than doubled (Figure 2.8.) from EUR 23bn 
in 2012 (41% of GDP) to EUR 49.8bn in 2016 (56% of GDP).  
More recently, in 2016 the sector continued its upward trend with the balance sheet total 
increasing by 16% compared to the previous year. Côte d’Ivoire accounts for 30% of the 
balance sheet total with 24 banking institutions, followed by Senegal (19.4% with 
23 institutions), Burkina Faso (13.7% with 13 institutions) and Mali (13.3% with 
13 institutions). Guinea-Bissau has the least developed banking sector with just four banks. 
Hence, bank resources rose by 9.6% in 2016 to FCFA 24,500bn (EUR 37bn). This uptick is 
chiefly attributable to a 9.5% rise in customer deposits to FCFA 20,688bn (EUR 31.5bn), which 
accounted for 36% of GDP in 2016. 
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Figure 2.8. - WAEMU: Banking Penetration Trend 
 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
Uses of funds increased by 16.8% in 2016 to FCFA 27,603bn (EUR 42bn) due to 12.6% growth 
in bank loans to FCFA 16,847bn (EUR 25.7bn).  
The share of bank loans in financing the economy has increased steadily – they accounted 
for nearly 29% of GDP in 2016 compared to 22% five years earlier. The rise in lending has been 
beneficial for all business sectors, specifically the “trade, restaurants and hotels” sector (33% 
of commitments reported to the Central Credit Risk Register in 2016), manufacturing 
industries (17%) and local authority services (16%). 
2.3.B.2. EASING OF MONETARY CONDITIONS FACILITATED BY THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
CLIMATE 
BCEAO is pursuing an accommodating policy in the WAEMU zone, going hand in hand with 
the overall improvement in macroeconomic conditions. The economic climate and the easing 
of monetary conditions by BCEAO have helped bring down the average lending rate.  
As a reminder, the lending rate established by BCEAO is broken down as follows:  
- Minimum bid rate: 2.5% compared to 4.25% before 16 September 2013 
- Marginal over-the-counter lending rate11: 4.5% compared to 3.5% before 
16 December 2016. 
                                                          
11 Highest interest rate at which banks will always obtain the liquidity they need. 
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Figure 2.9. - WAEMU: Average Lending Rate Trend 
 
 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
The average lending rate (Figure 2.9.) charged by the banks to their customers was therefore 
6.9% in 2016 compared to 7% in 2015 and 7.3% in 2014. Although this drop in lending rates 
was greater in Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau and Mali, it remained constant across the sub-
region, so reducing the variability between the eight member countries. Even though all 
customers have benefited from the lower rates applied by credit institutions, export credits (-
1.96 percentage points) and housing loans (-0.50 of a percentage point) remain the products 
most impacted. 
2.3.B.3. IMPROVED BANK FINANCING IN THE LONG TERM 
Outstanding loans in WAEMU are increasing at a sustained pace, although they are still 
mostly short-term loans geared to large corporates; and for good reason – the breakdown 
of deposits is similar: in 2016, for example, 82% of total deposits (EUR 31.5bn) received by 
commercial banks had maturities equal to or less than 2 years (Figure 2.10.). This sizeable 
share, which limits banks’ ability to create long-term assets and build up savings adapted to 
their needs, is more than 4 percentage points higher than in 2012. This trend demonstrates 
the growing desire of commercial banks to participate in the financing of corporate and 
household investment and infrastructure projects in the region. 
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Figure 2.10. - WAEMU: Change in Structure of Deposits by Maturity 
(% of total) 
    
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
Consequently, short-term loans, which accounted for 48% (Figure 2.11.) of the total amount 
in 2016 compared to 52% in 2012, still make up the lion's share of outstanding bank loans. 
This proportion is falling as the policy of monetary easing decided by BCEAO has reduced the 
rate of coverage of medium and long-term uses of funds by long-term resources to 50% 
(compared to 75% previously). Furthermore, the increase in the marginal lending rate (from 
3.5% to 4.5% at end-2016) will curb commercial banks’ investments in government securities, 
which accounted for 25% of the market’s aggregate use of funds in 2016. 
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Figure 2.11. - WAEMU: Change in Structure of Loans Granted by Banks 
 
 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
2.3.B.4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: THE SECTOR HAS BECOME MORE PROFITABLE 
WAEMU's banking sector generated a substantial return on equity (ROE) after tax of 16.1% 
in 2016 compared to 9.9% in 2015 (Table 2.3.). This performance is essentially attributed to 
the strength of economic growth in the region, combined with an increase in customer loans 
and the rationalisation of operating expenditure in the sector. In 2016, NBI (net banking 
income) totalled FCFA 1,643bn (EUR 2.5bn) compared to FCFA 1,520bn (USD 2.3bn) in 2015, 
i.e. twice the amount generated by banks in Central Africa. This positive trend was principally 
driven by the increase in customer loans. 
The operating result was thus 12.8% higher, partly thanks to better management of general 
expenses. The net operating ratio, which measures the level of coverage of NBI by general 
expenses, improved by 0.6 percentage points year-on-year to 66.3% in 2016.  
WAEMU’s banking sector produced a net result of EUR 646m (25% of NBI) in 2016, up 93% 
on the previous year. The banking sector’s overall margin follows the general trend, with a 
ratio of 6.8% in 2016 versus 6.5% in 2015. 
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Table 2.3. - WAEMU: Key Profitability Ratios 
(%) 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
 
2.3.C. REGULATORY REFORMS AND OTHER POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
ln prudential terms, and on the basis of available data, the average solvency ratio was 12.4% 
in 2016, i.e. higher than the standard of 8%. All WAEMU countries meet regulatory 
requirements, ranging between 8.4% in Togo and 30% in Guinea-Bissau.  
The WAEMU Banking Commission first decided to increase minimum capital requirements 
from FCFA 5bn (EUR 7.6m) to FCFA 10bn (EUR 15.3m) - with a maturity date of 1 July 2017 - 
to strengthen the banking sector and contend with the concentration of risk and rise in non-
performing loans. 
The actions undertaken by the WAEMU Banking Commission form part of the reforms 
initiated by BCEAO which, accordingly, has transposed the Basel II and III standards into law. 
Migration will take effect as of 1 January 2018, which will enable the tools and the prudential 
approach to be revised. The minimum solvency ratio will be set at 10.5%. 
This should enable BCEAO to: 
- better coordinate and closely monitor the banks responsible for regulation and 
prudential matters;  
- assist, within the established deadlines, credit institutions in difficulty;  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gross margin  
(Return on loans - cost of capital) 
7.3 7.9 6.7 6.5 6.8 
Net operating ratio  
(general expenses + depreciation)/NBI 
69.6 68.8 66.4 66.9 66.3 
Net margin ratio  
(Net result/net banking income) 
13.6 15.6 12.8 14.4 25.8 
Return on equity (ROE)  
(Net result/own funds) 
9.1 10.1 8.6 9.9 16.1 
Net non-performing loans ratio  
(Net bad debts/total net loans) 
6.7 6.7 6.5 6 5.2 
Non-performing loans provision ratio 
(Provisions/gross bad debts) 
64.1 60.9 61 60.1 64.9 
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- anticipate and address potential failures. 
Apart from the technical aspects mentioned, the new regulation will require banks to report 
their financial situation each quarter by submitting prudential statements to BCEAO in 
accordance with a new accounting plan. BCEAO has recast its accounting plan, incorporating 
new securities registration and recognition elements as well as modernising the electronic 
reporting tool. 
2.4. Comments on Selected Markets 
2.4.A. SPECIAL COUNTRY FOCUS: CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
Côte d’Ivoire’s banking sector comprises 29 banks holding 45% of GDP in assets, with 
27 branches per million inhabitants. Côte d’Ivoire has the largest number of banks in the 
WAEMU region and is among the countries with the largest population coverage by banks, as 
proxied by the number of branches per million inhabitants. Credit penetration in Côte d’Ivoire, 
at 25% of GDP in 2017, is well below that in Togo, Senegal and Burkina Faso. Annual credit 
growth declined to 12.5% in 2016 and 20% in 2017 from 34.3% in 2015, a trend observed in 
most WAEMU economies. Credit is mostly concentrated in the retail, transportation and other 
services sector where Ivorian banks combined record almost 57% of their loans. Banks fund 
their credit expansion by their domestic deposit base, which consists mostly of sight deposits 
that are insufficient to fund loans at maturities exceeding 3-5 years. Five-year maturity is the 
term most preferred by clients looking to finance a capex investment.  
Credit hovers at 82% of deposits, almost at par with most WAEMU peers (excluding Niger). 
Profitability of banks in Côte d’Ivoire is elevated and improving with a return on equity of 22% 
in 2016, up from 20% in the previous year, supported by an interest rate margin of 7% at par 
with its WAEMU peers. Foreign exchange risk is inexistent, as bank regulations do not allow 
banks to grant a loan in foreign currency12. Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) stood at 11% of total 
loans at end-2017, versus 9.3% of total loans in June 2017 and 10.3% in March 2017. The 
capital adequacy ratio improved to nearly 10% at mid-2017 from the regulatory minimum of 
8% at end-2016. Côte d’Ivoire is witnessing the phased introduction across the region of an 
ambitious reform package in preparation for the implementation of Basel III. The latter was 
introduced in January 2018 with full compliance expected within five years. 
Côte d’Ivoire’s access to finance is lower than for sub-Saharan African frontier market 
economies with considerable gender and rural/urban disparities. According to the World 
Bank’s data on Global Financial Inclusion, 18% of men have access to an account at a financial 
institution compared to 12% for women, revealing a gap of 6 percentage points in financial 
inclusion compared to an average gap of 8 percentage points in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 2.12.). Poorer and less educated individuals are less likely to have a bank account than 
wealthier and more educated individuals. The financial inclusion gap between rural and urban 
                                                          
12 80% of the foreign exchange proceeds of exporters has to be maintained at the central bank, opening of deposit accounts in 
foreign exchange is prohibited and importers are allowed to pay their suppliers only via the central bank. 
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areas is even higher at 10 percentage points, as access to financial services in rural areas is 
very limited and most banks and microfinance institutions are located in urban areas. 
Figure 2.12. - Financial Inclusion, 2014 
 
Source: World Bank 
Côte d’Ivoire has more scope for improvement in extending financing to SMEs than its 
neighbours. Difficulties in obtaining financing are the most frequently mentioned obstacles to 
doing business (Figure 2.13.). Specifically, fewer SMEs in Côte d’Ivoire are using banks to 
finance their working capital than in other sub-Saharan African economies, while the 
proportion of working capital financed by banks is lower than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The proportion of SMEs financing investments internally is equivalent to that in other sub-
Saharan African economies, while the proportion of investment financed by banks is higher. 
Hence, SMEs’ access to finance relates mostly to financing working capital rather than 
investment. 
There are almost 700 microfinance institutions in the WAEMU zone countries. Côte d’Ivoire 
is the second largest market for microfinance behind Senegal. Deposits with microfinance 
institutions stand at 6.9% of total deposits with credit institutions (including banks and 
microfinance institutions), while outstanding loans amount to 7% of credit from all credit 
institutions in the WAEMU region.  
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Figure 2.13. - Indicators of Access to Finance, 2016 
 
Source: World Bank 
The ratio of equity to assets for microfinance institutions is 4.5% in Côte d’Ivoire, below the 
minimum requirement of 15% and the regional WAEMU average of 19.5%. Outstanding 
credit by microfinance institutions remains below deposits in Côte d’Ivoire. Microfinance 
institutions provide mostly cash advances and working capital, with the former accounting for 
more than half of the total lending issued. According to the latest report published by the 
Microfinance Association of Côte d’Ivoire, more than 90% of the client base (40% of whom are 
women) consists of individuals and informal micro-entrepreneurs, the rest being smaller 
enterprises and groups. Applied interest rates are in the range of 11-24%, below the sub-
Saharan Africa average. Loans from microfinance institutions predominantly fund trade, light 
manufacturing and services, with the agricultural sector receiving only about 5% of credit 
despite the fact that it contributes a quarter of the country’s GDP. 
2.4.B. SPECIAL COUNTRY FOCUS: NIGERIA AND GHANA 
Both Nigeria and Ghana have relatively large and sophisticated financial sectors, and 
systemic crises have been avoided in recent years, demonstrating significant resilience of 
the banking sectors along with proactive actions from their central banks. However, 
economic events in 2014-2016 have left the financial sectors facing a variety of challenges. 
Financial soundness indicators related to capital adequacy and asset quality have deteriorated 
on average in both countries since 2014, and several banks are under enhanced supervision 
or have been placed in administration. In addition, the financial sectors are failing to 
effectively intermediate finance to the real economies. 
Nigeria’s commercial banking sector consists of 25 deposit-taking banks and one non-
interest bank. Of the deposit-taking banks, four are foreign-owned, accounting for roughly 
13% of total banking sector assets. The Ghanaian banking sector is more fragmented, 
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consisting of 34 banks. The top three banks account for around 41% of total operating assets 
and 42% of deposits, but even the largest banks are small by international standards.  
In both countries, deposits are the main source of funding, accounting for around 60% of 
sector liabilities. There are large gaps between deposit and lending rates, which makes 
deposits a highly attractive source for banks, and competition to attract deposits is fierce. The 
smaller banks are less able to attract deposits and end up relying more on more expensive 
interbank funding. Large international banks can access intergroup funding, and the largest 
banks can access market finance. Several of the larger Nigerian banks have successfully issued 
bonds in the last few years. The differences in financing structures lead to differences in cost 
of funds between small and large banks. Both countries display a large mismatch between 
funding and lending tenors, with a lack of longer-term finance even in Nigeria. 
Nigerian banks were affected by the economic crisis directly through their exposure to the 
oil and gas sector and to enterprises impacted by the recession and slow recovery. They 
have also been impacted indirectly, via spillovers from the fiscal situation, limited foreign 
currency liquidity, and exchange rate distortions. Capital adequacy stood at over 17% of risk-
weighted assets in 2013, but rapidly eroded to 10.6% in Q3 2017. Four banks are widely 
reported to be undercapitalised, of which one is insolvent. Asset quality deteriorated, in 
particular among the banks that were highly exposed to the oil sector. NPLs rose from 5% of 
total loans in Q4 2015 to 15% in October 2017, without an increase in provisioning13. In Ghana, 
the impacts of the challenging economic climate were exacerbated by the gradual realisation 
that much of the debt owed to the financial sector by energy sector State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) would be difficult to sustain. Capital adequacy declined from 18.5% in 2013 to 15.0% 
in late 2017. In the asset quality review exercise undertaken in 2016, nine banks were found 
to be significantly undercapitalised. While some have been put back onto a stable footing, and 
much of the SOE debt has been restructured, the Bank of Ghana intervened in relation to two 
banks in 2017 and one in early 201814. One of these was among the largest banks in the 
country (in terms of assets). The decline in asset quality has been steep, and driven only partly 
by SOE debt. By late 2017, following a second asset quality review, NPLs accounted for 22.7% 
of gross loans versus 12% in 2013 (Table 2.4.)15. Profits remain healthy in both countries, partly 
because of high returns on government securities, and liquidity is adequate on average16.  
The smaller Nigerian banks in particular are exposed to the oil and gas sector and thus to 
commodity price shocks. Many banks are exposed to the largest corporates, representing a 
concentration risk. NPLs can be expected to rise further, although outside commentators find 
it unlikely that they will reach the levels that followed the 2008-09 crisis. In Ghana, NPLs are 
                                                          
13 It should be noted that pre-emptive loan restructuring carried out by banks may be masking a larger underlying deterioration 
than is reflected in these official figures. 
14 The two banks whose licenses were revoked in 2017 were both taken over by Ghana Commercial Bank, which is majority-
owned by the State Social Insurance Fund, in addition to around 20% direct government ownership. The Bank of Ghana 
announced that the bank put into administration in early 2018 will be handed back to private owners once it is restored to 
financial health. 
15 While a large portion of energy sector SOE debt was restructured in 2016-2017, some banks still have significant NPLs from this 
sector, and from other SOEs, on their books. 
16  Nigerian banks experienced liquidity problems in hard currency during 2016-17, with some struggling or failing to honour letters 
of credit, but the situation has now improved. 
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on a downward trajectory. However, future consolidation of the Ghanaian banking sector can 
be expected, particularly as the banks will need to meet an increased minimum capital 
requirement by December 2018. The sector is also exposed to further problems with SOE 
debt, to problems in dominant sectors or the largest companies, and to foreign exchange risk 
(in September 2017, the IMF reported the overall net open position as 3% of capital). 
Nigerian and Ghanaian banks aspire to improve their involvement in financing the real 
economy. Domestic credit to the private sector stood at 16% of GDP in Nigeria and 20% in 
Ghana in 2016 (World Bank Development Indicators). This is well below the average for sub-
Saharan Africa (46%) even though the two economies are among the more developed in the 
region. There are a number of factors behind this, including the poor business climate and 
infrastructure deficiencies, which raise the risks and challenges of lending to the private 
sector. Strong crowding out of the private sector is another major challenge in both 
economies, reflecting the fiscal challenges discussed above. This is explored in Chapter 7 of 
this volume. 
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Table 2.4. - Financial Soundness Indicators, Nigeria and Ghana 
 
Q4 2013 Q4 2014 Q4 2015 Q4 2016 Q3 2017  
Nigeria      
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 17.1 18.6 17.7 14.8 10.6 
Tier 1 17.1 15.5 18.1 16.3 10.8 
NPLs net of provisions to capital 5.9 3.8 5.5 36.2 43.0 
NPLs to total gross loans 3.4 3 4.9 12.8 15.1 
Return on assets 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.3 2.4 
Return on equity 18.9 21.2 19.7 10 20.5 
Liquid assets to total assets 16.8 11.4 18.5 16.2 17 
Ghana     Q4 2017 
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 18.5 17.9 17.7 17.8 15.0 
Tier 1 14.7 15.3 14.5 14.4 12.8 
NPLs net of provisions to capital 8.3 11.2 14.9 15.8 16.1 
NPLs to total gross loans 12 11.3 14.9 17.3 22.7 
Return on assets 4.5 4.7 3.1 2.5 2.2 
Return on equity 31.1 32.3 21.4 18 16.7 
Liquid assets to total assets 21.7 26.8 34.3 35.1 41.5 
Source: IMF Country Reports, 2018 for Ghana and Nigeria, drawing on Central Bank data. 
Diversification of lending away from the largest corporates and oil and other commodities 
would be in the interest of banks, as it would reduce concentration risks and increase 
resilience to economic fluctuations. The governments and Central Banks are also keen to 
encourage the banks to lend to smaller enterprises and the non-oil economy (including larger 
firms), and have been promoting lending to agriculture and agri-business in particular. 
However, the challenges banks face in diversifying their portfolios should not be 
underestimated. For example, most of the smaller enterprises in the two countries lack 
collateral and experience in drawing up business plans, and many are fully or partly informal.  
Both countries have active microfinance sectors: almost 1,000 microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) are registered in Nigeria and over 300 in Ghana. However, the MFIs are vulnerable to 
instability and, like the banks, have been challenged by the economic climate. Oversight is 
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much weaker than for the deposit banks, particularly given the large number of institutions 
and the limited staff capacity of the regulators. Most Nigerian MFIs have high or even excess 
liquidity, but many have high and rising portfolio at risk ratios, and some have fallen below 
the minimum capital adequacy ratio. The IMF reported in September 2017 that many 
Ghanaian MFIs fall below minimum regulatory paid-up capital levels. In early 2018, customers 
of four institutions were reportedly unable to access their funds. In both countries, stronger 
oversight of the microfinance sector is urgently needed to increase efficiency and provide 
better protection for clients.  
Even leaving aside the risk considerations, it is clear that MFIs alone are unable to reach all 
areas and sectors of the economy. The outreach of MFIs in Nigeria (2.3 branches per 100,000 
adults) actually lags behind that of traditional banks (5.6 branches per 100,000) and is far 
behind the government’s financial inclusion aims. Further, MFI services are concentrated in 
wealthier, more secure and more densely populated areas. In Ghana, much of the 
improvement in access to finance and financial inclusion since 2010 has been driven by the 
expansion of microfinance. Nonetheless, only 41% of adults had a formal account in 2014. 
Developments such as the recent introduction of a collateral registry in Ghana, the 
increasing use of mobile technologies by both banks and microfinance institutions and the 
issuance of individual banking IDs in Nigeria should help to improve the situation. In Ghana 
the proportion of adults with a mobile account (13%, 2014) exceeds the average for sub-
Saharan Africa (12%) and for lower middle-income countries (2.5%). In Nigeria, by contrast, 
only 2.3% of adults had a mobile account in 2014, indicating clear scope for expansion. 
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3. The Banking Sector in the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CEMAC): Great Potential in the 
Face of Enormous Challenges 
JAD BENHAMDANE1, SAID HIDANE1, JEAN-PHILIPPE STIJNS2,3 
 
 Executive Summary  
 
• The macroeconomic situation in the countries of the Central African Economic 
and Monetary Community (CEMAC) is picking up following a sharp downturn in 
their economic momentum, under the combined effect of falling raw material 
prices and heightened security threats in several countries in the sub-region. The 
macroeconomic anchorage of the region's countries is also recovering, in terms 
of both inflation and fiscal position. Economic growth is expected to improve 
quite significantly from 2018 onwards. On the other hand, the situation with 
regard to public debt and foreign exchange reserves is more worrying and the 
expected upturn is not guaranteed. Indeed, diversification measures are 
essential to reduce the countries' vulnerability to oil price shocks.  
 
• As regards the banking sector, the progress made by the Central African Banking 
Commission (COBAC) has raised hopes of increased resilience and potential 
despite a difficult economic climate. COBAC is currently implementing a more 
risk-based surveillance system, while capital requirements will gradually be 
increased. The activity of financial institutions has grown slightly, albeit 
fluctuating considerably from one market to another. In contrast, banking 
activity in CEMAC in 2017 resulted in a decline in balance sheet totals, customer 
loans and customer deposits. Non-performing loans (NPLs), which are already 
very high, are on the rise and the fall in deposits is putting pressure on bank 
liquidity. As regards concentration risk, one third of solvent banks are failing to 
comply with the CEMAC regulation.  
 
• Financial inclusion in the sub-region has improved significantly since 2011, 
although there is still scope for developing financial inclusion further in Central 
Africa when benchmarking on developing countries. Mobile banking services are 
making a significant contribution to increasing the use of bank services in Central 
Africa and the recent acceleration in the growth of active accounts and operators 
suggests that a catching-up or convergence phenomenon is taking place 
between the region and sub-Saharan Africa. The needs of micro-enterprises and 
                                                          
1 Economists, Institute of Africa -. Launched in 2016, Institute of Africa was designed to meet the increased information needs 
regarding Africa and the will to better understand economic evolution and development opportunities on the continent. 
2 Senior Economist, European Investment Bank. 
3 The authors wish to thank Emmanouil Davradakis and Barbara Marchitto of the EIB’s Economics Department, Samia Azzabi and 
Amine El Kourchi of Institute of Africa, for their valuable comments which have been taken into account in this chapter. However, 
the views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment Bank or 
Institute of Africa. Any residual errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
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SMEs in terms of access to bank financing are such that the region still has a great 
deal of potential to be tapped over the next few years, particularly in Cameroon. 
3.1. Introduction 
CEMAC has several assets that distinguish it from the continent's other regions. It enjoys a 
strategic position enabling it to establish itself as a privileged transit area. It also possesses 
important high-value oil and mining resources, and considerable agricultural, forestry and 
hydraulic potential4. Moreover, the region’s population has expanded significantly in recent 
decades, doubling to more than 48 million between 1990 and 2017 (Table 3.1. below). More 
than 40% of this population is concentrated in Cameroon, which has over 24 million 
inhabitants. 
Table 3.1. - CEMAC: General Characteristics of Member Countries in 2017 
 Area (in km2) 
Population 
(in millions of 
inhabitants) 
GDP at 
constant 
prices (in 
USD bn) 
As % of 
CEMAC 
total 
GDP per 
capita 
(in USD1) 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP2) 
HDI3  
(of 188 
countries) 
Cameroon 475 442 24.3 34 42% 1 400.7 3 334.0 153th 
Central African 
Republic 622 984 5.0 1.9 2.7% 386.8 616.6 188
th 
Republic of the 
Congo 342 4.3 8.5 11% 1 958.2 6 049.8 
135th 
Gabon 267 667 1.9 15.2 19% 7 971.6  17 537.9 109th 
Equatorial 
Guinea 28 051 0.8 10.7 13% 12 727.0 32 807.0 135
th 
Chad 1 284 000 12.2 9.9 12% 810.2 2 134.7 186th 
CEMAC - 6 
countries 3 020 144 48.5 80.3 100% 4 209.1* 
 
- 
WAEMU - 8 
countries 3 508 048 118.4 108.3 - 850.6* 
 
- 
 
Sources: IMF, UNDP. 
Note: *On average; 1 Current USD; 2 Constant 2011 USD in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP); 3 UNDP Human 
Development Index in 2016. 
Against a backdrop of high population growth, governments in the region are now facing 
major challenges with regard to access to basic social services, rapid urbanisation and 
pressure on natural resources. In addition, they must meet the growing demand for jobs from 
new entrants to the labour market. With 45% of its inhabitants under 15 years of age 
(compared to 40% for the whole continent and 44% for West Africa), the region as a whole 
also has the youngest population in Africa, and it has the highest fertility rate (average number 
of children per woman of childbearing age) on the continent (about 6.0 compared to 5.4 for 
West Africa)5. By 2050, the population of CEMAC is expected to reach about 110 million6. 
                                                          
4 The Congo Basin is the second largest river basin in the world, after the Amazon. 
5 State of Africa’s Population 2017, African Union, March 2017. 
6 World Population Prospects, 2017 Revision, United Nations. 
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The Community authorities must also address other issues related, in particular, to the 
stabilisation and inclusiveness of volatile economic growth in a climate of fluctuating 
commodity prices. The fall in oil prices, for instance, resulted in a drop in average per capita 
income to USD 4 209.1 in 2017, compared to USD 7 364.5 three years earlier. Despite this 
decline, some countries in the region, such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, still have per 
capita income levels that are significantly higher than the CEMAC average, thanks to income 
from the oil sector. 
Figure 3.1. - Share of Oil in CEMAC Economies 
(as % - 2016) 
 
Sources: Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (Bank of Central African States – BEAC), BP, Bank of France. 
Since oil is a main driver of the sub-regional economy, the countries of the sub-region have 
been compelled to adopt austerity measures and to enter into bilateral negotiations with 
the IMF in order to agree on adjustment programmes7 for restoring macroeconomic 
balances. Indeed, oil revenue, which represented 60.5% of total revenue in 2013, accounted 
for only 30% in 2016, plunging the sub-region into a cash flow quagmire and thus resulting in 
a decline in foreign exchange reserves. Excluding the Central African Republic, the other five 
CEMAC States are all oil-producing countries. However, the contribution of oil to economic 
growth varies from one country to another depending on the level of economic diversification 
(Figure 3.1.). While crude oil accounted for almost 4% of Cameroon's GDP in 2016, it 
contributed around 45% for Equatorial Guinea, 36% for Congo and 25% for Gabon. This 
resource also represented 97% of Equatorial Guinea's total exports in the same year, 88% of 
Chad's, 80% of Congo's and 59% of Gabon's.  
                                                          
7 Three countries (Cameroon, Chad and Gabon) adopted new IMF-supported programmes, while the Central African Republic 
adjusted an existing programme. 
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Figure 3.2. - Contribution to Regional GDP in Central Africa by Sector, 2012-2016 
(average across countries - as %) 
 
Source: African Development Bank. 
Diversification measures are therefore essential to reduce the vulnerability of the countries 
in the sub-region to oil price shocks, unlock their full economic potential and restore more 
sustainable growth. Nevertheless, the analysis of the sectoral breakdown of major economic 
activities in Central Africa as a whole (Figure 3.2.) indicates that industry continues to 
dominate the region's economy, contributing about 41% to regional GDP8, even despite its 
decline since 2012. It is followed by the service sector, which contributes 40.5%, and 
agriculture (18%). The Bank of Central African States (BEAC) also estimates that the secondary 
and tertiary sectors were the driving forces behind CEMAC's growth in 2017, with each of 
them contributing +0.4 percentage points, against -0.9 and +1.3 respectively in 2016. The 
dynamics of secondary activities were driven by the manufacturing (+0.3 points, compared to 
+0.2 points in 2016) and other industries (+0.2 points as in 2016), and those of the tertiary 
sector by market services activity (+0.3 points, compared to +1.0 points in 2016). However, 
the primary sector reigned in growth with a contribution of -0.9 points in 2017, against -1.3 
points a year earlier. 
3.2. Macroeconomic Situation 
Overall, the macroeconomic situation in the CEMAC countries is picking up following a sharp 
downturn in their economic momentum, under the combined effect of falling raw material 
prices and heightened security threats in several countries of the sub-region. According to 
the IMF, economic growth in the region slipped slightly into the red at -0.1% in 2017 (-2.2% 
for the oil sector and +0.3% for the non-oil sector), compared to 4.7% in 2014. This slowdown 
                                                          
8 Central African Economic Outlook 2018, AfDB. 
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is thought to be due to the decrease in public spending9 as well as to the continued decline in 
oil production. In 2018, on the other hand, the region's economies are expected to begin a 
fairly significant economic recovery. The IMF forecasts growth of 1.7% for this year. This 
renewed vitality can be explained in particular by the increase in oil prices and production, the 
accelerated implementation of economic, monetary and financial reforms in the countries of 
the sub-region and the stabilisation of foreign exchange reserves thanks to the funds injected 
by the IMF and other international donors under adjustment and financial aid programmes 
aimed at reviving the economies of this sub-regional community and stabilising the CFA franc 
(XAF). 
Table 3.2. - CEMAC: Main Macroeconomic Indicators 
(2014-2018) 
 2014 2015 2016e 2017e 2018p 
Real GDP (year-on-year change as %) 4.7 2.0 -0.5 -0.1 1.7 
Consumer prices* (year-on-year change as %) 2.7 2.7 1.3 0.9 1.6 
Overall fiscal balance** (% of GDP) -4.7 -8.1 -7.6 -3.5 -0.3 
Public debt (% of GDP) 28.9 43.9 51.6 52.0 51.1 
Current external balance (% of GDP) -2.0 -13.2 -13.8 -4.3 -1.9 
Gross official reserves (months of imports)  5.8 4.3 2.4 2.5 3.3 
 
Source: IMF 
Note: e Estimate; p Projections; * Average for the period; ** Including grants. 
The macroeconomic anchorage of CEMAC countries is improving, in terms of both inflation 
and fiscal position (Table 3.2.). Inflation remains low in the region, well below the regional 
convergence ceiling (3%), mainly as a result of the contraction in economic activity and the 
system of fixed exchange rate against the euro. The annual average inflation rate is thus 
expected to be 1.6% in 2018 according to the IMF, compared to 0.9% a year earlier. Fiscal and 
current account deficits are projected by the IMF to gradually decrease in 2018, in particular 
as a result of successful fiscal consolidation efforts and the recovery in oil prices. The overall 
budget deficit is expected to shrink from 3.5% in 2017 to 0.3% in 2018, while the current 
account deficit is projected to go down by 1.9% in 2017, compared to 4.3% a year earlier. 
                                                          
9 According to BEAC, these expenditures dropped drastically by CFAF 4 000bn (about USD 7.2m) between 2014 and 2017. 
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Figure 3.3. - Economic Growth of Countries in the CEMAC Region 
(2017*-2018** - as %) 
 
Source: IMF. 
Note: * Estimate; ** Projections. 
In this context, economic growth in the CEMAC countries should improve significantly from 
2018 onwards and continue to strengthen over time. Thus, with the exception of Equatorial 
Guinea, all the countries in the regional bloc should record an upturn in their growth rates this 
year (Figure 3.3.). Economic growth in the majority of CEMAC countries should accelerate in 
the medium term to over 3% by 2019, according to IMF projections, and then stabilise at 
around 3.7%.  
However, this recovery is not guaranteed and its achievement will require the countries in 
the region and their partners to monitor developments closely. Performance is conditional 
upon continued diversification efforts, the completion of fiscal consolidation programmes, a 
better allocation of public investment and an improved business climate. However, there are 
significant risks linked in particular to trends in international raw material prices, the 
implementation of adjustment programmes and commitments made by the Governments, as 
well as the security situation, which remains precarious in certain areas, including the Central 
African Republic, the Lake Chad region and Congo’s Pool area. In addition, continued political 
tensions in some countries in the region could disrupt the proper application of government 
economic policies. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic situation is worrying with regard to public debt and foreign 
exchange reserves. In fact, the total public debt-to-GDP ratio estimated for the sub-region 
rose from 29% at end-2014 to 52% in 2017. Over the same period, the outstanding external 
debt of the CEMAC countries rose from 18% to 28% of GDP, as a result of the continuation of 
public investment programmes in certain countries in a fairly difficult environment. In 
addition, the downward trend in external assets led to a significant fall in foreign exchange 
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reserves to below three months of imports between 2016 and 2017. However, these reserves 
are expected to climb above this level in 2018 owing to aid from international organisations 
and improved oil revenue. According to the IMF, by 2021, the region's public debt, estimated 
at 52% of GDP in 2017, should gradually decline to 47% of GDP, the external current account 
deficit should narrow to around 1.5% of GDP, and reserve coverage should be around 4.5 
months of imports. 
Table 3.3. - Gross FDI Flows to CEMAC Countries 
(in USD m, 2011-2017) 
Country/Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 16/17 change 
(as %) 
Cameroon 739 567 727 627 664 672 1.2 
Central African 
Republic 
70 2 3 3 7 17 142.9 
Chad 580 520 -676 559 244 335 37.3 
Congo -283 609 1 659 3 802 3 565 1 159 -67.5 
Equatorial Guinea 985 583 168 233 54 304 463.0 
Gabon -221 771 1 048 990 1 241 1 498 20.7 
CEMAC 1 870 3 052 2 929 6 214 5 775 3 985 -31.0 
West Africa* 15 485 13 354 11 647 9 677 12 423 10 977 -11.6 
Source: UNCTAD (World Investment Report, 2018). 
Note: * Excluding Mauritania. 
A recovery is expected for foreign investment in the sub-region, whereas, in 2017, low 
commodity prices curbed investors’ appetite for Central Africa (Table 3.3.). According to 
UNCTAD estimates, gross FDI flows to CEMAC fell by around 31% in 2017 compared to the 
previous year, to almost USD 4bn. These inflows plummeted, for instance, by 68% to USD 
1.2bn in Congo, mainly due to the country's economic difficulties, combined with volatile oil 
investments and weak FDI in non-oil sectors. On the other hand, they increased substantially 
in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea to USD 1.5bn (+21%) and USD 304m (+463%) respectively, at 
a time when they were virtually stagnant in Cameroon (+1.2% to USD 672m). As far as outlook 
is concerned, FDI in the sub-region should, according to the IMF, begin to grow again as raw 
materials prices recover and structural reforms are implemented. However, these flows will 
remain subject to cyclical swings due to Central Africa's dependence on basic commodities.  
Table 3.4. - Business Climate Ranking of CEMAC Member Countries 
(Doing Business Ranking - 2016-2018) 
Country 2016 2017 2018 
Cameroon 172 166 163 
Gabon 162 164 167 
Equatorial Guinea 180 178 173 
Republic of the Congo 176 177 179 
Chad 183 180 180 
Central African Republic 185 185 184 
Source: World Bank. 
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Progress has been made in improving the business climate (Table 3.4.). In order to improve 
their business environment, CEMAC governments have initiated a series of structural reforms, 
enabling four out of the six countries in the sub-region to move up in the latest World Bank 
Doing Business ranking. Cameroon, for instance, has implemented the OHADA reform10, while 
strengthening the prerogatives of the Investment Promotion Agency (IPA). The Central African 
Republic has set up some thirty focal points, attached to its Permanent Technical Secretariat 
of the Joint Business Improvement Framework (CMCAA) and tasked with proposing measures 
to improve the country's ranking. For its part, Congo has developed a user guide and a manual 
of procedures for administrations in order to modernise the public sector. Numerous reforms 
have also been carried out in Gabon, in particular with a view to simplifying procedures, and 
via the introduction of a National Investment Charter and the establishment of an arbitration 
centre for the management of commercial disputes. Chad has created a National Investment 
and Export Agency (ANIE) and a one-stop shop to simplify procedures. In addition to the 
adoption of a National Investment Charter, it has set up a Public-Private Dialogue Forum 
(FODEP), and fixed tariffs for the creation, modification and renewal of business certificates. 
Finally, and with a view to improving the economic environment in the region and fostering 
the development of a dynamic and competitive private sector, the countries of the region 
intend to set up a sub-regional business climate observatory in the near future. 
Sub-regional economic integration in the CEMAC region11 has been supported by a fairly 
advanced institutional framework. A common currency, the CFA franc, was adopted and 
issued by an independent monetary authority, BEAC, which steers the Member States' 
monetary policy. A harmonised public financial management framework has been put in 
place. A financial institution has been created to finance the development of the countries in 
the sub-region, Banque de Développement des États de l'Afrique Centrale (Central African 
States Development Bank – BDEAC). This integration process is also based on compliance with 
a number of economic convergence criteria, which have been in place since 2001 and were 
redefined on 1 January 2017. This recent reform mainly concerns (i) the revision of the fiscal 
balance criterion, which now takes better account of each country's oil revenue, (ii) the 
introduction of a debt brake in order to limit the accumulation of medium-term debt, and (iii) 
the adaptation of the inflation criterion, now based on a three-year average. 
  
                                                          
10 Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa. 
11 Founded in 1994, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) is made up of six countries: 
Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Central African Republic. Its purpose is to promote the harmonious 
development of the Member States and the establishment of a genuine common market based on the free movement of persons, 
goods, capital and services. 
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Table 3.5. - Indicative Position of the Member States in Relation to Multilateral 
Surveillance Criteria 
(Primary surveillance criteria) 
 Cameroon Central 
African 
Republic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Gabon Equatorial 
Guinea 
Chad 
2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 
Basic fiscal balance, 
positive or zero 
+ - - - - - + - - - + - 
Benchmark fiscal 
balance ≤ -1.5%* 
- - + + - - + - - + + + 
Average annual 
inflation rate ≤ 3% 
+ + + - + - + + + + - + 
Total public 
debt/nominal GDP ≤ 
70% 
+ + + + + - + + + + + + 
Arrears variation ≤ 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Number of criteria 
fulfilled 
3/4 2/4 2/4 1/4 2/4 0/4 3/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 
Notes: + = Fulfilled; - = Not fulfilled; * For information. 
Sources: CEMAC Commission, Bank of France 
The analysis of the state of convergence of the Community region reveals widespread non-
fulfilment of the associated criteria in 2016, in connection with an unfavourable economic 
context (Table 3.5.). For instance, none of the six countries met the basic budget deficit 
criterion (whereas three countries had met it in 2015) in a context of declining oil revenue. In 
addition, both the Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic recorded an 
inflation rate above the Community standard. Congo's debt ratio was also well in excess of the 
70% threshold. 
3.3. Recent Trends in the Financial Sector 
Despite adverse economic conditions, vulnerabilities in the CEMAC financial system had 
little impact on its stability. According to the IMF, bank profitability remains intact and 
banking regulation continues to be strengthened. Although there is still room for 
improvement, financial inclusion has been considerably strengthened in the region thanks to 
the development of microfinance activity and the expansion of mobile banking. The sub-
region's capital market should benefit from the positive effects expected from the project for 
its unification, and therefore constitute an alternative source of financing for SMEs in the 
region. 
CEMAC's banking sector remains relatively strong despite the slowdown in its dynamics in 
2017. In the same period, the activity of other financial institutions increased slightly despite 
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the sluggish environment. The situation in the region also varies considerably from one market 
to another. Non-performing loans (NPLs), which are already very high, are on the rise and the 
decline in deposits is putting pressure on bank liquidity. COBAC is currently implementing a 
more risk-based surveillance system, while capital requirements will gradually increase. As 
regards concentration risk, one third of solvent banks are contravening the CEMAC regulation. 
Financial inclusion has improved in recent years but it is still too early to talk about 
convergence with the rest of Africa and the rest of the developing countries. 
3.3.A. BANKING SECTOR 
Table 3.6. - The Banking Sector in the CEMAC Region 
(as at 31 December 2017, in USD m) 
Source: COBAC. 
CEMAC's eight largest banks are currently privately owned institutions, majority-owned by 
foreign investors, with the exception of the first two (Table 3.6.). On 31 August 2017, CEMAC 
had 65 credit institutions12 including 11 financial institutions13. They are spread across the 
Member States as follows: 15 banks and eight financial institutions in Cameroon, four banks 
in the Central African Republic, 11 banks in Congo, ten banks and three financial institutions 
in Gabon, five banks in Equatorial Guinea and nine banks in Chad. The total assets of the 
banking sector in the zone amounted to CFAF 12.7 quadrillion as at 31 December 2017, or USD 
23.2 billion. As regards the microfinance sector in the region, in 2016, there were 825 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) approved by COBAC, 700 of which are actually active (COBAC, 
2017). 
                                                          
12 Credit institutions are entities which carry out banking operations as a regular activity, in particular the receipt of funds from 
the public, loan operations and the management and provision to customers of means of payment. They are classified into two 
categories: banking institutions and financial institutions. 
13 CEMAC financial institutions differ from banks in that they are prohibited from receiving demand funds from the public and 
funds with less than two years of maturity, and in that they require a minimum share capital of CFAF 2 billion, compared to CFAF 
10 billion for banks. There are two main categories: financial companies (consumer credit, leasing, factoring, etc.) and specialised 
financial institutions with a public policy mandate (loans, guarantees, equity investments, advice, etc.). 
10 Largest Banks in Terms of 
Assets 
Assets Equity Deposits Foreign 
majority 
 
Public 
majority 
 
1 BGFIBANK  1 966.13 223.71 1 563.04 No No 
2 Afriland First Bank 1 784.41 200.59 1 318.85 No No 
3 SGBC 1 575.31 163.38 1 289.31 Yes No 
4 BICEC 1 416.89 9.61 1 112.01 Yes No 
5 CCEI BANK  1 337.86 321.75 782.88 Yes No 
6 BGFIBANK Congo 1 053.97 174.85 653.30 Yes No 
7 CA-SCB 978.12 96.91 811.34 Yes No 
8 Ecobank Cameroun 859.99 74.71 636.59 Yes No 
9 BANGE 757.53 65.26 669.58 No Yes 
10 BICIG 732.43 110.22 575.02 Yes No 
Total for Whole Banking Sector 23 213.66 2 807.77 17 091.24   
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Table 3.7. - Changes in Banking Sector Resources and Uses of Funds 
(in USD m, 2014-2017) 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Customer deposits 18 748.20 16 461.70 15 081.80 17 091.20 
 of which, demand customer accounts 14 261.33 12 873.74 12 334.12 14 107.16 
 of which, term deposits  3 285.75 2 966.06 2 841.73 3 250.23 
Debts owing to credit institutions  892.40 793.10 669.91 705.87 
Bond debt 3.08 1.82 0.00 0.00 
Own funds 2 463.78 2 438.65 2 419.68 2 975.43 
Other liabilities 179.79 158.65 281.64 218.14 
Net profit 266.10 208.08 140.51 105.25 
Total liabilities 22 553.36 20 061.96 18 593.51 21 095.94 
Core Tier 1 capital 13 565.17 13 538.34 13 606.07 15 491.92 
Customer loans 239.87 266.53 243.77 420.64 
 of which, long-term debt (> 5 years) 4 929.58 4 942.09 5 207.17 5 807.57 
 of which, medium-term debt (1-5 years) 3 251.71 3 325.49 3 243.26 3 802.18 
 of which, short-term debt (< 1 year) 5 338.95 3 735.31 3 054.55 4 210.76 
Loans and advances to credit institutions  13 565.17 13 538.34 13 606.07 15 491.92 
Central Bank Investments 10.88 150.91 52.24 0.07 
Treasury bills 679.02 862.29 1 852.54 1 715.09 
Other assets 2.92 14.73 18.24 10.28 
Total assets 19 596.94 18 301.58 18 583.63 21 428.11 
Source: COBAC. 
Overall, CEMAC's financial system remained resilient in 2017. While vulnerabilities increased 
in the financial sector in 2017, the profitability of banks remained stable and the average 
capital adequacy ratio increased (IMF 2017). At 31 December 2017, banking activity in CEMAC 
(Table 3.7.) showed a rebound in total assets of USD 2.5 billion (corresponding to a contraction 
of 0.80% in CFAF) between December 2016 and December 2017, an increase in customer loans 
of USD 1.89 billion and an increase in customer deposits of USD 2.00 billion (corresponding to 
a decline of -0.45% in CFAF). However, this upward trend when the amounts are expressed in 
USD corresponds to a contraction in assets of around CFAF 840 billion, visible in all CEMAC 
countries except Cameroon and the Central African Republic14. 
 
According to the IMF15, significant progress has been made in banking regulation and 
supervision thanks to COBAC's sustained efforts, even though CEMAC’s financial sector 
continues to display some vulnerabilities. Weak economic activity and the stabilisation of 
public finances are having an impact on both sides of commercial banks' balance sheets, thus 
contributing to a further rise in non-performing loans from already high levels, and a fall in 
deposits. The banking sector continues to feel the negative impact of the oil price shock 
through its direct exposure to the sector and through its indirect exposure to public spending. 
                                                          
14 COBAC (2017), Situation of the banking system of CEMAC, as at 31 August for banks and 30 June 2017 for financial institutions 
respectively. 
15 IMF (2017) Country Report No. 17/389, December. 
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Table 3.8. - Banking Sector Resilience Indicators and Credit Ratios in CEMAC 
(Percentages 2014-2017) 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Regulatory capital 
Regulatory capital/risk-weighted assets 17.8 18.2 17.7 21.5 
Core Tier 1 capital/risk-weighted assets 12.6 13.2 12.4 15.2 
Equity/assets 3.1 3.8 3.6 3.6 
Profitability16 
Return on assets (ROA) 1.15 0.95 0.66 0.42 
Return on equity (ROE) 13.53 10.28 7.32 4.47 
Net interest margin/net banking income 58.0 54.9 57.3 115.2 
Staff costs/net banking income 20.7 21.2 22.0 46.7 
Bad debts 
Doubtful debts/total loans 8.0 8.9 9.8 11.0 
Specific provisions/doubtful debts 86.0 82.0 86.4 90.4 
Doubtful debts net of provisions/total loans  1.1 1.6 1.3 1.1 
Liquidity 
Liquid assets/total assets 29.4 25.4 23.6 26.1 
Liquid assets/short-term liabilities 156.3 151.9 141.3 158.2 
Liquid assets/customer deposits 36.5 33.2 32.7 35.5 
Deposits/loans 138.2 121.6 110.8 110.3 
Sensitivity to market risks 
Net open foreign exchange position/core Tier 1 
 
215.2 101.6 82.0 75.2 
Foreign currency assets/total assets 12.9 5.0 4.1 4.2 
Foreign currency liabilities/total assets 19.9 9.1 7.3 7.2 
Credit ratios 
Loans/assets 58.4 63.1 65.0 66.7 
Private sector credit/GDP 11.43 13.65 14.51 13.54 
Growth in private sector credit 8.8 10.6 4.9 0.4 
Foreign currency loans/total assets 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 
Source: COBAC 
Non-performing loans (NPLs), which are already very high, are on the rise and the decline in 
deposits is putting pressure on bank liquidity (Table 3.8.). Several banks across all countries 
in the region are in breach of key prudential indicators, and credit growth could put pressure 
on future profits. The accumulation of arrears by large national administrations, which is 
continuing in some countries, has played an important role in the increase in NPLs. Doubtful 
debts accounted for the largest share of bad debts, at 63% in August 2017, compared to 60% 
a year earlier (COBAC, 2017). Provisions for impairment of customer accounts are also 
increasing and the cover ratio of doubtful loans by provisions was 90% at end-2017, compared 
to 86% twelve months earlier. Return on assets and equity declined in 2017. The average 
solvency ratio, on the other hand, rose over the same period. 
COBAC is currently implementing a more risk-based surveillance system, while capital 
requirements will gradually be increased from 8% to 10.5% in 2019. To this end, the banking 
                                                          
16 For 2017, the ratios relating to profitability are calculated as at 30/06/2017.  
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regulator is preparing additional capital requirements to cover counter-cyclical risks and 
systemically important banks, as well as capital charges for operational and market risks. The 
IMF also welcomed the adoption of the new regulatory framework for microfinance, which 
will strengthen and stabilise this sector. The international institution recommends that the 
rules governing the operation of the Deposit Insurance Fund (FOGADAC) be adopted rapidly 
to make it fully operational, and that the conditions and procedures for reimbursing 
depositors in various circumstances be well defined. 
As regards concentration risk, one third of solvent banks are failing to comply with the 
CEMAC regulation. If fully implemented, the envisaged major increase (from 75% to 90%) in 
the risk weightings applied to the debts of Member States that have failed to meet the 
regional convergence criteria would probably lead to even more banks not complying with 
this prudential risk concentration ratio. As a result, COBAC recently specified the conditions 
under which banks could be temporarily (for 1 to 2 years) exempted, on a case-by-case basis, 
from implementing these additional risk weightings. In particular, exemptions will only be 
granted for government securities issued by countries involved in programmes with the IMF. 
Table 3.9. - Breakdown of Loans by Sector 
(as percentage of value of loans, 2014-2017) 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Finance 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.5 
Private companies 31.4 32.8 34.5 33.9 
Other sectors 17.8 25.0 27.8 22.9 
Public authorities 8.2 9.5 10.6 12.4 
Non-residents 42.2 32.3 26.6 30.4 
 
Sources: COBAC; authors’ calculations. 
In line with the IMF’s recommendations, we believe that measures should be taken to 
reduce the high and growing level of NPLs and to rapidly rescue banks in difficulty in order 
to restore the banks’ capacity to lend to the economy and maintain confidence in the 
financial sector. Indeed, the longer banks remain in distress, the higher the potential fiscal 
costs of restructuring may prove to be. The high volume of NPLs absorbs capital and liquidity 
and hampers banks in financing the economies of the CEMAC countries. If these conditions 
were to persist, the banking sector would not be sufficiently able to support CEMAC's 
diversification away from the oil and public sectors (Table 3.9.). 
The situation of several banks in difficulty has, in fact, been dragging on for a long time, with 
supervisory authorities delaying resolution in many cases until recently. These banks are not 
systemic, but their continued non-compliance with prudential rules undermines COBAC's 
credibility in terms of its ability to apply the rules consistently. Fortunately, COBAC has taken 
decisions concerning all these institutions, ranging from appointing liquidators for two of 
them, to requesting other banks to provide restructuring plans. On the other hand, several 
banks have had delays in finding recapitalisation solutions. 
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From a banking point of view, the monetary policy stance is appropriately calibrated for 
now. If the accumulation of reserves should fall short of BEAC's objectives, further tightening 
will probably have to be considered. BEAC eliminated statutory advances at the end of 2017. 
This reform should help restore fiscal discipline in CEMAC and contribute to strengthening 
monetary policy transmission over time. 
3.3.B.  FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Figure 3.4. - Share of Adult Population with an Account in CEMAC 
(age 15+, 2017) 
 
Source: FINDEX. 
Note: FINDEX does not report data for Equatorial Guinea. 
Financial inclusion in CEMAC still leaves room for improvement, even according to 
developing country standard. The Central African Republic, Chad and the Republic of the 
Congo all have an account ownership rate not only below 30% of the population over the age 
of 15 but also lower than the average for weak countries (Figure 3.4.). Although Cameroon 
has a level of account ownership above 30%, it still scores below the median of sub-Saharan 
African countries and significantly below the average for the lower-middle-income country 
category, to which it belongs. 
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Figure 3.5. - Development in Share of Adult Population with an Account in CEMAC 
(age 15+, 2017) 
 
Source: FINDEX. 
On the other hand, there has been a sharp upward trend in financial inclusiveness in CEMAC 
since 2011 (Figure 3.5.). The Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, 
Cameroon and Gabon all recorded sustained growth in the number of bank and mobile 
accounts between 2011 and 2014 and 2014 and 2017. This development is consistent with 
the trend observed for the rest of the countries spread across sub-Saharan Africa, as well as 
for low- and lower-middle-income countries. The absence of FINDEX data for Equatorial 
Guinea suggests, however, that the country is lagging significantly behind the rest of the 
region, let alone the overall continent and the countries in its income category (lower-middle 
income), in terms of financial inclusion. 
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Figure 3.6. - Active Financial Inclusion in Central Africa 
(2011-2017) 
A. Active accounts per capita B. Active agents per capita 
  
Source: GMSA (2018). 
Similarly, a deeper analysis points to the beginning of the convergence of financial inclusion 
in Central Africa with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 3.6.). In particular, the growth in 
the number of active accounts and agents seems to have been accelerating since December 
2016, recently surpassing the rest of the region in terms of momentum. The share of the adult 
population in Central Africa having used a bank or mobile account in the preceding three 
months rose from 0% in 2011 to 11% in 2017. The ratio of active banking agents to the adult 
population rose from 0.00% to 0.13%, i.e. 13 active banking agents per 1 000 inhabitants, over 
the same period. An acceleration in this trend can be observed in 2014 and 2017. In terms of 
financial inclusion, the sub-region still clearly has a long way to go to catch up with sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole, but the closing of the gap that appeared impossible at the turn of 
the decade (EIB, 2016) now seems to be perfectly feasible. 
 
In this respect, mobile banking is currently making a significant contribution to increasing 
the level of bank usage in the region. The majority of accounts consist of mobile accounts in 
Chad and Gabon. Cameroon, for its part, has a mobile banking rate that is close to the average 
of low-income countries, even if though it is below the median for sub-Saharan African 
countries. Accordingly, the role played by the mobile banking sector in Cameroon is 
proportionally less important than in the other countries of the sub-region but nevertheless 
significantly higher than the average of countries in the lower-middle-income bracket, in 
which it belongs. 
 
As a result, banks in the sub-region have been forced to begin their digital transformation 
within a context of rapidly evolving, innovative technologies, the boom of electronic 
portfolios (Orange Money, MTN Mobile Money, etc.) and the growing demands of 
customers in terms of response times. Faced with these challenges, these institutions are 
starting to deploy a wide range of digital services, like Ecobank Cameroon which launched 
"Ecobank Mobile" in February 2017, an application enabling customers to send and receive 
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money instantly across 33 African countries. In addition, the BGFIBank Group is relying on 
digital technology to implement its "Excellence 2020” project. The Gabonese bank has 
therefore developed several innovative solutions, including a new-generation dynamic code 
card, mounted on the back of the bank card to secure transactions, particularly those made 
via the Internet. 
 
Table 3.10. - Financing Requirements of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(MSMEs) in Central Africa 
 
Number of 
MSMEs 
Current 
offer 
(USD m) 
Financing 
requirements 
(USD m) 
Total MSME 
financing 
requirements/
 GDP 
Investments 
financed from 
own funds 
(%) 
Investments 
financed by a 
bank 
(%) 
Angola 27 603 2 707 34 178 33% 91.5 (2006) 2.6 
     88.8 (2010) 3.9 
Cameroon 93 030 1 662 8 715 30% 75.6 (2009) 5.1 
     65.3 (2016) 2.4 
Central African 
Republic 
22 326 31 242 16% 70.8 (2011) 4.1 
DRC 319 090 447 9 305 26% 88.0 (2010) 0.6 
     92.9 (2013) 0.6 
Chad 5 170 282 1 134 10% 89.3 (2009) 1.7 
     72.8 (2018) 0.5 
Note: countries selected for data availability. 
Source: SME Finance Forum (2018), World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
The needs of micro-enterprises and SMEs in terms of access to bank financing are such that, 
in some countries in particular, the region still has a great deal of potential to be tapped 
over the next few years (Table 3.10.). The country with the highest proportion of investments 
by small businesses (5–19 employees) undertaken on the basis of bank financing is Cameroon, 
at only 2.4% in 2016, down from 5.1% in 2009. The financing gap for MSMEs ranges from 10% 
of GDP in Chad to 33% in Angola. In Cameroon, this gap represents 30% of GDP, suggesting an 
enormous potential in the context of a relatively well-diversified economy enjoying sustained 
growth. In order to facilitate access to finance for this type of enterprise, the Cameroon 
authorities recently announced the reinforcement of the National SME Agency, the 
strengthening of the financial capacities of Banque Camerounaise des PME (Cameroon SME 
bank) and the creation within it of a Credit Guarantee Fund for these structures. 
 
3.3.C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS 
Although still at an embryonic stage, the activity of financial institutions - outside the 
banking sector - is beginning to play an important role in financing the economy in the 
CEMAC region. However, according to COBAC, only four of the eleven financial institutions 
operating in the sub-region met all prudential standards in 2016 (Table 3.11. below). More 
specifically, four institutions complied with the minimum capital representation 
requirements, while seven institutions reported a ratio of weighted-risk coverage by net 
equity of greater than or equal to the minimum of 8%. With regard to the liquidity ratio, eight 
institutions had liquid assets on demand, or at less than one month, greater than or equal to 
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the regulatory minimum of 100% of liabilities of the same term. The same applies to the long-
term conversion factor: eight institutions managed to finance at least 50% (regulatory 
threshold) of their applications of funds with a residual term of more than five years from 
long-term resources. 
 
Table 3.11. - Number of Financial Institutions Complying with Prudential Standards 
Prudential standard 2015 2016 
Minimum capital 6 4 
Risk coverage 8 7 
Overall risk ceiling 8 7 
Individual risk ceiling 8 7 
Fixed asset coverage 8 7 
Liquidity ratio 8 8 
Conversion factor 8 8 
Related-party commitments 8 7 
Total number of financial institutions  8 8 
Source: COBAC. 
CEMAC's capital market offers a definite growth potential and activity is up slightly despite 
the sluggish environment. Given the sub-region's strengths - economic potential, ambitious 
development plans, major infrastructure projects, membership of a monetary union with a 
common currency, the existence of a substantial legal framework in the financial sectors and 
financial institutions with access to regional mandates - this market has considerable 
untapped growth potential. 
In Central Africa, the capital market is divided into two main segments: a short-term money 
market and a financial market centralising the supply and demand of long-term capital. The 
first market was opened in the sub-region on 1 July 1994, following the monetary and financial 
reforms launched after the severe economic crisis in the sub-region in the mid-1980s. The 
financial market was only officially established in 200317, the year in which the regional Central 
African Stock Exchange (BVMAC), based in Libreville, was created. At the same time, 
Cameroon set up its national Douala Stock Exchange (DSX). 
 
                                                          
17 The BVMAC only began its administrative activities on 13 August 2008. 
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Table 3.12. - Comparison of Interbank Interest Rates in CEMAC, WAEMU and Eurozone 
(annual average as %) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
TIMP1 (CEMAC) 2.66 4.42 5.00 4.12 5.00 
1-day rate (Central Bank 
of West African States - 
BCEAO) 
4.20 3.93 3.92 3.72 4.42 
3-month rate (BCEAO) 5.10 5.66 5.15 4.72 4.68 
EONIA18 (overnight) 0.07 0.091 0.094 -0.108 -0.320 
3-month EURIBOR19 rate 0.19 0.221 0.209 -0.020 -0.265 
Sources: BEAC and Bank of France (BDF). 
Note: 1 Weighted average interbank rate. 
The CEMAC money market is organised in two compartments and has enjoyed sustained 
activity. The first compartment is the interbank market - Level 1 - on which credit institutions 
and public financial institutions exchange liquidity in accounts at the Central Bank on freely 
negotiated amount, rate, duration and possibly guarantee conditions. In 2016, this 
compartment experienced some recovery with transactions of around USD 48.9m 
(CFAF 30.4bn), compared to USD 44.8m (CFAF 27bn) a year earlier. These national and sub-
regional operations were carried out with interest rates ranging from 2.50% to 5.00% and 
maturities ranging from one day to one year (Table 3.12.) 
The second compartment - level 2 - also enjoyed an upsurge. It corresponds to BEAC 
operations implemented through two windows (A20 and B21), in favour of eligible credit 
institutions. In 2016, the average outstanding amount of advances from the issuing institution 
to these institutions rose sharply to nearly USD 1.04bn (CFAF 646.1bn) in 2016, compared to 
USD 473.5m (CFAF 280.8bn) a year earlier, i.e. an increase of +123%22. This upturn was mainly 
due to the sharp rise in the cash requirements of the region’s banking system against a 
backdrop of tightening resources due to the fall in oil-related budgetary revenue. 
The average volume of lending to credit institutions has increased considerably. In BEAC’s 
main window of operation (Window A), this increase is due to the fourfold increase in BEAC 
lending to Chad's banking system and the doubling of lending to Cameroon's banks. This 
volume grew by 136% to USD 964.2m (CFAF 600bn) in 2016 compared to USD 408.4m 
(CFAF 246bn) in 2015. As regards Window B, the average volume of facilities granted to the 
Central African States Development Bank (BDEAC) through this channel reached, according to 
COBAC, USD 76.2m (CFAF 47.4bn) on 31 December 2016, compared to USD 57.8m 
(CFAF 34.8bn) on the same date of the previous year. 
                                                          
18 EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average). This the overnight rate for transactions on the Eurozone interbank market. 
19 EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate). This is the arithmetic average of the rates at which banks are willing to lend money 
on the interbank market for terms of one to twelve months. 
20 Window A corresponds to the money market sphere where all liquidity injection and withdrawal operations are processed. 
21 Window B is for refinancing productive investments for periods of two to seven years, particularly those of BDEAC. 
22 The level of annual variation varies according to CFAF (BEAC)/USD exchange rate fluctuations. 
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Figure 3.7. - Developments in Official BEAC Interest Rate 
(TIAO1 end of period, as %, 2009-2017) 
 
Source: BEAC. 
Note: 1 Bid interest rate. 
With regard to its official rates, BEAC’s Monetary Policy Committee decided to tighten up 
monetary policy (Figure 3.7.). On 22 March 2017, the Committee raised the bid interest rate 
(TIAO) by 50 basis points to 2.95%, in order to contain inflation and replenish the region's 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Finally, it should be noted that BEAC has, for several years, been implementing a series of 
reforms aimed at stimulating the CEMAC money market. These include, in particular, the 
granting of greater flexibility to credit institutions in the management of their liquidity, the 
revitalisation of interbank trade23 and the launch of an emergency liquidity provision facility 
for banks and another facility for the management of minimum reserves24. 
There is increased market demand for government securities issued by auction. Launched in 
November 2011, this market consists of two compartments: a primary market where newly 
issued government securities are placed and a secondary market where securities are traded 
after they have been issued. The securities issued on this market are Fungible Treasury Bills 
(BTA)25 and Fungible Treasury Bonds (OTA)26. In 2016, this market was in high demand among 
the public treasuries of the Community's Member States in relation to the previous year, due 
to the fall in oil revenue. On the primary market, 110 tendering procedures for treasury bills 
and bonds were launched in the same year (of which 103 were successful, raising almost 
USD 1.6bn/CFAF 992.4bn), compared to 77 a year earlier. 
In terms of transactions, the secondary market for government securities was very subdued 
over the above-mentioned period with only two purchase/sale operations recorded. On the 
other hand, there was a significant increase in operations for pledging of securities with the 
central bank, the total outstanding amount of which reached a record level in 2016, made up 
                                                          
23 Decision No. 11/CPM/2017. 
24 Decision No. 02/CPM/2016. 
25 13, 26 and 52-week discount bills with a face value set at CFAF 1 000 000. 
26 Public securities issued with maturities of two years or more, a face value of CFAF 10 000 and interest payable annually. 
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of 222 135 BTA and 32 800 700 OTA with a total value of USD 884m (CFAF 550.1bn) and 
21 420 000 treasury bonds (OT) with a face value of USD 345.8m (CFAF 208.3bn). 
The sub-regional financial market in Central Africa is dominated by the bond compartment. 
The low volume of activity on this market indicates in fact that there is considerable potential 
for investment opportunities. According to BEAC, market and bond capitalisation on the 
BVMAC market on 31 December 2016 reached almost USD 515.4m (CFAF 320.7bn), or 0.7% 
of CEMAC's GDP, up 19% on 2015. The highlight of bond market activity was the registration 
of two public offerings in the bond compartment: the first bond issue by the Government of 
Congo, "EOCG 6.5% Net 2016-2021", for USD 309m (CFAF 192.3bn), and an issue by the 
Government of Gabon, "EOG 6.50% Net 2016- 2021", for USD 216.8m (CFAF 134.9bn).  
The number of bonds listed at the sub-regional level remains limited, suggesting untapped 
potential. The number of bonds listed on the BVMAC remained unchanged in 2016 compared 
to 2015: eight after the Chad Government bond issued in 2011 matured on 20 July 2016. At 
end-2016, the bond compartment reached almost USD 506m (CFAF 314.9bn) market 
capitalisation, up 16.9% on end-2015. The secondary market or the shares compartment had 
only one company listed on the stock market (SIAT Gabon27) with a market capitalisation of 
approximately USD 9.2m (CFAF 5.7bn) at 30 December 2016, down 1.7% compared to a year 
earlier. 
In Cameroon, the financial market enjoyed an increase in transactions despite the decline 
in capitalisation. As at 31 December 2016, the market and bond capitalisation of the DSX 
amounted to USD 531.9m (CFAF 331bn), or about 2% of Cameroon's GDP, down 21% on the 
previous year. In the bond compartment, there were five debt securities listed on this 
exchange compared to six in 2015, following the repayment of the first Cameroon 
Government bond entitled EMCR (5.6% net 2010-2015), which matured in 2015. As a result, 
bond capitalisation fell to USD 292.5m (CFAF 182bn) from USD 422.3m (CFAF 254.4bn) a year 
earlier. Despite this decline, transactions in this segment increased significantly, reaching a 
cumulative value of almost USD 4.7m (CFAF 2.9bn) in 2016, compared to USD 76 000 (CFAF 
45.8m) the previous year. Bonds issued by the Government of Chad (Chad Government 6% 
net 2013-2018) and the Government of Cameroon (Cameroon Government 2014-2019) were 
the most traded securities on this market. 
The recovery of the CEMAC financial market is expected to accelerate. After nearly a decade 
of existence, these markets have made some encouraging progress, but still have to face up 
to many challenges (co-existence of two stock exchanges, capitalisation, liquidity, depth, 
critical size and attractiveness) in order reach levels comparable to regional financial centres. 
The sub-region’s financial market is characterised by a dichotomous organisation based on 
the existence of two stock exchanges: one regional, based in Libreville, the BVMAC, and the 
other national, located in Cameroon, the DSX. By launching these markets, the authorities of 
the sub-region were aiming to develop alternative financing for their economies. Bearing this 
in mind and taking into account the constraints linked to both the structural adjustment of 
public finances and to external debt, the leaders of the CEMAC countries recently decided to 
                                                          
27 Gabonese investment company for tropical agriculture, responsible for rubber-growing and livestock production activities. 
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accelerate the unification of the stock exchanges in order to equip their Community with a 
new instrument for financing the sub-regional economies and to make it a strong financial 
hub in Africa28. 
The convergence of the sub-regional financial market is therefore seen as the first step of a 
comprehensive reform. In Central Africa, the establishment of a financial market has without 
doubt contributed to unlocking regional financial resources at competitive costs for the 
benefit of businesses and to securing financing for governments through various public bond 
issues. BVMAC alone raised funds amounting to nearly USD 1.6bn (CFAF 800bn) on the CEMAC 
sub-regional market over the period 2008-201729. Despite this progress, this market is still 
confronted with several challenges that hamper its development. 
The market could also be deepened through a project with a more structuring effect, namely 
the convergence of the two stock exchanges, the BVMAC and the DSX. Under this plan, 
Libreville would become the place of regulation and Douala the financial centre, given that 
Cameroon possesses the Community’s densest economic fabric. To this end, on 11 April 2018, 
COSUMAF and CMF (Cameroon financial market supervisor) set out in a cooperation and 
information exchange agreement the procedures to be applied during the transition period 
leading up to the formation of a single stock exchange in the CEMAC region by 30 June 2019. 
The implementation of this convergence project should help to stimulate the financial 
market in the sub-region. According to Roland Berger's estimates, this merger could generate 
almost USD 1.8bn (CFAF 1 000bn) of issues by 2020. Led by BEAC, which launched a study to 
organise this integration, the unification process first involves the creation of a single 
regulatory authority, called the "Commission de Surveillance du Marché Financier de l'Afrique 
Centrale”, with headquarters in Libreville, Gabon. The agreement then requires the 
establishment of a single market company, "Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de l’Afrique 
Centrale (Central African Stock Exchange)", in Douala, Cameroon, which will de facto absorb 
the DSX. The unification of the markets will also result in the establishment of a single Central 
Depository - temporarily BEAC - pending the approval of an independent structure dedicated 
to this activity. While the unification of the Douala and Libreville stock exchanges represents 
a major step in the development of a more efficient sub-regional financial market, there 
remains an even greater need to work towards the achievement of stronger regional 
economic and financial integration. 
3.4 Conclusion 
On balance, even if the various economic and financial reforms currently undertaken by the 
CEMAC countries still need to be reinforced, they should already unlock part of the growth 
potential of the region's economies and accelerate their structural transformation. The 
financial system can therefore play a crucial role in the economic development of countries in 
                                                          
28 Announcement made at the Extraordinary Session of the CEMAC Heads of State Conference on 23 December 2016 in Douala 
and at the Session on 31 October 2017 in N'Djamena. 
29 According to the President of COSUMAF (supervisor of the Central African financial market) Rafael Tung Nsue, May 2017. 
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the sub-region, in particular by supporting their economic diversification, enhancing the 
financial inclusion of their populations and improving access to finance for their businesses. 
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4. The Banking Sector in East Africa - Responding to Market 
Shocks 
Jared Osoro1, Ricardo Santos2 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
• East Africa is a diverse region with common development challenges such as a 
high population growth that exerts upward pressure on youth unemployment 
and a financially constrained private sector. Economic growth remained subdued 
in 2017, mostly due to the impact of adverse weather conditions, but is expected 
to recover already in 2018. 
 
• Public finances have deteriorated in recent years. The deceleration in economic 
activity and the impact of electoral cycles have led to an increase in budget 
deficits in the region and to a corresponding increase in public debt. Most 
countries, even those with more comfortable debt positions, remain highly 
vulnerable to shocks. 
 
• Risks to the outlook are rising. Over the short run, the main risks stem from 
potential external shocks: i) further depreciation of local currencies; ii) increase 
in oil prices that would impact all the countries but especially the ones less 
dependent on commodities exports; and iii) normalisation of monetary policy in 
the developed economies that could lead at some stage to a sudden halt in the 
capital flows to these countries. 
 
• Access to finance remains a bottleneck for companies (particularly for SMEs and 
micro-enterprises) throughout the region, although less so in the bigger 
economies. In some countries, lending to the public sector is crowding out 
private credit. Mobile accounts and financial inclusion is improving unevenly 
across the region. In some countries, still less than 5% of the population uses 
digital banking or payment systems. 
 
• In the recent past, East Africa has experienced both policy and market shocks. 
Interest rate regulation in Kenya and a spate of bank failures have put the market 
in the spotlight. That has provided a warning for both market regulators and 
players to be vigilant as opportunities for growth are pursued.  
 
• The banking industry has been characterised by mixed performance in terms of 
efficiency and soundness. The low level of market competition is often masked 
                                                          
1 Director, Kenya Bankers Association Centre for Research on Financial Markets and Policy®. 
2 Economist, European Investment Bank. 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment Bank or the 
Kenya Bankers Association Centre for Research on Financial Markets and Policy . All remaining errors remain the authors’. 
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by the extent of market concentration, country-specific regulatory issues, such 
as business climate, and country-specific economic developments. 
4.1. Economic Overview and Recent Trends 
East Africa is a diverse region with common development challenges. The East Africa region 
comprises a diverse group of countries that share, however, significant common development 
challenges. With the exception of Kenya, they are low-income and low-human development 
economies, heavily dependent on agriculture. The unweighted average GDP per capita in the 
region is USD 2 528 (in PPP-adjusted terms) but it ranges from USD 735 in Burundi to USD 4 
586 in South Sudan.  
Countries in the region also vary widely in population size, with Ethiopia being very populous 
with 93 million inhabitants, followed by Tanzania with 49 million and Kenya with 47 million, 
while other countries are sparsely populated. The rate of population growth is relatively high, 
exerting upward pressure on youth unemployment. On a more positive note, the private 
sector has great potential for development and job creation, but faces several constraints, of 
which access to finance is a major one.  
Table 4.1. - Macroeconomic Overview 
 
Population GDP GDP per capita 
 
million USD bn 
PPP1-adjusted 
international dollar 
Burundi 10.9 3.4 735.2 
Eritrea 5.9 5.8 1581.3 
Ethiopia 92.7 80.8 2160.8 
Kenya 46.7 79.5 3491.1 
Rwanda 11.8 9.1 2079.9 
South Sudan 12.6 2.9 4586.0 
Tanzania 48.6 51.7 3240.4 
Uganda 37.6 26.3 2353.7 
Average2 33.5 32.4 2528.6 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2018). 
1PPP = purchasing power parity. 
2Unweighted average. 
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Economic growth remained subdued in 2017 but is expected to recover. Over the past 
decade, East Africa has been one of the best-performing regions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, more recently GDP growth has decelerated.  In 2017, regional GDP growth reached 
5.3%, still below the average of the last 10 years (6.5%) (Figure 4.1.). This deceleration was a 
consequence not only of the severe drought that affected the region but also a consequence 
of the political instability felt in East Africa, and that continued in 2017. Kenya and Uganda 
were the worst performers, with GDP growing 4.8% and 4.5% respectively. Growth in Rwanda 
remained stable at close to 6%. Regional economic growth is projected to pick up to 5.8% in 
2018 and then accelerate further to 6.2% in 2019, assuming there is a more stable political 
environment and a gradual increase in oil prices. Still, Kenya and Uganda will underperform 
their regional peers both in 2018 and 2019, albeit less than in 2017. Economic developments 
during the first part of 2018 indicated a gradual strengthening of activity. 
Inflation accelerated across the region because of the weather conditions.  Severe draughts 
in 2016 and 2017 led to poorer crops and less agricultural production. Still, this increase in 
prices was much more subdued than in the past as macroeconomic policies implemented 
across the region were able to contain second-round effects so that inflation remained 
substantially below the levels registered for previous episodes of spikes in the price levels. 
External balances are still negative but improving due to weaker economic activity and lower 
oil prices. The (unweighted) average current account deficit reached 7.4% of GDP in 2017. 
Figure 4.1. - Recent Economic Developments in East Africa1 
(as percentage) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2018)  
1 Unweighted average 
The business climate is uneven across the region. Business conditions in Rwanda and Kenya 
are already better than most of the countries in Africa and improved further in 2018 as some 
of the World Bank’s recommendations, particularly regarding land registration, have been 
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implemented. In Tanzania and Uganda, business conditions are lagging behind and barely 
improved in 2018. Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and especially Eritrea are lagging even further 
behind. Business conditions in these countries are among the least supportive on the 
continent and barely improved in 2018. Improving business conditions is critical for attracting 
foreign investment, which remains subdued at 2% of GDP (even in Kenya, it only reached 0.8% 
of GDP in 2017). 
Figure 4.2. - Doing Business (Distance to Frontier) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Most countries in the region are members of the East African Community (EAC) and could 
further benefit from even greater integration. Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, 
Tanzania and Uganda form the East African Community (EAC). It is comprised of a customs 
union and a common market. In addition, the EAC countries signed in 2013 a protocol 
including economic and fiscal targets, and are aiming to form a monetary union by 2023. More 
recently, in 2017, the EAC members agreed to form a Political Confederation as a transitional 
model for the East African Political Federation. There is still room for progression as intra-
regional trade accounted for only 10% of the total trade in the region in 2016 (the same share 
as in 2010). Many countries in East Africa have already signed the agreement, which will 
deepen integration of the African continent and increase the potential economic impact of 
further integration.  
Public finances have deteriorated in recent years. The deceleration in economic activity and 
the impact of electoral cycles led to an increase in the average budget deficit in the region to 
close to 8% of GDP in 2016. The fiscal deficit declined in 2017, but at 5.7% of GDP, it remains 
higher than in the recent past. This trend is common across the region with exception of 
Kenya, Burundi and Ethiopia, where the fiscal deficit is still expected to increase in 2018. 
Bringing down fiscal deficits, preferably by broadening the tax base and increasing the 
efficiency of expenditure, is necessary to make public finances more sustainable and create 
room for much-needed structural investments. The sustained fiscal deficits have increased the 
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average public debt by 20 percentage points since 2011. It now stands at 60% of GDP. And 
while this level is still substantially below the maximum of 100% reached in the early 2000s 
(before the debt relief under the HIPC initiative), this recent trend already undoing some of 
the positive outcomes of the HIPC. Furthermore, the level of debt is subject to significant risks. 
According to the IMF, debt sustainability risks are higher in Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
Sudan. Most countries, even those with more comfortable debt positions, remain highly 
vulnerable to shocks, emanating from exchange rates, interest rates or the price of oil. 
Therefore, the long-term sustainability of public finances in the region depends on the 
implementation of fiscal reforms.  
Figure 4.3. - Public Finances 
(% of GDP) 
 
Risks to the outlook are rising. The economic and political challenges of the various countries 
are significant. Political risk remains elevated, although less than it has been in the past. In the 
wake of the elections that took place late in 2017 in Kenya, the political background of the 
region’s main economy is now less volatile following the acceptance of the election results. In 
the short run, the main macro-risks stem from potential external shocks. The first potential 
shock could come from the continued depreciation of local currencies due to further spikes in 
inflation. The second relates to a further increase in oil prices, which would impact all the 
countries but especially the ones less dependent on commodities exports such as Uganda and 
Rwanda. Finally, the normalisation of monetary policy in the developed economies and the 
continuing increase in government debt stocks across this region could at some stage lead to 
a sudden halt in capital flows to these countries. 
Political risk is less pronounced than in the past but tensions remain. Recent years have been 
marked by electoral uncertainty but without the conflicts that affected the region in the past. 
More specifically: following the elections that took place late in 2017 in Kenya, the political 
background remained volatile but is now somewhat more stable as the new cabinet has 
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assumed office. Uganda could become politically more volatile in the near future as the 
incumbent Government and Parliament attempt to increase the duration of their terms in 
order to remain in power. In Rwanda, the authorities have successfully ensured order since 
the 1994 civil war, but there is still a risk of political instability. President Kagame was re-
elected for a third presidential term (extending his 17-year rule) in the August 2017 election. 
As for Tanzania, while there are no elections on the horizon, growing polarisation between 
rival political factions could become a source of volatility and concern for external investors, 
although this is unlikely to intensify to a level that could threaten the country's underlying 
stability.   
On a positive note, the recent peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea brings welcome 
prospects of resolving the long-lasting conflict between the two countries and reducing the 
risks in the region as a whole. 
4.2. Access to Finance and Financial Inclusion 
4.2.A. ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR SMES  
SMEs and micro-enterprises are an important driver of economic activity in East Africa, even 
more so than in other regions. East Africa is less resource-dependent than other regions on 
the continent, and therefore the private sector plays a more critical role, generating on 
average more than 30% of the different countries’ economic output and roughly the same 
share of average gross value-added. The contribution of this sector to employment is 
substantially more important as it is estimated to account for more than 80% of total 
employment3. 
Access to finance remains a bottleneck for investment particularly for micro-enterprises. In 
Eritrea and to a lesser extent in Kenya, SMEs and micro-enterprises can obtain credit when 
needed (Figure 4.4.). However, in the other countries the situation is not supportive of 
investment and economic activity in general. Micro-firms face the largest difficulties, 
particularly in Ethiopia where 70% of these businesses report difficulties in accessing credit, 
whereas only 40% of SMEs report the same impediment. In Tanzania, both micro and small 
enterprises report large constraints in accessing credit (almost 70% in both cases). As asset 
quality deteriorated due to the economic slowdown, banks tightened their credit standards. 
In addition, many increased lending to the public sector. In some countries, the higher interest 
rates on sovereign paper reduced the attractiveness of lending to the private sector. The risk 
that lending to the public sector will crowd out private credit is particularly prevalent in Kenya 
and Uganda (see Chapter 7). 
                                                          
3 These figures are an average of the statistics available for the different countries in the region. The most recent data relate to 
Kenya (2016) and reflect broadly the same picture as the regional average. 
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Figure 4.4. - Access to Credit for Micro-Enterprises and SMEs 
(last available year) 
 
Source: SME Finance Forum database 
4.2.B. ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR INDIVIDUALS  
Digitalisation has helped financial inclusion in some countries in the region. Given the low 
level of development and high population growth in most of these economies, rapid access to 
new technologies has allowed some of these countries to skip some steps towards improved 
financial inclusion. However, access to financial services varies significantly across the region 
and in some countries it still only barely exists. In Kenya, more than 80% of the population 
older than 15 years has an account at a bank or at another kind of financial institution, but in 
many countries this share is much lower, even below 10% in Burundi or below 20% in Sudan 
(Figures 4.5. and 4.6.). In all the countries, women have less access to bank accounts than men 
and the difference in access between the poorest and the richest sections of the population 
remains substantial across the region 
The regional differences in access to mobile payment systems is even more striking. In 
Kenya, often quoted as one the main references worldwide for digitalisation, almost 80% of 
the population older than 15 years uses digital payment systems or has a mobile bank account. 
This contrasts with the other countries in the region. In Tanzania and Uganda, around half of 
the adult population uses mobile banking or mobile payments. In Rwanda, the share drops to 
30% and in the remaining countries it is is considerably smaller and sometimes almost 
negligible with less than 5% of the population using digital banking or payment systems. 
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Figure 4.5. - Accounts at Banks or Other Financial Institutions 
(population age 15+) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Global Findex database 
Figure 4.6. - Mobile Accounts 
(population age 15+, as percentage) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Global Findex database 
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4.3. Structure and State of Banking Systems in East Africa 
The six East African Community (EAC) partner states4 enjoy varied levels of financial sector 
development. However, all EAC countries share a common feature: bank-led financial sectors 
(Osoro and Osano, 2014). The relative dominance of the Kenyan banking system in the EAC is 
reflected in the level of domestic credit as a share of GDP, which is substantially higher than 
in the other economies (Table 4.2.). 
Table 4.2. - Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
(share of GDP) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Burundi 20.3 18.9 17.4 16.7 16.4 16.7 
Kenya 30.6 29.5 31.7 34.1 34.4 32.8 
Rwanda 16.0 18.5 19.2 20.8 21.1 21.2 
South Sudan 0.4 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.7 - 
Tanzania 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.8 15.2 14.3 
Uganda 15.8 14.0 13.9 14.9 15.6 15.9 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
The market dynamics in each of the EAC economies - and especially how they relate to the 
cross-border operations of banks - are indicative of the unique nature of the market. Typical 
cross-border banking is seen, in the context of international banks, entering new, often less-
developed markets and leading to enhanced competition, financial stability and increased 
access to credit (World Bank, 2018). Even when the spotlight has been on sub-Saharan Africa 
(for instance Mecagni, Marchettini and Maino, 2015), the nuances that make the East Africa 
market distinct from the general narrative are not highlighted. For instance, the implicit 
assumption that the leading pan-African banks - notably East Africa’s Standard Bank and 
Togo’s Ecobank - are the core drivers of cross-border banking momentum in East Africa is 
countered by the reality that Kenyan domiciled banks have the biggest footprint in the region. 
In that respect, the role that Kenyan banks play in the region is relatively more significant than 
that of the Pan-African banks. The size of the Kenyan economy has provided Kenyan banks the 
necessary scale to play a key role in the EAC region. The Kenyan Banks have a dominant status 
in South Sudan, an economy, the size of which makes the number of banks operating there 
arguably unjustifiable (Table 4.3.) 
  
                                                          
4 The EAC Members are the Republic of Burundi, the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
the Republic of South Sudan, and the Republic of Uganda.     
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Table 4.3. - Number of Banks Relative to Size of the Economy 
 
Nominal GDP - USD bn (2017) Number of Banks 
Burundi 3.4 10 
Kenya 79.5 43 
Rwanda 9.2 11 
South Sudan 2.9 22 
Tanzania 51.7 40 
Uganda 26.3 24 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data, Respective Economies’ Central Banks.  
The strong presence of the Kenyan banks in the region is not reciprocated by the presence 
of banks from other EAC economies in Kenya. This issue has been a subject of recent studies 
(Kodongo, Natto and Biekpe, 2015; and Njoroge and Ouma, 2014)5. These studies conclude 
that intense competition in the local market has motivated banks from Kenya to seek cross-
border opportunities, taking advantage of the market openness promoted by the EAC 
integration process. Underpinning the position of the Kenyan banking sector is the dominance 
of the local players, unlike in Uganda and Tanzania where the banking systems are dominated 
by foreign bank ownership.  
EAC banking industry has a low concentration. If we take the concentration ratios - defined 
as the share of banking assets held by the largest three banks in a given economy - the three 
largest EAC economies’ banking sectors are less concentrated than the most advanced market 
in Africa (Figure 4.7.)6. Less concentration is by no means an indication of relatively more 
market competition given that the nexus between concentration and competition has been 
established to be tenuous (Berger, et. al., 2004). The competition-enhancing measures 
continually being put in place in East Africa include regulatory measures to enhance pricing 
transparency, and legal reforms to address, property rights, and freedom to compete in the 
economy.     
  
                                                          
5 Subsequent to these studies, the entry of the State Bank of Mauritius (SMB) into the Kenyan market in November 2017 through 
a 100-percent acquisition of Fidelity Bank - one of the Tier III banks - and its subsequent takeover in April 2018 of Chase Bank (in 
receivership), a hitherto fast-growing Tier II bank, are interesting developments.  Meanwhile Tanzania domiciled banks are 
venturing into Burundi and Uganda, while a Uganda-domiciled bank ventured into Rwanda, only for the parent institution to be 
closed by the regulator and the subsidiary acquired by a Kenya-domiciled bank.        
6 Notably, whilst the financial systems of Tanzania and Uganda are considered relatively less developed than that of a middle-
income country such as South Africa, they are less concentrated. 
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Figure 4.7. – Market Concentration 
(%) 
 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database (June 2017 version). 
4.4. Recent Banking Sector Performance  
The performance of the banking industry in East Africa in terms of efficiency and soundness 
is mixed. A number of factors played a role in shaping this performance. These include the 
low level of competition that is often masked by the extent of market concentration, country 
specific regulatory issues, such as business climate, and country-specific economic 
developments. A historical perspective of banks’ Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE) shows a banking industry that is generally profitable, albeit with a mixed performance 
over time and across countries (Table 4.4.). Instances of very high ROE during the earlier part 
of the new millennium in Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania are attributed to market 
imperfections associated with relatively limited depth compared to Kenya where such returns 
have been fairly consistent, except in 2002 when economic shocks jolted banks’ performance. 
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Table 4.4. - Profitability Indicators 
(%)   
 
Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
 
ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
2000 3.82 30.84 0.82 13.99 6.98 112.12 3.73 35.18 5.51 63.80 
2001 3.12 23.50 2.16 19.79 4.30 56.62 3.18 35.47 5.31 54.18 
2002 2.00 15.72 0.44 3.06 2.46 32.33 3.27 39.68 1.95 20.13 
2003 1.51 13.54 2.04 16.77 3.34 55.43 3.17 44.18 3.21 37.87 
2004 1.40 12.29 2.36 19.67 1.98 28.26 4.40 59.37 4.18 49.03 
2005 2.46 19.86 2.80 22.74 0.96 11.88 2.94 37.48 3.42 36.51 
2006 2.69 24.48 3.02 23.39 2.44 29.59 2.96 33.45 3.44 32.97 
2007 1.85 19.36 3.18 23.74 1.24 11.76 3.66 36.45 3.64 33.04 
2008 3.78 39.47 2.69 19.85 2.42 20.32 2.76 26.66 3.34 26.41 
2009 3.26 29.66 2.85 20.52 1.19 9.11 2.09 19.71 3.55 23.96 
2010 2.84 23.09 3.98 25.98 2.00 13.55 1.31 11.84 2.69 18.50 
2011 3.66 26.86 3.50 23.10 2.30 14.00 1.60 15.11 3.98 27.87 
2012 1.99 13.55 3.32 21.99 2.13 12.03 1.73 16.65 3.93 24.88 
2013 1.28 9.26 3.40 20.94 1.85 10.71 1.62 13.98 2.67 16.32 
2014 1.25 9.17 3.32 20.88 2.40 14.96 2.04 15.97 2.74 16.81 
2015 0.48 3.25 2.63 17.39 2.20 13.67 1.66 12.61 1.88 11.44 
 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database (June 2017 version) 
Over the past two years, the EAC banking system has been characterised by both 
opportunity and risks. Economic growth remained strong, albeit with headwinds resulting in 
a slowdown across the board in 2017. Over the same period, even though inflation rose mainly 
due to increasing oil prices and the poor performance of the agricultural sector due to dry 
weather conditions, it remained benign and even started easing during the second half of 
2017.  
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The downward trend in inflation provided the central banks in the region with an 
opportunity to ease monetary policies with varying speeds and timing. This, however, did 
not translate into increased lending owing to the interplay between demand and supply 
conditions. Indeed, bank lending to the private sector in EAC countries slowed down further 
on account of subdued demand. In the case of Kenya, for instance, the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) commenced an easing monetary policy stance in September 2016 when it lowered the 
Central Bank Rate (CBR) from 10.5% to 10.00%; the CBR was reduced further to 9.5% in March 
2018 and 9.0% in July 2019. Over this period, growth in credit to the private sector remained 
at the lower single-digit level and is evidently unresponsive to the monetary policy signal.  The 
subdued pace of private sector credit growth was accompanied by a deterioration in the 
quality of assets, and the lagged effect of the economic activities slowdown.  
The slow pace of private sector credit growth was accompanied by heightened credit risk as 
measured by the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans, which increased across 
the region except in Uganda. According to data from the EAC central banks, by June 2017, 
Burundi had the highest NPL ratio at 17.4% followed by Kenya with 9.9%, and Tanzania and 
Rwanda with 8.2%. Uganda had the lowest NPL ratio at 6.2%. The drivers of the increase in 
NPLs include poor credit assessment processes, delayed payments to contractors for 
government-funded projects, drought and subdued economic performance.  
The high level of NPLs in Burundi is worrisome. Not only is the Burundian economy small by 
regional standards, but it has been growing at the slowest pace in East Africa on the back of 
political challenges and uncertainty. Notable too is the rapidly rising level of NPLs in Kenya, 
the biggest economy in the EAC block, which also has a relatively deeper banking sector than 
the other economies in the region. Just like Burundi, the NPL ratio in Kenya has shown a rising 
trend from 9.9% in mid-2017 to 10.6% by the end of the year (Figure 4.8.).  
Rising NPLs in Kenya have largely stemmed from the fast decline in the rate of private sector 
credit growth (Figure 4.9.). The latter has been compounded by the impact of the 2016 
Banking (Amendment) Act: the new law that came into effect in September 2016 introduced 
interest rate controls whereby banks may not charge more than “4% above the base rate set 
and published by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK)”. Additionally, the law stipulates a floor on 
interest-earning deposits, of 70% of the base rate set by the CBK. 
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Figure 4.8. - NPLs/Gross Loans 
 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya 
Figure 4.9. - Banks’ Claims on Private Sector 
(12-month % growth) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya 
The application of the interest rate cap in Kenya was motivated by the perception that 
lending rates in Kenya were too high, even relative to other economies in East Africa. In 
reality, nominal lending rates are much higher in Uganda and relatively comparable in 
Tanzania; so are the interest rate spreads that have been at single-digit level in Kenya since 
2005 (Table 4.5.) (Box 4.1.).   
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Table 4.5. - Average Lending Rates and Spreads 
 
Interest rate spread  
(lending rate minus deposit rate, %) 
Average Lending rate (%) 
  Kenya Uganda Tanzania Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
1995 15.20 12.55 18.21 28.80 20.16 42.83 
1996 16.20 9.68 20.37 33.79 20.29 33.97 
1997 13.52 9.53 18.44 30.25 21.37 26.27 
1998 11.09 9.51 15.14 29.49 20.86 22.89 
1999 12.83 12.82 14.14 22.38 21.55 21.89 
2000 14.24 13.08 14.19 22.34 22.92 21.58 
2001 13.03 14.19 15.25 19.67 22.66 20.06 
2002 12.97 13.53 13.11 18.45 19.10 16.40 
2003 12.44 9.09 11.47 16.57 18.94 14.52 
2004 10.10 12.86 9.94 12.53 20.60 14.14 
2005 7.80 10.85 10.52 12.88 19.65 15.25 
2006 8.50 9.61 8.93 13.64 18.70 15.65 
2007 8.18 9.84 7.39 13.34 19.11 16.07 
2008 8.71 9.78 6.73 14.02 20.45 14.98 
2009 8.84 11.20 7.06 14.80 20.96 15.03 
2010 9.81 12.49 7.92 14.37 20.17 14.54 
2011 9.42 8.49 8.19 15.05 21.83 14.96 
2012 8.15 9.35 6.01 19.72 26.15 15.56 
2013 8.67 11.17 5.89 17.31 23.28 15.86 
2014 8.14 10.77 6.43 16.51 21.58 16.29 
2015 6.90 9.83 6.21 16.09 22.60 16.10 
2016 7.87 10.65 5.46 16.56 23.89 15.96 
2017 5.99 11.58 - 13.67 21.28 - 
Source: Respective Central Banks 
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Box 4.1. - Interest Rate Capping - Still a Blunt Tool 
A recent comprehensive study on interest rate regulation (Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014) 
points to two key findings. The first is that that interest rate capping is still popular, with 
over 60 countries globally having such regulation in one form or another. The second is that, 
notwithstanding their popularity, interest rate caps are not only ineffective at addressing 
the root causes of high rates - such as lack of market competition, market inefficiency, large 
fiscal deficits and legal bottlenecks that prevent customers from switching banks - but they 
also introduce additional distortions in the system as banks try to circumvent caps (for 
instance by increasing other fees). Analytical work carried out following the enactment of 
the capping law in Kenya law (for instance World Bank, 2017; Central Bank of Kenya, 2018; 
and Safavian and Husnain, 2018) confirm that it is indeed a blunt tool. The law effectively 
regulates the risk that a bank can take, in the sense that any potential borrower whose risk 
profile would be priced above the cap is unable to access credit. Moreover, these studies 
confirm that rate caps also interfere with the conduct of monetary policy. The declining 
trend in credit growth to the private sector, occurring on the back of banks’ heightened risk 
sensitivity given the rising levels of NPLs, has compounded the challenges of the credit 
market and consequently hindered the economy’s growth. Ultimately, the intention of the 
law to provide access to credit for low-income households and small and medium-sized 
enterprises has not been realised; indeed, the effect has been the exact opposite. 
Enterprises and households with a risk profile that is considered high are typically more 
constrained by access to credit than the cost of credit, as much as the latter is still 
important.   
4.5. Market Stability 
Even with the increasing exposure to credit risk, the banking industry in East Africa remains 
stable. Market stability is confirmed by various financial stability analyses as well as the IMF’s 
financial sector assessment programmes undertaken at both local and regional economic 
levels. The market remains well capitalised with the banking industry meeting its minimum 
core and total capital adequacy ratios. In Kenya, the minimum core and total capital adequacy 
ratios required are 10.5 and 14.5 respectively, while in Uganda they are 8.0 and 12.0% 
respectively. In Tanzania, the minimum core and total capital adequacy ratios required are 
10.0 and 12.0% respectively. Overall, capital adequacy ratios, which measure how effectively 
banks can sustain a reasonable amount of loss, remain above the prudential limits across the 
region; the capital buffers that have been built into the requirements provide an extra 
measure of safety in the event of unexpected loss. 
However, risks persist and the region has in the recent past demonstrated instability in the 
form of bank failures. During the period 2015-2016, Kenya experienced the failure of three 
banks including one with a regional presence. Uganda also had a bank failure, with the 
collapsed bank having a presence in Rwanda and thus having regional implications. In January 
2017, the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) - the economy’s central bank - closed five community banks 
that it considered to be inadequately capitalised. Commercial banks have remained well 
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capitalised (they are subject to a different regulatory framework) and thanks to the BOT 
intervention they were shielded from possible contagion effects from the affected 
institutions.  
Bank failures in East Africa have largely stemmed from structural weaknesses. A study by 
Waweru and Kalani (2009) tracks bank failures in Kenya: between 1986 and 1998, Kenya saw 
37 banks fail. The study finds that the bankruptcies were due, inter alia, to customers’ failure 
to disclose vital information during the loan application process and the lack of an aggressive 
debt collection policy as a bank-specific factor that contributes to the NPL debt problem in 
Kenya, which then affects vulnerable banks. Studies on the recent bank failures such as 
Gathaiya (2017) argue that, unlike past episodes, the recent bank collapses are largely due to 
governance and regulatory lapses. Subsequently, the supervisory role of the CBK has been 
enhanced and the three affected institutions have not generated any systemic challenges. The 
only weakness that the recent bank failures have exposed is the segmentation of the interbank 
market. 
Pursuant to the “lender of last resort” function, the central banks have provided sufficient 
liquidity to the market. Such intervention has tended to give the appearance of normal 
conditions on the interbank market as witnessed by the interbank rates (Figure 4.5.). 
Nevertheless, the interbank market remains segmented and inefficient (Sichei, Tiriongo and 
Shimba, 2012). In these circumstances, the interbank rate cannot pick up the distress signal 
since the lenders avoid each other given the high risk aversion that usually follows a banking 
crisis (Box 4.2.). 
Figure 4.10. - Interbank Market Rates (%) 
 
Source: Respective Countries’ Central Banks 
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Box 4.2. - The Interbank Market in Kenya - The Alternative Signal 
The role of the interbank market in any economy is critical in allocating liquidity from 
banks with a surplus to banks facing a liquidity deficit. In the event of a shock, such as the 
collapse of three banks in Kenya, there is limited interbank lending between big banks 
(often with surplus liquidity) and small bankers (often victims of liquidity flight to big banks). 
This characteristic of a segmented and inefficient market implies that the interbank rate 
has no signalling effect as to the state of market liquidity; nor does it have the ability to 
signal market distress. Given that banks with surplus liquidity will be seeking investment 
opportunities, the nearest attractive proposition is the 91-day Treasury Bill market, which 
offers both liquidity and risk-free attributes. Therefore, the behaviour of the 91-day 
Treasury Bill rate in the Kenyan money market where the interbank rates are only for 
overnight trading fulfils a signalling role for possible liquidity stress in the system. Implicitly, 
this is a pointer to the extent to which fiscal policy filters into monetary policy conduct, 
given that Treasury Bills are one of the monetary instruments used for implementing Open 
Market Operations (OMO). Interbank market segmentation is often underpinned by the 
“small bank - big bank” dichotomy. The liquidity flow from the small bank to the big bank 
during a market shock, often assumed to be a “flight to quality” while in reality it could 
merely be a “flight to size”, points to a structural problem. Empirical evidence indicates that 
interbank market shocks are long-lasting rather than transitory. Consequently, 
interventions by the central bank through liquidity allocation does not address the 
structural weaknesses of the market. 
 Source: Osoro and Muriithi (2017) 
 
4.6. Policy Highlights  
East Africa’s banking industry continues to experience policy developments that have 
changed its evolution over time. In the case of Kenya, a milestone was the Banking 
(Amendment) Act of 2016, the effects of which were outlined above. In Uganda, the Financial 
Institutions (Amendment) Act of 2016 led to the introduction of Islamic banking, 
bancassurance and agent banking in the banking system. During the same year, another Act - 
the Tier 4 Microfinance Institutions and Money Lenders Act, 2016 - was introduced, 
establishing the Ugandan Microfinance Regulatory Authority, providing for the licensing and 
management of Tier 4 microfinance institutions, regulating money lending and establishing 
the Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisations (SACCO) Stabilisation Fund and SACCO 
Savings Protection Scheme. In Tanzania, the central bank has issued a number of regulations 
including the Banking and Financial Institutions Capital Adequacy (Amendment) Regulations 
2015, the Guidelines on Agent Banking for Banks and Financial Institutions 2017 and the 
Foreign Exchange (Amendment) Act 2017. 
The implementation of IFRS9 brings a new dimension to banking. With IFRS9, the most 
fundamental changes are expected, particularly in light of the recognition of credit risk losses, 
as banks are now expected to recognise a loan’s risk at the beginning of and during the loan’s 
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entire life cycle and make the necessary provisions as opposed to at the point of default as 
was the norm before coming into effect of IFRS9. This change will have a significant impact on 
banks’ profitability and capital provisioning. During the early implementation of the new 
reporting standard, the market is grappling with the different interpretations of the standard 
by the central banks and the tax authorities. At the same time, the issue of the treatment of 
banks’ exposure to the Government remains unresolved, especially since a common risk rating 
methodology has not been determined for assets such as government securities.    
4.7. Conclusion 
Economic activity has remained subdued across the region over recent years but is expected 
to recover already in 2018 as adverse weather conditions are no longer a drag on growth. 
However, public finances have deteriorated in recent years. The deceleration in economic 
activity and the impact of the electoral cycles led to an increase in the budget deficits in the 
region and to a corresponding increase in public debt. Most countries, even those with more 
comfortable debt positions, remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Risks to the outlook are rising 
and, in the short run, stem from potential external shocks.  
Access to finance remains a bottleneck for companies throughout the region, although less 
so in Kenya, particularly for SMEs and micro-enterprises. In some countries, lending to the 
public sector is crowding out private credit. Mobile accounts and financial inclusion is 
improving unevenly across the region. In some countries, less than 5% of the population uses 
digital banking or payment systems. 
The overall economic trends in East Africa have shaped the growth of the financial sector 
generally and the banking industry in particular. In the recent past, the region has 
experienced both policy and market shocks. Interest rate regulation in Kenya and a spate of 
bank failures have put the market in the spotlight. This has provided a wakeup call for both 
market regulators and players to be vigilant as opportunities for growth are pursued. 
Nonetheless, even with increasing exposure to credit risk, the banking industry in East Africa 
remains stable. 
The banking industry has been characterised by mixed performance in terms of efficiency 
and soundness. The low level of market competition is often masked by the extent of market 
concentration, country-specific regulatory issues, such as business climate, and country-
specific economic developments. Overall, the EAC banking system is characterised by both 
opportunity and risks. Economic growth remained strong, albeit with headwinds resulting in 
a slowdown across the board in 2017. The key policy message is that sustainable growth can 
only be achieved by macroeconomic and regulatory stability. 
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 Executive Summary 
 
• Economic growth in Southern Africa has been lacklustre recently, but a cautious 
recovery is underway. The pick-up in growth is supported by rising commodity 
prices, structural reforms that improve the business climate and ongoing 
regional integration.  
 
• Public finances remain the Achilles’ heel of most countries in the region. 
However, external risks are also rising as concerns are mounting about global 
trade conditions, while interest rates are set to rise further. 
 
• Access to finance remains a bottleneck for companies throughout the region. In 
some countries, lending to the public sector is crowding out private credit. 
Mobile accounts are spreading rapidly throughout the region, enhancing access 
to finance for individuals.   
 
• Slower GDP growth, weaker currencies, increasing public debt and reduced tax 
collection led to a deterioration of sovereign credit ratings, constraining the 
funding and liquidity of banks operating in Southern African markets. Managing 
heightened sovereign indebtedness is becoming the main challenge for many 
banks. 
 
• Despite distress in some markets, asset growth has remained positive and non-
performing loans have remained manageable. On the whole the region’s banks 
have remained strongly profitable.  
 
• Advanced economies’ banks have been withdrawing from the region, but 
regional banking groups have consolidated their presence. Given the conditions, 
more cross-border expansion could be expected. The declining number of 
correspondent banking relationships is a reason for concern. 
 
• Regulatory development has proceeded at a steady pace in the region 
particularly under the guidance of the IMF. Several markets are busy with 
redrafting legislation to improve oversight of banks and other financial 
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5.1. Recent Macroeconomic Trends 
Southern Africa is a diverse region. It covers countries with relatively high incomes per capita 
such as Botswana, Mauritius and the Seychelles, but also countries with very low incomes such 
as Comoros, Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique (Table 5.1.). Countries in the region also 
vary widely in population size, with South Africa being the most populous, followed by 
Mozambique, Angola and Madagascar, while other countries are sparsely populated. Though 
each is unique, Southern African countries have many development challenges in common, 
including the need for economic diversification, supporting entrepreneurship and financial 
sector development.  
Table 5.1. - Selected Macroeconomic Statistics 
(2017) 
 
Population Nominal GDP GDP per capita  
million USD billion 
PPP1-adjusted 
international 
dollar 
Angola 28.2 124.2            6,151  
Botswana 2.2 17.2          16,239  
Comoros 0.8 0.7            1,447  
eSwatini 1.1 4.5            9,003  
Lesotho 1.9 2.8            3,262  
Madagascar 25.6 11.5            1,413  
Malawi 19.2 6.2            1,063  
Mauritius 1.3 12.4          19,711  
Mozambique 29.5 12.7            1,133  
Namibia 2.3 12.7          10,303  
Seychelles 0.1 1.5          26,214  
South Africa 56.5 349.3          12,337  
Zambia 17.2 25.5            3,640  
Zimbabwe 14.9 17.5            2,079  
Average2 14.4 42.8            8,143  
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2018). 
1PPP = purchasing power parity. 
2Unweighted average. 
Economic growth has been lacklustre recently, but a modest recovery is underway in several 
countries. Annual growth has fallen from around 5% during 2010-14 to around 2.5% in recent 
years (Figure 5.1.), as the many commodity exporters in the region were hit by falling 
international demand and subsequent decline in prices. In some countries, domestic 
institutions, and various aspects of Basel III have been implemented in the larger 
markets. 
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developments also contributed to the growth slowdown, while lower demand from 
neighbours further weighed on growth. Only Madagascar and Mauritius recorded higher 
growth in recent years than during 2010-14. Lower commodity prices caused weaker foreign 
exchange earnings and tax receipts, contributing in many countries to sharply higher budget 
and current account deficits. That led to weaker exchange rates, contributing to inflation, 
which soared to almost 10% in 2016, but has recently started to normalise. Investment fared 
relatively well, even expanding as a share of GDP, which partly reflects the fact that 
governments kept their spending levels stable to help absorb the economic shock. The result, 
however, has been a deterioration of the average budget position from balanced in 2012 to a 
deficit of 5% of GDP in 2016 and 2017. Economic developments during the first part of 2018 
indicated a gradual strengthening of economic activity. 
Figure 5.1. - Recent Economic Developments in Southern Africa1 
(in per cent) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2018). 
1Unweighted average. 
With the moderate revival of commodity prices, heavy reliance on natural resources is no 
longer a drag on growth. The increasing oil price has been supporting the mild recovery in 
Angola, which depends on oil for 95% of its exports and a third of GDP, and continues to 
bolster the growth outlook. Similarly, Zambia benefitted from the recovery in copper prices, 
while rising gold and diamond prices supported growth in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
Nevertheless, the fall in commodity prices that extended from 2011 to 2016 highlighted the 
need for resource-rich countries to diversify their economies. Turning the increased 
awareness into actual changes is key for sustainable development. Similarly, Mozambique is 
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making slow but steady progress towards the exploitation of off-shore gas fields, but these 
future revenues should not distract from creating the conditions for growth in other sectors 
of its economy. As the region’s commodity exports are set to strengthen, while imports 
related to the extractive industry will remain high, current account deficits are expected to 
remain elevated. 
Structural reforms are improving the overall business climate throughout the region. 
Business conditions in Mauritius are already the best in Africa and were further improved by 
the new Business Facilitation Act (Figure 5.2.). Madagascar, Malawi and Zambia have also 
implemented several reforms to support private sector activity4. In Zimbabwe, political 
changes have stabilised business sentiment, which bodes well for improvements in the 
regulatory environment going ahead. Only in South Africa have business conditions slipped 
somewhat recently, although political changes there have also contributed to improved 
sentiment. Strengthening business conditions will help to attract foreign investment, which 
remains subdued. 
Figure 5.2. - Doing Business (Distance to Frontier) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Further regional itegration would boost growth and is supported through several 
supranational organisations. The five southernmost countries are part of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU). The four African countries in the Indian Ocean together with 
Réunion form the Indian Ocean Commission, which promotes co-operation and development. 
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) supports further socio-economic 
cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation among 16 Southern 
African countries. Several countries are members of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), a free trade area. SADC and COMESA together with the East 
                                                          
4 In Zambia, the overall Doing Business indicator improved despite the recent step-up in tax claims on foreign miners.  
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African Community launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement, which provides 
preferential treatment for selling goods and services in the 26 countries that are expected to 
participate. Many countries in Southern Africa have already signed the agreement which will 
deepen integration on the African continent.  
Public finances have stabilised, but remain the Achilles’ heel of the economic outlook of 
most Southern African countries. A mild increase in commodity prices, some fiscal reform 
and consolidation and a resumption of growth helped support government revenues. 
Although on average budget deficits stopped deteriorating in 2017, they remain high at almost 
5% of GDP. Bringing down those deficits, in particular through broadening the tax base and 
increasing the efficiency of social expenditure, is necessary to make public finances more 
sustainable and to create fiscal space for structural investments. Reducing deficits is also 
needed to bring down public debt, which reached over 50% of GDP in 2017 – an increase of 
12 percentage points in just three years. According to the IMF, Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
are in debt distress, with debt sustainability risks being high (and rising) in Zambia and 
moderate in the Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar and Malawi. In addition, most countries, 
including those with more comfortable debt positions, remain highly vulnerable to shocks, for 
example to the exchange rate or the oil price, while significant improvements crucially depend 
on the implementation of fiscal reforms.  
External risks to the outlook are rising. Trade prospects are less bright than they were a few 
years ago and might deteriorate further. Commodity prices have increased, but a slowdown 
in growth in advanced economies or the rebalancing of China might weigh on price 
developments, depressing export receipts and fiscal revenues. Brexit could also cause a 
reduction in exports, as technical and political complexities could delay arrangements to 
replace lapsing agreements with the EU. Botswana, Mauritius and the Seychelles are among 
the countries with the highest export dependence on the United Kingdom. 
Most currencies performed better than last year, and several countries managed to increase 
their foreign exchange reserves. The rand regained some ground after the sizable 
depreciation in 2015, which worked through currencies throughout the region. Most countries 
experienced less volatility and a stronger performance of their currencies than in previous 
years. As a result, several countries, including Mozambique, were able to increase reserves. 
Zambia on the other hand saw an early-2017 rally reversed as concerns mounted about the 
sustainability of public finances. Most countries still have overvalued exchange rates, which 
reduces competitiveness and hampers exports. 
Foreign exchange rate policies remained largely unchanged, but developments in some 
countries are noteworthy. In Botswana, the Ministry of Finance did not revise the weighting 
of the pula basket but changed the direction of the crawl from upwards to downwards as 
inflation in main trading partners was lower. The targeted weakening of the pula against the 
basket of currencies will be very small (0.3%) and actual exchange rate development will 
remain largely determined by the value of the rand versus hard currencies. In Mozambique, 
new regulation created a more open market for capital flows as exporters and investors are 
allowed to keep all proceeds in foreign currency. In Zimbabwe, the shortage of foreign 
currency led the government to introduce controls over capital and current account 
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transactions, with import rationing as a result. Persistent cash shortages gave rise to several 
quasi-currencies that complement the US dollar, with the informal market continuously 
searching for equilibrium pricing. A sustainable currency situation is likely to be accompanied 
by a devaluation of the quasi-currencies to improve the competitiveness of Zimbabwean 
exports.  
Several major leadership changes bolstered political stability. Until mid-2017, several 
countries in the region were facing imminent or inevitable leadership changes, without the 
assurance of these taking place smoothly. However, a year later several new leaders were in 
power following peaceful, albeit not necessarily straightforward, events. In South Africa, a 
long legal battle over corruption allegations caused Jacob Zuma to resign as president under 
threat of being dismissed by his party. The new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has vowed to 
combat corruption and to reverse the eroding trust in government, the criminal justice system 
and business. Some months earlier, Robert Mugabe, the long-time president of Zimbabwe, 
stepped down after mounting political and military pressure. The country’s population hopes 
that with a new president, a new era has begun with improving economic conditions and a 
normalisation of international relations. After elections in Angola, the ruling party kept its 
majority but João Lourenço took over from José Eduardo dos Santos who had been the 
president since 1979.  
The risk of instability remains tangible in some areas. The main risk relates to unrest in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, as a slide into anarchy would have repercussions for the 
wider region. Political and social unrest in Lesotho culminated in the deployment of a SADC 
military contingent in December 2017. The preventive mission has been successful in 
stabilising the political and security situation. In Madagascar, tensions were rising ahead of 
the presidential elections taking place in late 2018 as changes to the electoral law could result 
in several opposition leaders being barred from standing as candidates. On the positive side, 
the peace process in Mozambique is progressing despite continuing instability in the northern 
part of the country, and life in the affected areas has been normalising. 
5.2. Access to Finance and Financial Inclusion 
Access to finance remains a bottleneck for companies throughout the region, and recent 
years have not brought significant improvement. In Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa 
companies can rather easily obtain credit when needed (Figure 5.3). However, in several other 
countries the situation is much less conducive to economic activity. Unsurprisingly, micro 
firms face the largest difficulties. As several countries faced an economic slowdown, banks 
tightened their credit standards. At the same time, many also increased lending to the public 
sector, which needed to fund the increasing budget deficits. In some countries, high interest 
rates on sovereign paper decreased the attractiveness of lending to the private sector and 
bearing the related credit risk. The risk that lending to the public sector might crowd out 
private credit is particularly present in Zambia and Mozambique (see Chapter 7). 
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Figure 5.3. - Access to Credit of Micro Enterprises and SMEs 
(last available year) 
 
Source: SME Finance Forum database 
Access to financial services varies greatly throughout the region, but is in general 
improving. In Mauritius, 90% of the population over 15 has an account at a bank or 
another kind of financial institution, but in many countries this share is much lower, 
sometimes even below 25% (Figure 5.4.). In most countries, accounts have become more 
widespread, but in Botswana and South Africa there has been a modest decline. Women 
have an account almost as often as men, and in some countries even more often, while in 
many countries the rural population has caught up with the urban population. However, 
the difference in access between the poorest and the richest part of the population 
remains substantial in many countries. 
Mobile accounts are spreading rapidly throughout the region. The use of mobile 
payment services has increased, particularly in Zimbabwe (Figure 5.5.), where cash 
shortages have spurred the digitalisation of transactions. However, the use of mobile 
accounts has also increased rapidly in other countries, particularly Namibia. Compared to 
normal bank accounts, differences between men and women are more pronounced for 
mobile bank accounts, and the same holds for residents of urban and rural areas, and for 
the rich and the poor. 
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Figure 5.4. - Accounts at Banks or Other Financial Institutions 
(population Age 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank Global Findex database 
Figure 5.5. - Mobile Accounts 
(population Age 15+, in per cent) 
 
Source: World Bank Global Findex database 
5.3. The Financial Sector 
The region’s banking sectors faced heightened international regulatory scrutiny, generally 
weaker liquidity levels, and significant credit distress triggered by the slump in commodity 
prices from 2011 onward. The region’s banks vary widely in size, balance sheet structure and 
sophistication so conclusions about general performance features are difficult to draw 
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(Table 5.2.). However, many markets continued to see the ongoing effects of the commodity 
slump. A clear theme is sovereign credit weakness brought on by weaker GDP growth; 
depressed currencies and reduced tax collection led to deteriorating sovereign credit ratings 
that constrained the funding and liquidity of banks operating in Southern African markets. 
Several banking sectors redirected lending out of their private sectors and into the public 
sector to support sovereign finances, crowding out lending to the private sector (see 
Chapter 7). Tight foreign currency conditions made it difficult for some banking industries to 
support their customers’ foreign currency needs or to service their own foreign currency 
liabilities. Overall, there was weaker loan growth, heightened client debt distress and 
constrained profitability growth. While conditions in 2017 showed signs of improvement 
compared to the exceptionally weak 2016, banks are having to contend with several 
regulatory interventions including stringent anti-money laundering rules, the implementation 
of Basel II or III, and the imposition of IFRS 9 to standardise provisioning for credit defaults, 
while the economic recovery remains tepid. Some markets in the region, particularly Angola, 
have had to contend with the risk that their banks may lose key correspondent banking 
relationships, leaving them outside of the international banking circuit.  
Table 5.2. - Selected Financial Statistics 
(2016) 
 
Bank capital to 
assets ratio 
Domestic credit 
to private 
sector 
Gross domestic 
savings 
Interest rate spread 
(lending rate minus 
deposit rate) 
 
per cent per cent of GDP per cent of GDP per cent 
Angola NA 21.1 9.0 10.2 
Botswana 8.4 31.7 37.6 5.2 
Comoros NA 26.5 -6.9 8.8 
eSwatini 13.0 21.6 9.3 7.3 
Lesotho 13.2 16.8 -12.6 10.5 
Madagascar 10.7 13.1 13.0 45.0 
Malawi NA 10.5 3.3 32.5 
Mauritius 10.6 96.4 7.3 3.4 
Mozambique NA 34.5 0.3 10.4 
Namibia 11.1 67.2 2.0 4.2 
South Africa 8.2 144.4 19.5 3.3 
Seychelles 11.9 26.9 NA 8.9 
Zambia 12.1 15.4 34.7 4.7 
Zimbabwe NA NA -1.8 NA 
 
Source: World Bank 
On the whole the region’s banks have remained strongly profitable. Certain markets have 
experienced distress, particularly Angola where at least three banks are currently subject to 
support by the central bank, but in general asset growth has remained positive and non-
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performing loan ratios have remained manageable. The bigger challenge now is managing 
heightened sovereign indebtedness.  
Developed market banks have been withdrawing from markets in the region. In particular, 
Barclays has concluded the disinvestment of its majority interest in Barclays Africa Group, 
which is now broadly held through its listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and 
renamed Absa Group. The Barclays brand will be replaced with Absa in its African markets up 
until 2020. Insurance giant Old Mutual also intends to reduce its controlling stake in South 
Africa’s Nedbank to a minority strategic interest. Other global banks have also shown less 
interest in African networks, with Deutsche Bank due to shut down much of its operations in 
South Africa after Credit Suisse did so last year. Only Standard Chartered appears to remain 
committed to its African network among developed market banks. The loss of appetite from 
developed market banks for African assets has been driven by home market capital rules that 
have increased the costs of holding international subsidiaries, particularly for those banks 
deemed to be systemically important. 
Regional banking groups have, however, stabilised after a difficult 2015 and 2016 on the 
continent. Standard Bank, the largest on the continent by assets, grew profits from its regional 
network in 2017, as did Absa, the next largest regional player. Ecobank, the West and Central 
African banking network that has an alliance with South Africa’s Nedbank, recovered its 
profitability during the year too. Regional banking groups have become the main form of 
cross-border bank and we expect more cross-border expansion as banks grow from their 
domestic bases, particularly among Nigerian, Angolan and East African banks, which will 
gradually move into SADC markets. 
Regulatory development has proceeded at a steady pace in the region, particularly under 
the guidance of the IMF. The larger markets have all now introduced some form of 
macroprudential regulation to monitor the riskiness of the system as a whole and have 
adopted various stress testing methodologies to assess the riskiness of their banks. Several 
markets are busy with redrafting legislation to improve oversight of banks and other financial 
institutions. Various aspects of Basel III have been implemented in the larger markets 
including risk-weighted capital levels and, less often, net stable funding ratio requirements. 
Anti-money laundering regulation has also been a key feature of regulatory development in 
most markets as countries have urgently sought to protect their relationships with 
international providers. One country - Angola - has lost all of its US-based dollar clearing 
correspondent relationships over concerns regarding money laundering while several others 
have seen some of their banks similarly frozen out of US relationships. While these markets 
can rely instead on European or South African corresponding banks to maintain links to the 
international financial system, these are usually more cumbersome and expensive. 
Capital markets in the region remain dominated by South Africa, which has the largest and 
most sophisticated stock exchange and bond market by a considerable margin. Next largest 
Mauritius has been developing well, attracting new listings especially of regionally active 
investment vehicles. Smaller markets like Zambia have been attempting to accelerate capital 
market development by compelling international companies to list on domestic exchanges. 
However, liquidity is often so poor that such listings fail to see any appreciable volumes. Given 
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the funding demands of the state in those markets, there is little investment appetite for 
equities. Pension funds are still mostly channelled through state-owned fund managers who 
direct flows into government paper, property or cash, and hold little equity. Reforms to 
pension industries have attempted to address this pattern, but while the state remains the 
major recipient of funding there is unlikely to be much progress. Namibia and Botswana also 
have small but active stock exchanges while eSwatini, Mozambique and Malawi operate 
fledgling markets. Angola has long planned to launch a stock exchange but has continually 
delayed doing so. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange has seen the most active number of new 
listings with 37 companies in 2016 raising a total of USD 2.7bn of capital. Mauritius had two 
new listings and Botswana three, while Zambia and Zimbabwe had one each, collectively 
raising less than USD 300m.  
5.4. Country Comments 
5.4.A. ANGOLA 
Angola’s banking market faces difficult conditions, with a shortage of foreign currency, 
significantly deteriorating credit performance, and several banks surviving on central bank 
support. The sector has had its access to international funding substantially curtailed amid 
concerns over money laundering with US banks no longer willing to clear dollars for Angolan 
banks since October 2016. Angolan banks are also unable to raise funding on any international 
markets. There is a serious foreign currency shortage with workers in Angola’s oil sector no 
longer able to be paid in dollars without substantial difficulty. Some European banks are 
clearing dollars but at higher cost and with delays. Some progress has been made toward 
addressing the issue, with the Financial Action Task Force having removed Angola from its 
blacklist last year and an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for technical 
assistance to strengthen banking supervision and anti-money laundering oversight. 
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Table 5.3. - Major Banks in Angola 
 
2016 
Rank 
2015 
Rank 
Rank 
change 
Total 
assets 
(2016) 
Asset 
growth 
(2016) 
    USD million per cent 
Banco de Poupança e Crédito, S.A. 1 1 0 10,193 3.0 
Banco Angolano de Investimentos, S.A. 2 3 1 8,232 1.6 
Banco Fomento Angola 3 2 -1 7,914 -12.9 
Banco Económico S.A. 4 5 1 6,648 5.0 
Banco BIC Português, S.A. 5 4 -1 6,191 -14.3 
Banco Millennium Atlântico 6 6 0 5,717 51.1 
Banco Sol 7 8 1 2,392 -1.0 
Standard Bank Angola, S.A. 8 11 3 2,217 0.3 
Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola 9 10 1 1,947 -12.7 
Banco Caixa Geral Angola, S. A. 10 9 -1 1,888 -19.4 
Banco de Negócios Internacional, S.A. 11 12 1 1,560 -7.8 
Banco de Comércio e Indústria, S.A. 12 14 2 1,112 18.2 
Banco Regional do Keve SARL 13 13 0 848 -12.3 
Standard Chartered Bank Angola S.A. 14 17 3 292 65.6 
Banco Angolano de Negócios e Comércio, S.A. 15 16 1 279 -3.3 
BCA-Banco Comercial Angolano, SARL 16 15 -1 265 -23.6 
Industry       57,695 2.2 
Source: Fitch Connect 
Three of the country’s largest banks are receiving support from the central bank, according 
to media reports. The country’s largest bank, state-owned BPC, has been undergoing 
extensive restructuring since September 2016, with the media reporting a capital hole of 
around USD 1.4bn, some 14% of the bank’s total assets. According to the central bank, as 
much as 30% of its loan book may have to be impaired. The ninth largest bank, Banco de 
Desenvolvimento de Angola, a development bank that reported large losses in 2015 and 2016, 
and the 12th largest, Banco de Commercio e Industria SA, are also being reorganised under the 
supervision of the central bank. According to ratings agency Fitch, the fourth largest player, 
Banco Economico, is relying on central bank liquidity. After a controversial recapitalisation, 
Economico does however appear to be stabilising, and recently received a B3 credit rating 
from Moody’s, only the second Angolan bank to do so (BAI is the other). 
Despite the Angolan economy facing significant obstacles, there are pockets of strong 
profitability in Angola. BAI, the largest private sector bank, reported a return on equity of 
28% in 2017 with a net interest margin of 8.9% that has been growing for three years. Standard 
Bank Angola, the subsidiary of the South African group, has the highest ROE in the market at 
46% in 2017. Liquidity in the banking system has been constrained due to efforts to bring 
inflation under control while the public sector sucked up available credit, causing total credit 
to the private sector to fall by 1.8% in 2016, the first decline in many years. The central bank 
has introduced tough new capitalisation levels, increasing the capital requirement three-fold. 
The higher capital levels have to be met by end-2018 and are expected to lead to consolidation 
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in the fragmented industry. The central bank is also determined to boost anti-money 
laundering supervision with the aim of improving banks’ international relationships. 
5.4.B. BOTSWANA 
Botswana has a relatively well-developed and stable banking system that remains highly 
profitable despite economic weakness in 2015 brought on by lower diamond prices. A strong 
economic recovery on the back of higher diamond prices since, along with high government 
spending during the downturn, has ensured that the banking sector is healthy. The industry is 
dominated by four banks, three of which are subsidiaries of South African firms and one 
British. Average capital adequacy is close to 20% of risk-weighted assets, returns on equity 
among the big four are in the high 20% range, averaging 23% for the industry, while private 
sector credit extension has been growing at around 9% a year since 2015. Non-performing 
loans have however ticked upward, from 3.5% of gross loans in 2013 to 5.3% at end-2017.  
Table 5.4. - Major Banks in Botswana 
 
2016 
Rank 
2015 
Rank 
Rank 
change 
Total 
assets 
(2016) 
Asset 
growth 
(2016) 
 
   USD million per cent 
First National Bank of Botswana Limited 1 1 0 2,001 -5.5 
Barclays Bank of Botswana Limited 2 2 0 1,445 10.8 
Standard Chartered Bank Botswana Ltd. 3 3 0 1,303 11.5 
Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited 4 4 0 1,127 5.6 
African Banking Corporation of Botswana 
(Pty) Ltd. 5 5 0 781 10.2 
Letshego Holdings Limited 6 6 0 740 11.4 
Bank Gaborone Limited 7 7 0 405 2.6 
Botswana Building Society 8 8 0 347 -7.2 
Capital Bank Limited 9 10 1 153 27.5 
Bank of Baroda (Botswana) Limited 10 9 -1 148 1.0 
Bank of India (Botswana) Limited 11 11 0 17 -31.4 
Industry       8,468 5.3 
Source: Fitch Connect 
Government policy is focused on diversifying the economy from diamond mining, which 
includes an international financial centre to attract regional financial services groups to base 
themselves in Botswana. These efforts have had limited success, but the government has 
renewed its diversification plans which includes plans for increased minerals beneficiation, 
tourism, financial services, education and cattle farming. These plans are export-led and 
focused on developing the private sector, with extensive investment in infrastructure. The 
government is also privatising several state assets including the national telecommunications 
company and a power station. All of these efforts hold promise for the banking sector both 
directly in funding new development and indirectly through the resulting growth of a middle-
class consumer base in the small country. 
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The central bank is actively strengthening oversight. In line with international standards, the 
central bank is developing a macroprudential policy function to improve the management of 
risk in the banking system while pushing ahead with delayed efforts to implement full Basel II 
compliance. It is also improving its anti-money laundering regulations and monitoring to bring 
Botswana into line with international standards.  
5.4.C. MAURITIUS 
Along with Botswana and South Africa, Mauritius is the most developed banking market in 
the region with the highest banking services penetration. It is somewhat unique in having 
relatively little exposure to commodity prices as a net commodity importer, though its 
services-based economy does feel the secondary effects of the economic performance of 
other African markets. It maintained relatively strong economic growth during the 
commodities down cycle of 2011-2015. Credit growth to the private sector has been 
improving and stood at 7.5% in mid-2017, although the banking sector’s non-performing loan 
ratio is high compared to South Africa and Botswana at 7.1%. Profitability is reasonable, 
averaging 13.8% at end-2016. 
Table 5.5. - Major Banks in Mauritius 
 
2016 
Rank 
2015 
Rank 
Rank 
change 
Total 
assets 
(2016) 
Asset 
growth 
(2016) 
    USD 
million per cent 
MCB Group Limited 1 1 0 8,937 12.2 
SBM Holdings Ltd. 2 2 0 4,079 7.5 
Barclays Bank Mauritius Limited 3 3 0 3,000 -13.1 
Standard Chartered Bank (Mauritius) 
Limited 4 4 0 2,787 -19.2 
AfrAsia Bank Limited 5 5 0 2,491 17.0 
Standard Bank (Mauritius) Limited 6 7 1 1,535 8.2 
ICICI International Limited 7 6 -1 1,457 0.5 
SBI (Mauritius) Ltd 8 8 0 1,092 2.0 
Bayport Management Ltd. 9 9 0 1,074 9.9 
Maubank Ltd. 10 NA NA 801 NA 
Bank One Limited 11 13 2 702 24.2 
HSBC Bank (Mauritius) Ltd 12 11 -1 681 -5.4 
Banque des Mascareignes Ltee 13 12 -1 619 -1.6 
Deutsche Bank (Mauritius) Ltd 14 10 -4 605 -16.7 
ABC Banking Corporation Ltd 15 14 -1 425 21.3 
Warwyck Private Bank Ltd 16 16 0 206 73.7 
Industry        30,492  4.6 
Source: Fitch Connect 
Mauritius is reorienting its financial sector and has been increasingly successful in attracting 
regional financial services companies to base operations on the island. Various 
advantageous tax regimes, including for financial services, have at times brought the country 
into conflict with other jurisdictions over tax leakage. These now account for about half of the 
country’s banking assets. However, Mauritius has signed OECD and G20 agreements to 
Banking in Africa: Delivering on Financial Inclusion, Supporting Financial Stability 
 
© European Investment Bank, October 2018  135 
prevent base erosion and profit shifting which will require it to implement rules to prevent 
the abuse of tax treaties, but may also weaken Mauritius’s ability to attract global businesses. 
Mauritius’s Global Business Companies (GBC) sector has been a major source of credit and 
deposit growth for the banking system and represents some risk if the tax incentives that 
underpin the GBC regime are reversed. To counter that risk, Mauritian authorities are intent 
on evolving the rationale for establishing regional businesses in Mauritius from tax incentives 
to value-adding services and efficient access to markets, particularly in Africa. 
The Central Bank of Mauritius has been steadily improving the bank supervision regime. It 
is introducing several elements of Basel III including capital adequacy and liquidity regulations, 
while creating a macroprudential policy regime. The international character of the financial 
services industry creates specific risks, particularly of currency mismatches in deposits and 
assets. The IMF has encouraged Mauritius to stress test for these risks and to implement 
Basel III net stable funding ratios to address them. Is has also provided technical assistance to 
strengthen the bank resolution framework. 
5.4.D. NAMIBIA 
Namibia has a vibrant and sophisticated banking sector that is closely tied to South Africa’s. 
The four largest banks are all South African. Asset growth has been consistently above 10% 
for several years and ROE above 20%, coming in at 21.1% last year. The industry is well 
capitalised with a 15.5% risk-weighted capital ratio, which is high given the sophistication of 
the industry. Non-performing loan ratios are among the lowest in the region at 2.5% at end-
2017, though this was the highest level since mid-2010. 
Table 5.6. - Major Banks in Namibia 
 
2016 
Rank 
2015 
Rank 
Rank 
change 
Total 
assets 
(2016) 
Asset 
growth 
(2016) 
 
   USD million per cent 
Capricorn Investment Holdings 
Limited 1 1 0 2,623 -5.8 
FNB Namibia Holdings Limited 2 2 0 2,314 -5.2 
SBN Holdings Ltd. 3 3 0 1,980 28.3 
Standard Bank Namibia Limited 4 4 0 1,979 28.2 
NedNamibia Holdings Limited 5 5 0 1,172 31.8 
Nedbank Namibia Limited 6 6 0 1,144 32.5 
Agribank of Namibia 7 7 0 203 15.6 
Bank BIC Namibia Limited 8 NA NA 22 NA 
Industry         11,435  14.2 
 
Source: Fitch Connect 
Credit extension is substantial with a household debt-to-income ratio of 83%, comparable 
with several developed economies and ahead of South Africa’s 71%. The banking sector is 
highly exposed to Namibia’s housing market with residential mortgages accounting for 40% 
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of all loans in the banking system and commercial real estate a further 12%. This relatively 
high exposure has been flagged as a risk by the central bank which is concerned about the 
potential impact of a property market contraction. 
Namibia’s central bank has been working with the legislature to upgrade legislation for the 
financial sector, ranging from deposit insurance to financial markets laws. These will bring 
Namibian banking oversight in line with international standards. Bank supervision is already 
of high quality with robust inspections. The Bank of Namibia has, however, been lagging in 
macroprudential supervision according to an IMF assessment, with a Financial Stability Council 
planned for the task of macroprudential supervision but not yet established. Legislation is also 
being amended to increase domestic investment allocations for institutional investors from 
35% to 45% of their portfolios. This is expected to deepen domestic capital markets and 
increase liquidity in the financial system.  
5.4.E. SOUTH AFRICA 
South African banks have had a reasonably good few years, benefitting from a stronger 
credit performance following a difficult period after the global financial crisis. Stringent 
credit management and higher pricing then led to a recovery in the performance of loan 
books, though credit metrics have begun a new downturn. Underlying growth was moderate 
over the last year, with growth in total assets of 5.1% in the year to end-January 2018, while 
total profits grew 6.6% and return on equity averaged 16.0% (2017: 17.5%). Improving 
profitability was achieved largely thanks to stronger net interest margins, while credit 
performance reversed several years of improvements, with impaired advances growing by 
9.2%. Capital levels continued to improve, now averaging 16.1%, suggesting that banks are 
prepared for the credit cycle to continue a downward phase. 
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Table 5.7. - Major Banks in South Africa 
 
2016 
Rank 
2015 
Rank 
Rank 
change 
Total 
assets 
(2016) 
Asset 
growth 
(2016) 
 
   USD million per cent 
Standard Bank Group Limited 1 1 0 142,642 11.6 
Barclays Africa Group Limited 2 2 0 80,458 9.3 
Nedbank Group Limited 3 3 0 70,593 18.5 
Nedbank Limited 4 4 0 65,773 18.8 
PSG Group Ltd. 5 5 0 6,300 41.0 
Capitec Bank Holdings Limited 6 6 0 5,632 43.7 
African Bank Holdings Limited 7 NA NA 2,715 0.0 
RMB Holdings Limited 8 7 -1 2,678 -10.6 
Toyota Financial Services (South Africa) 
Limited 9 8 -1 2,612 25.6 
SAHL Investment Holdings (Proprietary) 
Limited 10 9 -1 2,271 27.0 
Grindrod Bank Limited 11 11 0 1,108 53.3 
Mercantile Bank Holdings Ltd. 12 14 2 893 38.3 
Mercantile Bank Limited 13 15 2 854 37.7 
Transaction Capital Limited 14 12 -2 799 14.2 
Sasfin Holdings Ltd. 15 10 -5 745 -16.4 
Sasfin Bank Limited 16 13 -3 611 -11.6 
Industry       386,683 14.7% 
 
Source: Fitch Connect 
The country’s difficult economic conditions had repercussions on the banking sector. 
Consumer and business confidence have been seriously damaged by perceptions of rampant 
corruption, which is now widely discussed under the label “state capture”. The precarious 
financial situation of some large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) contributed to serious 
concerns about the sustainability of public finances as the budget deficit ballooned and credit 
metrics of key government balance sheets deteriorated sharply. The Reserve Bank, which 
oversees the banking system, was itself subjected to attacks as part of the state capture 
efforts, but fended these off robustly. Two of the three major international rating agencies 
downgraded South Africa’s sovereign debt to junk for both local and foreign currency issues 
in 2017. This constrained funding access for South Africa’s banks, though they were able to 
protect margins by front loading issuance before the downgrades. The installation of new 
president Cyril Ramaphosa led to a resurgence in confidence, but this has yet to result in 
tangible investment and resumption of solid economic growth, and the ongoing difficult 
economic situation will thus continue to hamper the credit performance of banks.  
The Reserve Bank’s role as a supervisor of the banking system was changed dramatically in 
April this year with the launch of the Prudential Authority as a replacement for the previous 
bank supervision department. This represents the culmination of the “Twin Peaks” regulatory 
authority which sees systemic stability fall under the authority of the Prudential Authority, 
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while an external Financial Sector Conduct Authority focuses on market conduct issues, 
incorporating what had been the Financial Services Board. The Prudential Authority will now 
oversee risk in all financial institutions, including insurance companies, at both 
macroprudential (system wide) and microprudential (individual institution) levels. To combat 
money laundering, a risk-based rather than rules-based system has been introduced to limit 
financial crime by banks, aligning South Africa with global best practice.  
The sector is set to face much more competition in the years ahead, with the entry of new 
banks for the first time in several years, as well as a reorientation of several older banks. 
The Post Bank, a part of the country’s Post Office, has been corporatised and is expected to 
become a more aggressive competitor. African Bank, the result of the curatorship and rescue 
plan of the old African Bank that collapsed in 2015, is profitable and ramping up activities to 
become a full-fledged retail bank. Three new banks have been granted licenses, Discovery 
Bank, Bank Zero, and TymeDigital, a subsidiary of Commonwealth Bank of Australia, that are 
each promising radical innovations for the consumer market. These will spur innovation in the 
industry, which is already world class. 
South Africa’s large banks also all have aspirations to grow in the rest of Africa. During the 
first part of the year, Barclays concluded its majority disinvestment from Barclays Africa, which 
has been renamed Absa. Absa now needs to develop its go-it-alone strategy through the 12 
African markets where it has banks or representative offices. Standard Bank, which rivals Absa 
for the biggest African network, has operations in 17 African markets, and uses its strategic 
relationship with the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China to leverage off the China-Africa 
trade corridor. Nedbank owns banks in neighbouring markets and has a strategic shareholding 
in Ecobank, which is widely active in West and Central Africa. FirstRand has been following a 
slower organic growth strategy, starting new businesses in key markets to grow its African 
network to ten other African countries. As discussed under other country headings, South 
Africa’s banks are often the largest banks in the rest of SADC’s markets. 
5.4.F. Zambia 
The banking system is dominated by foreign-owned banks, a feature that has ensured its 
continued integration into the global financial system. Domestic-owned banks have been 
losing correspondent banking relationships amid concerns over anti-money laundering 
regulation. The two largest banks are subsidiaries of South African banks followed by Britain’s 
Standard Chartered, while fourth-ranking Zanaco is the largest domestic bank by some 
margin. Last year Zanaco’s largest shareholder, the Dutch lender Rabobank, transferred its 
46% stake into a new entity, Arise BV, which is backed by Norfund, Rabobank and the Dutch 
Development Bank. 
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Table 5.8. - Major Banks in Zambia 
 2016 Rank 
2015 
Rank 
Rank 
change 
Total 
assets 
(2016) 
Asset 
growth 
(2016) 
    USD 
million per cent 
Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited 1 1 0 1,062 7.8 
Barclays Bank Zambia PLC 2 3 1 877 6.2 
Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Plc 3 4 1 828 5.5 
Zambia National Commercial Bank Plc 4 5 1 807 11.5 
Bank of China Zambia Limited 5 7 2 611 43.5 
First National Bank Zambia Limited 6 6 0 547 9.5 
African Banking Corporation Zambia Limited 7 9 2 336 42.4 
Citibank Zambia Limited 8 10 2 230 16.2 
Bayport Financial Services Limited 9 11 2 180 21.3 
Ecobank Zambia Limited 10 13 3 153 26.9 
Investrust Bank Plc 11 12 1 130 2.3 
Cavmont Bank Limited 12 14 2 96 -13.2 
Cavmont Capital Holdings Zambia Plc 13 15 2 96 -13.2 
First Alliance Bank Zambia Limited 14 16 2 68 8.3 
Access Bank (Zambia) Limited 15 17 2 58 -0.7 
United Bank Africa Zambia Limited 16 19 3 55 54.1 
Industry         6,133  14.1 
 
Source: Fitch Connect 
The Zambian banking sector has struggled to recover from the 2015 collapse in copper prices 
as public finances have been worsening. Non-performing loans have remained stubbornly 
high and increasing, at over 12% in mid-2017, despite a moderate recovery in copper prices 
since mid-2016. Growing government arrears to suppliers have filtered through into NPLs, 
which also suffered from electricity blackouts in 2016 on the back of a long drought that 
compromised hydroelectric supply.  
Despite the poor conditions in the banking sector, it remains fairly profitable with ROEs of 
around 15%, although these have been declining from over 30% in 2011. Profitability is 
helped by high interest rates, which were at 24.5% on average in December 2017 as well as 
over 10% on government paper and the relatively passive deposits available in the domestic 
market. With inflation at around 7%, real interest rates are high. Lending margins were steady 
at around 14.5% during 2017. As the government’s need for funding has drained much 
liquidity out of the market, bank appetites for further private sector lending have been 
constrained (see also Chapter 7), which in turn is hampering growth. The microfinance sector 
now comprises 34 lending institutions, though most have small balance sheets and focus on 
payroll lending.  
Banks are grappling with the implementation of IFRS 9, which imposes an expected loss 
model for the calculation of provisions in place of the incurred loss model that applied 
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previously. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, Zambian bankers have raised the lack of 
quality forward-looking data as a major impediment to the implementation of IFRS 9, a 
problem that several other markets in the region will also experience.  
The Bank of Zambia undertakes regular stress tests of credit and liquidity vulnerabilities and 
generally ensures good macroprudential oversight of the sector. However, the IMF last year 
criticised the central bank for falling behind international best practice, citing staff shortages 
that lead to insufficient bank inspections and cumbersome and outdated legal frameworks. 
5.4.G. ZIMBABWE 
Despite the difficult conditions toward the end of Robert Mugabe’s presidency, the banking 
sector managed to grow dollar-denominated assets, though the inability to monetise these 
assets makes the figures more notional than real. Political change in the last quarter of 2017 
had an immediately positive impact on the banks, with average ROE increasing to 15.5% from 
11.15% in the previous quarter. Net profit was 33.6% higher in the last quarter compared to 
a year earlier. Capitalisation is strong at over 27% while the non-performing loan ratio also 
trended downward in the last quarter to 7.1%. However, the major dollar shortage of the 
country hampers the convertibility of assets and complicates understanding banks’ health. 
This has clear consequences for consumers who are limited to ATM withdrawals of USD 20 in 
the form of bond notes. Physical cash trades at a 40% premium to electronic cash on the black 
market, and government bonds and notes at some 20%. As most banks hold large amounts of 
government paper or have large central bank balances, any recognition of their lower real 
value could have substantial repercussions for banks’ health. 
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Table 5.9. - Major Banks in Zimbabwe 
 
2016 
Rank 
2015 
Rank 
Rank 
change 
Total 
assets 
(2016) 
Asset 
growth 
(2016) 
 
   USD million per cent 
ABC Holdings Ltd. 1 2 1 2,040 12.7 
CBZ Bank Limited 2 1 -1 1,913 5.4 
Central Africa Building Society 3 3 0 1,073 2.9 
Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Ltd. 4 4 0 846 42.1 
FBC Holdings Limited 5 5 0 610 24.4 
Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd. 6 9 3 504 31.5 
Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited 7 12 5 476 59.1 
FBC Bank Limited 8 8 0 470 21.4 
ZB Financial Holdings Ltd 9 7 -2 439 5.2 
Ecobank Zimbabwe Limited 10 14 4 395 69.0 
NMB Bank 11 10 -1 321 -3.9 
NMBZ Holdings Ltd. 12 11 -1 321 -3.8 
MBCA Bank Limited 13 13 0 299 22.6 
Steward Bank Limited 14 16 2 226 34.0 
Metbank Limited 15 17 2 201 27.1 
People's Own Savings Bank 16 18 2 164 22.9 
Industry         10,299  18.9 
 
Source: Fitch Connect 
Once the liquidity problem is dealt with and the resulting balance sheet issues are fully 
digested, Zimbabwe’s banks are set for radical transformation as they step up to playing a 
bigger role in an economic recovery. Substantial foreign lending is required to restore 
liquidity in Zimbabwe, though it needs to tackle legacy debts in order to regain access to large-
scale development assistance. While most international lenders are waiting for the elections 
scheduled for July, a USD 100m loan from Britain’s CDC and Standard Chartered was already 
secured beforehand, making it the first time since 1999 that the country could tap 
international capital markets. After the liquidity problem is fully dealt with, the presence of 
several foreign-owned banks may help to reintegrate Zimbabwe into the international 
economy, restoring its once vibrant agricultural sector, tourism and natural resources 
industries. More generally, the banking sector is sophisticated with a diverse set of products, 
and is well positioned to service a strong recovery in Zimbabwe’s economy.   
5.5. Conclusion  
The region is slowly recovering from the economic slowdown, but banks, although in 
general in good shape, are still grappling with the fallout. Profitability has remained solid, 
and capital positions are in general strong. However, in some countries several banks had to 
be taken over by the supervisor. NPL levels remain elevated, as the impact of the commodity 
price slump of 2011-2015 works its way through the system. Banks’ funding costs have 
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increased due to the downgrades of their sovereigns on the back of their deteriorating budget 
situation. As lending to the public sector increased, crowding out of the private sector has 
been intensifying in several countries. As foreign banks have reduced their presence, the 
economic recovery could provide opportunities for local and regional banks provided that 
they can arrange the liquidity required to step up lending activities.   
As the region looks to regain the growth rates of a decade ago, it will require its banks and 
financial systems to support development. That is feasible if governments are able to stabilise 
their own finances and work to create the enabling environment that will see banking systems 
financing productive areas of their economies. Higher commodity prices can underpin a broad 
economic recovery, but sustainable improvements in the financial systems of the region will 
require political will to align regulation with global standards to ensure their banks form a part 
of the global financial system. 
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6. Banking Sectors in North Africa: Improving Slowly 
but Noticeably1 
Samia Azzabi2, Jad Benhamdane2 and Andreas Kappeler3 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
• Being the most industrially advanced region in Africa, North African 
countries are currently undergoing a more prominent economic 
transformation to avoid the middle-income country gap. Many countries 
see this transformation as an opportunity to also make economic growth 
more inclusive and improve the business environment. 
 
• The economic outlook for North Africa remains positive, thanks to 
considerable structural and macroeconomic reforms. GDP growth in 
North Africa reached 3.4% in 2017. Besides, the fiscal policy is improving 
thanks to the introduction of new taxes and rising oil prices. It should also 
support the creation of sustainable and quality jobs. 
 
• Building on notable progress in recent years, the business environment is 
quite competitive, especially in Morocco and Tunisia. However, more 
efforts are expected to be made regarding certain specific infrastructure 
needs, notably to better connect rural areas and upgrade trade links. 
 
• Financial sectors in the region are still dominated by traditional banking 
activities. Banks are well developed and have a pan African vision. Non-
bank financial institutions are still at an early stage of development. This 
represents an opportunity in terms of enhancing SME financing and 
financial inclusion. 
 
• Banking supervision improved across the region over the past few years. 
Internationally accepted prudential standards have been adopted in 
several countries. Continued efforts are under way to comply with the 
Basel III regulatory framework. 
                                                          
1 North Africa refers in this chapter to Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Libya is not included in most of the analysis 
in this chapter because some of its economic and political characteristics and current macroeconomic and banking 
sector dynamics are significantly different from those of other economies in the region. The situation in Libya is 
addressed separately within this chapter but Libya’s outlier figures are not used in regional averages and tables. 
2 Samia Azzabi and Jad Benhamdane are economists at Institute of Africa - Launched in 2016, Institute of Africa was 
designed to meet the increased information needs regarding Africa and the will to better understand economic 
evolution and development opportunities on the continent. 
3 Andreas Kappeler is an economist at the European Investment Bank. 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment 
Bank or Institute of Africa. All remaining errors remain the authors’. 
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6.1. Recent Macroeconomic Trends 
The events of the “Arab Spring” led to a process of political change in several 
countries in the region. The results of this economic and political change were different 
depending on the country in North Africa: 
• In Egypt, the election in 2014 of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi marked the return of 
political stability, and the transition process continued following the 
Parliamentary election in January 2016. 
• Morocco reformed its Constitution in 2011, radically overhauling the country’s 
institutions. King Mohammed VI launched a political, economic and social 
modernisation of the country marked by greater openness, which was 
recognised by international observers. 
• In Tunisia, seven years after the Jasmine Revolution, the transition to 
democracy is reaching fruition with the adoption of the new constitution and 
the organisation of free elections. 
• Algeria seems to be the only country where the uprising in 2011 did not bring 
about major institutional change. The implementation of important social 
policies – wage increases and a far-reaching social assistance plan – helped 
contain protests. 
To successfully pursue this political transformation process, the countries in the 
region have launched initiatives designed to promote financial inclusion and inclusive 
growth. This must include creating opportunities for all social groups, by promoting 
access to financing and education and ensuring that increased prosperity is shared 
fairly across society (AfDB, 2017). 
6.1.A. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: FAVOURABLE OUTLOOK 
Although down, economic growth in North Africa remained robust in 2017 at 3.4% 
(Figure 6.1. below). A good harvesting season, strong external demand and structural 
reforms in certain countries underpinned economic growth. 
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Figure 6.1. - Change in GDP Growth 
(in %) 
 
Source: IMF 
The major economic turning points in the region over the last decade concerned the 
international financial crisis, the events of the Arab Spring and the instability of raw 
material prices. The international trade vacuum, combined with a decline in foreign 
direct investment, resulted in a slower pace of growth and the need to support the 
economy in a number of countries in the region. Public accounts and current balances 
therefore deteriorated. Adjustments related to the Arab Spring also limited the region's 
growth prospects. 
Since 2012, the region's economic environment has stabilised. Egypt's economic 
growth has benefited from the development of new gas resources and from budgetary 
reforms (IMF, 2018). The floating of the pound at the end of 2016, coupled with support 
for international lenders and budgetary reforms, have helped correct the 
macroeconomic imbalances experienced since 2011. Until 2015, Algeria managed to 
curb the impact of reduced hydrocarbon prices and generated GDP growth of more 
than 3%. Nevertheless, the difficulties encountered in terms of financing public 
investment severely impacted the rate of economic growth, which fell to 2% in 2017 
(IMF, 2017a). The outlook is still favourable, however, with the IMF projecting growth 
of 3% in 2018. 
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Table 6.1. - Macroeconomic Indicators  
(2017) 
  
Regional 
average* Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Libya 
GDP growth (constant prices; annual %) 3.4 2.0 4.2 4.2 1.9 70.8 
GDP (current prices; USD bn) 180 178 237 110 40 31 
GDP per capita (current prices; USD) 3331 4292 2501 3348 3913 7411 
Government gross debt (% GDP)* 69 26 103 64 71 n.a. 
Fiscal balance (% GDP) -7.9 -6.4 -11.4 -3.6 -6.0 -43.2 
Current account balance (% of GDP) -8.1 -12.3 -6.5 -3.8 -10.1 2.2 
External debt (% of GDP)* 27.1 2.3 33.3 35.0 78.1 n.a. 
Inflation, CPI (% change) 12.2 5.6 23.5 0.8 5.3 28.0 
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 11.9 11.7 12.2 10.2 15.3 n.a. 
Notes: * Regional average excludes Libya. 
Source: IMF 
The impressive budgetary consolidation efforts undertaken must continue 
(Table 6.1.). Sustainability of public finances suffered in 2017, with North Africa 
showing the highest deficit on the continent (7.9%). This imbalance was essentially 
caused by the widening of Algeria’s budget deficit from 7% in 2014 to 13% in 2016 due 
to the drop in hydrocarbon prices. In 2017, the uptick in oil prices helped improve this 
deficit to 6%. 
Ongoing budgetary stabilisation efforts suggest that budget deficits in the region will 
continue to improve. For example, as from 2018, Egypt's tax revenue is expected to 
benefit from improved economic growth, the effect of the new 14% VAT rate that has 
been in force since end-2016, and the revision of excise duties and charges on certain 
goods and services. 
The unemployment rate of the countries in the region has stabilised but remains high. 
Over the past five years, the unemployment rate in Algeria and Tunisia has remained 
at 11% and 15% respectively, whilst in Morocco it fell from 10% in 2014 to 9.5% in 2018 
and in Egypt it decreased from 13% in 2014 to 11% in 2018. Egypt aims to reduce its 
unemployment rate to 4% as part of its “Egypt 2030 Vision” strategy whilst the Tunisia 
2016-2020 Development Plan aims to reduce the unemployment rate to 12%. 
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Figure 6.2. - Change in Inflation 
(in %) 
 
Source: IMF 
Inflation in the region was mostly driven by the rise in raw material prices in Algeria 
and the forced liberalisation of the Egyptian pound (Figure 6.2.). Inflation in North 
Africa rose from 7.2% in 2016 to 11.5% in 2017, driven chiefly by events in Egypt, whose 
currency depreciated and whose certified electricity tariffs increased. In Algeria, the 
inflation rate was nearly 7% in 2016 and 5.5% in 2017 following the increase in prices 
of manufactured and imported products and the fluctuation of food prices. In recent 
years, Morocco and Tunisia have managed to keep their inflation rates below 4%. 
The drop in prices of basic products has widened the current account deficits of 
countries in the region. Countries in the region are characterised by large current 
account deficits, except Morocco which has a current surplus of 3.8%. Deteriorating 
terms of trade are contributing to this trend. 
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Table 6.2. - Evolution of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
(USD millions) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Algeria 2 580 1 499 1 684 1 507 584 1 546 
Egypt - 483 6 031 4 256 4 612 6 925 8 107 
Morocco 2 658 2 728 3 928 3 561 3 255 2 322 
Tunisia 1 148 1 603 1 117 1 064 1 002 958 
North Africa 7 548 15 759 11 952 12 089 12 981 14 472 
West Africa 18 926 16 822 14 479 12 176 10 189 11 433 
Africa 66 018 77 501 74 551 71 254 61 495 59 373 
 
Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD 2017. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be a powerful engine of growth and innovation 
thanks to the transfer of knowledge (UNCTAD, 2017). North Africa’s inflows rose by 
more than 11% to USD 14.5bn in 2016 (Table 6.2.). Over 50% of these inflows - 
representing on average 2% of GDP in the countries of the region in 2016 - concerned 
Egypt. This reflects the discovery of new gas reserves in the west of Egypt and reforms 
of the exchange rate regime, which made the exchange rate more flexible and the 
country more competitive. Egypt is gradually positioning itself as an attractive hub in 
the region. Morocco is ranked second for FDI thanks to the development of its high-
tech industry - especially in the aeronautics and automotive fields. By contrast, foreign 
investment in Algeria and Tunisia remains weak, amounting to USD 1.5bn and USD 1bn 
respectively in 2016. 
Table 6.3. - Doing Business Ranking 2016-2018 
  2018 rank 
2017 
rank 
2016 
rank 
Number of reforms 
undertaken 2016-2018 
Algeria 166 156 163 6 
Egypt 128 122 126 4 
Morocco 69 68 68 11 
Tunisia 88 77 75 3 
 
Source: World Bank Group. 
In recent years, North African countries have made major changes to improve their 
business climate (Table 6.3.). Algeria has adopted a number of reforms aimed at 
removing a minimum capital requirement for setting up a company and reducing the 
rate of tax levied on business activities. Morocco is the top ranked country in the region 
in the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking. Morocco simplified its procedures for 
setting up a business. Notwithstanding their different socio-economic backgrounds, 
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Tunisia and Egypt have also made substantive changes, principally aimed at facilitating 
the creation of businesses and improving cross-border trade. 
Nonetheless, the position of North African countries in the Doing Business ranking 
has remained unchanged in recent years. Sustained efforts are required to make the 
region more competitive. For example, political instability is considered to be a major 
obstacle by nearly half of all companies in Egypt and Tunisia. Moroccan businesses 
lament the fact that, despite the considerable improvements that have been made, red 
tape and an inadequately trained workforce represent the prime obstacles to 
improving the country’s business climate (EIB, EBRD and WBG, 2016). 
Libya, which is not included in the regional averages presented in this chapter, is 
characterised by instability and substantial macroeconomic fluctuations (World Bank 
Group, 2018). GDP growth in Libya reached 71% in 2018 and is expected to moderate 
to 16% in 2018, according to the IMF. Sustaining growth requires bold reform efforts 
to resolve political strife and a comprehensive programme to rebuild the economic and 
social infrastructures. Both the fiscal and current account balances will significantly 
improve. However, high inflation coupled with weak basic service delivery are likely to 
have raised inequalities. Inflation hit a record level of 28% in 2017 reflecting acute 
shortages in the supply chains of basic commodities, speculation in the expanding black 
markets and the strong devaluation of the Libyan dinar (World Bank Group, 2018). 
6.1.B. REGIONAL INTEGRATION: OPENNESS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT 
Regional integration in North Africa is less developed than in other regions on the 
African continent. The achievement of the objectives of the Arab Maghreb Union has 
never come to fruition. The Union is an economic and political organisation formed by 
the five Maghreb countries in 1990 with the goals of establishing a free trade area and 
boosting the economic development of its Member States. The Maghreb region is 
estimated to lose 2-3% of GDP each year due to a lack of openness and regional 
integration (AfDB, 2012). 
In recent years, North African countries started to search for new commercial 
opportunities. Following the slowdown observed in Europe, the region’s traditional 
partner, North African countries showed an increasing interest in opening up to sub-
Saharan economies. North African countries’ membership of the African Continental 
Free Trade Area (ZLECA) and their closer ties with both the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) now offer genuine prospects to this region and foster deeper commercial 
ties with other African regions. 
• Morocco re-joined the African Union in 2016 and took its first steps towards 
joining ECOWAS. The country also stepped up its operations on the continent, 
particularly in West and East Africa, in sectors such as banking, insurance, 
pharmaceuticals, logistics, etc. 
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• Algeria has formed closer ties with countries such as Nigeria and South Africa 
under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) principally for 
projects in the infrastructure and hydrocarbons sectors. 
• Egypt is also deeply committed to opening up the region to the rest of the 
continent, and in 2015 oversaw the signature of a tripartite free trade 
agreement between the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), advocating the development of intra-African trade 
as a driver of growth in North Africa. 
• Tunisia, with 10% of intra-regional trade according to the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), is the best-performing North African country in 
terms of regional integration. 
6.2. Financial Inclusion 
Financial inclusion in North Africa has made substantial progress, but gaps remain 
(Table 6.4. below). Countries in the region have progressed in a number of areas. The 
share of adults with an account is relatively high in Algeria and Tunisia. A relatively large 
share of adults in Tunisia and Egypt borrow from financial institutions and the use of 
debit cards is relatively widespread in Egypt. Nonetheless, the gap with upper middle-
income countries remains notable in a number of aspects. 
Table 6.4. - Financial Inclusion Indicators 
(% of population aged 15+, 2017) 
  
North 
Africa 
Upper 
middle 
income Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia 
Account 34.7 73.1 42.8 32.8 28.6 36.9 
Account, female 26.0 69.3 29.3 27.0 16.8 28.4 
Digital access bank account 3.8 30.0 2.0 1.3 1.2 3.7 
Debit card ownership 25.4 58.8 20.0 24.8 21.1 23.5 
Outstanding housing loan 4.8 11.1 4.7 3.9 2.8 8.0 
Borrowed from a financial institution 5.4 9.9 3.0 6.3 2.6 8.5 
Saved at a financial institution  10.1 26.9 11.4 6.2 6.3 18.3 
Source: World Bank Group: The Global Findex Database 2017.  
 
Box 6.1. - The Digital Sector and Islamic Finance, Engines of Opportunity for the 
Region 
The region's banks are not shying away from developing new products and services. 
The use of mobile payment methods and remote banking services offers a real 
opportunity for development. Currently, just 3% of the adult population use e-payment 
services. 
 
In terms of innovation, the banking sector in the region has numerous assets. Remote 
banking services and e-banking are emerging against a backdrop of high internet 
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penetration (49%) and mobile internet access throughout the region. Banks are 
increasingly using low-cost digital distribution channels that require innovative 
technologies. 
 
Mobile payment is growing at a slower pace in North Africa than in the rest of the 
continent, except in Egypt where the service has been available since 2013. Tunisia 
has officially adopted mobile payment services under its “Digital Tunisia 2020” national 
strategic plan.  Morocco has announced that mobile payment services will be available 
this year. The Algerian authorities are still opposed to the introduction of these kinds 
of services. 
 
Islamic finance also contributes to financial inclusion. The development of Islamic 
finance in the region could represent a driver of financial inclusion as part of the 
population does not use banks for religious reasons. This type of finance could also 
support the emergence of new facilities for financing public investment and 
alternatives to microfinance (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Randall, 2013). 
 
For some countries, Islamic finance serves as a solution to make up their budget 
deficit. The Algerian government plans to introduce sovereign issues of Sukuk on the 
Islamic financial markets. In Tunisia, despite numerous efforts made since 2013 to put 
in place a suitable regulatory framework for the emergence of Islamic finance, its share 
of the local financial market is below 5%. In Morocco, the growth of Islamic finance is 
most recent. In 2017 the Central Bank issued five “participation” banking licences and 
Islamic finance accounted for up to 10% of Morocco's banking assets. On the other 
hand, Egypt has experienced very slow growth in Islamic finance. Of the country’s 40 
banks, only three are entirely dedicated to Islamic finance and 12 universal banks offer 
“sharia-compliant” products. 
 
Currently, Islamic finance activity is less developed in North Africa than in Asia and 
Europe (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Randall, 2013). Just 3% of adults in Egypt and 
Algeria, 2% in Tunisia and 1% in Morocco are consumers of “sharia-compliant” 
products. Worldwide, the Islamic finance market is worth USD 2tn and is growing at an 
annual rate of 15-20%. 
 
Banks in the region have made considerable efforts to develop the density of their 
branch networks. Moreover, the provision of banking and financial services is 
increasingly adapted to each customer segment, for both individuals and businesses, 
although challenges remain. This ensures a better match between supply and demand. 
Financial institutions also invest in the digitalisation of their products and services. 
Coupled with a high rate of penetration of mobile telephony and the internet, this 
should further improve access to financial services (Box 6.1.). 
Financial intermediation is fairly developed in North Africa and provides a solid basis 
to further strengthen financial inclusion. The ratio of private credit to GDP in the 
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region is well above the average for peer economies. Morocco and Tunisia have made 
substantial progress in expanding access to credit (IMF, 2017b; IMF, 2016). However, 
Egypt lagged behind in the percentage of firms with a bank loan or line of credit. One 
reason is that bank lending in Egypt seems to be highly concentrated, with credit 
targeting only a limited number of companies. In 2010, the top 20 exposures accounted 
for more than half of total loans in the economy, implying that credit is absorbed 
primarily by large corporate clients. 
Figure 6.3. - Firms’ Credit Relationship with the Financial Sector 
(% of firms, 2013) 
 
Source: EIB, EBRD and WBG (2016). “What’s holding back the private sector in MENA? – Lessons from the 
Enterprise Survey”.   
Despite the provision of high volumes of credit to the private sector, access to finance 
for small firms needs to be strengthened (Figure 6.3.). In Egypt, for example, firms 
seem to have adjusted production strategies and expectations to the reality of limited 
involvement with the financial sector. In practice, these firms have become 
disconnected by shutting themselves off from the formal financial sector. Disconnected 
firms may have enough capital to operate but not enough to invest, expand and create 
new jobs. While still needing to improve, the share of firms reporting that they are 
connected to the financial sector is substantially higher in Morocco and Tunisia, 
according to the 2016 MENA Enterprise Survey report (EIB, EBRD and WBG, 2016). 
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Figure 6.4. - Small Firms and Informality 
Panel A: Share of small firms                                Panel B: Share of informal enterprises 
  
Source: IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Data. 
Note: Small firms means enterprises with fewer than 100 employees. North Africa is the simple average 
over the four countries. Numbers refer to 2010. 
Constituting the vast majority of enterprises in North Africa, MSMEs are more 
dependent on bank financing than large firms, since their access to alternative forms 
of financing (e.g. bonds or equity) is limited (Figure 6.4.). However, information 
problems are more important in the case of MSMEs and may therefore constrain their 
access to finance. The majority of enterprises in North Africa are MSMEs: small firms 
with fewer than 100 employees account for roughly 85% of businesses; many of them 
are informal, which makes it difficult for them to access external funding sources. 
SMEs also often find it difficult to access bank funding due to intrinsic limitations. For 
instance, SMEs often have limited liquidity and difficulties in providing consistent 
financial and business plans or the necessary regulatory documents. This is why in some 
countries in the region, such as Morocco and Tunisia, governments and banks are 
increasingly supporting capacity building for SMEs. Banks are increasingly equipped 
with guarantees to back credit lines granted to SMEs, including for movable property, 
real estate and cash and deposit collateral. Banks are therefore increasingly adapting 
to the needs of SMEs, maintaining a strong focus on SMEs’ projected cash flows. 
Policy leaders have recognised the importance of access to finance and are 
increasingly strengthening their efforts to promote financial inclusion. Accordingly, a 
number of governments in the region have taken initiatives to reinforce the links 
between banks, companies and individuals and to promote diversification of the 
financial sector, including through efforts to shift to digital and online financial services: 
• In Morocco, the Caisse Centrale de Garantie (CCG) facilitates access to 
financial services. It stands as guarantor for MSMEs and individuals with little 
income, or co-finances projects considered to be “non-bankable”. Over the 
period 2013-2018, CCG's guarantee benefited nearly 18,000 MSMEs and more 
than 112,000 households. In the early 2010s the Central Bank limited the 
amount of collateral to be provided by banks to obtain refinancing for loans 
granted to MSMEs. 
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• In Algeria, the Fonds de Garantie des Crédits aux PME (FGAR) and the Caisse 
de Garantie du crédit d’investissement pour les PME (CGCI-PME) provide 
guarantees to banks for SME loans. They thereby facilitate access to bank 
financing for these enterprises. The 2015-2022 Financial Sector Modernisation 
Plan launched by Tunisia’s Finance Ministry targets reforms designed to benefit 
financial inclusion, digitalisation, microinsurance and financial education, in 
particular (OECD, 2018). 
• At the beginning of 2016, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) launched an 
initiative encouraging banks to set aside 20% of their lending portfolio for 
SMEs. Each participating bank must create an entity specifically dedicated to 
dealing with loan applications from SMEs. The interest rates must not exceed 
5% for enterprises whose yearly net profit is between EUR 50,000 and EUR 1m. 
Experience in Kenya has shown though that such an interest rate cap can 
reduce banks’ incentive to provide loans to small enterprises given that SME 
loans are high-risk. The CBE will authorise banks participating in this initiative 
to reduce their mandatory reserves. Egypt has also launched other initiatives 
to promote financial inclusion, e.g. by improving its bankruptcy law. 
SME lending in North Africa could benefit from reformed secured transaction 
frameworks and better credit information systems. Capacity building for banks to 
strengthen their credit risk assessment would help those interested in lending to SMEs, 
without putting financial stability at risk. Moreover, efforts to build capacity for SMEs 
to improve their transparency would help to overcome information asymmetries and 
facilitate access to finance for SMEs. Further steps to improve access to finance should 
include the establishment of modern secured transaction laws, an efficient collateral 
registry, and credit guarantee schemes to alleviate collateral constraints. 
6.3. Financial Sector Overview 
The region's banking sectors are relatively large and generally well regulated. Non-
banking financial institutions and capital markets in the region are still at an early stage 
of development and only account for a small share of the financial sector's total assets. 
6.3.A. Structure and State of the Banking Sector 
North Africa's banking sector is one of the most developed on the continent. This was 
evidenced by its resilience during the most recent international financial crisis and the 
raw materials crisis in 2014. In Tunisia and Egypt the banking systems maintained their 
support for the economy despite a delicate macroeconomic and political climate. Public 
banks continue to play a key role in Algeria 
Operators in the sector have also demonstrated a strong ability to adapt. Moroccan 
banks have distinguished themselves by seeking out potential sources of growth on the 
continent: BMCE BANK acquired stakes in the Bank of Africa Group in 2008; more 
recently, Barclays Bank Egypt was taken over by Attijariwafa Bank and BIA Niger was 
obtained by Banque Centrale Populaire. 
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North Africa's banking sector contributes substantially to financing the economy. The 
Egyptian, Moroccan and Tunisian banking sectors are important engines of their 
respective economies; Algeria’s banks principally finance public investment although 
their share in terms of financing the private sector remains considerable, at 75% in 
2016. 
Table 6.5. - Key Banking Sector Indicators 
Country  Number of banks 
Number of 
branches Loans/GDP Loans/Deposits 
North Africa - 2016 111 13546 59% 101% 
Algeria - 2016 29 1,489 47% 87% 
Egypt - 2017 40 4,000 57% 114% 
Morocco - 2017 19 6,283 76% 91% 
Tunisia - 2016 23 1,774 77% 80% 
 
Sources: IMF, Central Banks (latest available data). 
Financial intermediation is well developed in North Africa, as reflected by a wide 
network of branches (Table 6.5.). The region’s banking sector comprises 111 banks and 
13,000 branches, offering a broad range of financial products and services, with a 
strong presence of international groups. Consolidation of the sector, particularly in 
Egypt where the number of banks fell from 62 to 43 between 2003 and 2006, remains 
a decisive factor to increase the profitability of North Africa's banking system. 
There is a high level of banking concentration in the region. In Morocco, the three 
leading banks - Attijariwafa Bank, Banque Centrale Populaire, and BMCE Bank - capture 
81% of assets. Algeria's banking system continues to be dominated by public banks, 
which account for 87% of total banking assets. Egypt’s top five banks account for 64% 
of the sector's balance sheet total. The banking sector in Tunisia is more fragmented. 
Four banks - BIAT, BNA, Attijari Bank and STB - share 47.5% of total deposits. 
6.3.B. OVERALL THE SECTOR IS SOUND AND SOLID 
North African banks operate within a complicated context but continue to show 
strong resilience. In 2016, five years after the events of the Arab Spring, the rate of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) remained uneven across the region (Figure 6.5. below). In 
Algeria, the fall in hydrocarbon prices resulted in longer payment terms for public 
sector enterprises, which caused the level of NPLs to deteriorate to 11.4% in 2016. 
Lastly, in Tunisia the level of NPLs remains high: 50% of NPLs concern loans to the 
industrial and tourism sectors. At the same time, the North African countries have 
made improvements in the areas of provisioning and credit risk management. The loan 
loss provisioning rate in Egypt is close to 100%. 
 156   © European Investment Bank, October 2018 
Figure 6.5. - Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and Rate of Provisioning of NPLs by 
Country 
(2016) 
 
Sources: IMF, Central Banks. 
The level of liquidity remains disparate. In Algeria, the reduction of liquidity in the 
banking sector has caused banks to seek refinancing from the Central Bank to meet 
their liquidity requirements, including for the maintenance of mandatory reserves. In 
Tunisia, the growing use of government bonds for financing purposes and the widening 
of the current deficit have reduced the level of liquidity in the banking sector. By 
contrast, Egypt's banking sector is highly liquid, with an average liquidity ratio of more 
than 800% (local currency) at end-June 2017 while the regulatory minimum required is 
80%. In Morocco, despite the upturn in lending, banks’ liquidity ratios are expected to 
remain at acceptable levels. 
Table 6.6. - Profitability Ratios 
(2016) 
  North Africa EGYPT ALGERIA TUNISIA MOROCCO 
Return on assets (ROA) 1.4% 1.5% 1.8% 1.0% 0.8% 
Return on equity (ROE) 19.3% 24.4% 18.0% 10.8% 8.6% 
Sources: IMF, Central Banks. 
Profitability ratios of the region’s banking sector have improved following the 
stabilisation of the countries’ economic fundamentals (Table 6.6.). With a rate of 20%, 
the return on equity of the region’s banking sector is favourable. For example, the 
return on equity in West Africa is 16.1% (see Chapter 2). Tunisia and Morocco, which 
operate in more competitive environments and strive to achieve wider access to credit, 
have lower levels of profitability. 
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6.3.C. NON-BANK FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Non-bank financial institutions and capital markets are still at an early stage of 
development and account for only a small share of total assets of the financial sector. 
This represents an opportunity for further development and for enhancing access to 
finance for the private sector, especially MSMEs. Effective regulation helps non-bank 
financial institutions to develop and thereby provide a larger variety of financial options 
to MSMEs. 
Microfinance in the region is operating below potential and plays a minor role in 
financing small firms in North Africa (EIB et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016). Lending by 
microfinance providers in 2011 reached only 1.8% of the adult population. Even in 
Morocco, the country that has made most progress in developing the industry, 
microcredit loans barely exceed 1% of total bank credit. Algeria does not have a 
conventional microcredit sector comparable to that of its regional peers. A number of 
government programmes target microenterprises (ANGEM), young self-employed 
individuals (ANSEJ) and unemployed adults (CNAC). These subsidised programmes 
leave little space for conventional microfinance providers in Algeria (IMF, 2014). 
Table 6.7. - Microfinance Regulations  
 
Introduction of specific 
legislation 
Deposit taking allowed 
by MFI/ Post Bank Regulator 
 
Algeria No  Yes No 
Egypt 2014 Yes 
Egyptian Financial 
Supervisory Authority 
(EFSA) 
Morocco 1999 Yes Bank Al-Maghrib (BAM) 
Tunisia 2011 Yes 
Microfinance Control 
Authority (AMC) 
    
Source: CGAP (2017). Financial Inclusion Measurement in the Arab World, CGAP Working Paper; Douglas 
Pearce (2011), Financial Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank Group, Policy Research 
Working Paper 5610. 
Governments have recently strengthened their efforts to promote microfinance 
(Table 6.7.). For instance, in Tunisia, a rapid transformation of the microfinance market 
is under way, with the passing of a new microfinance law in 2011 and creation of a new 
supervisory body (World Bank, 2016). Recent efforts to strengthen the microfinance 
sector have focused on the provision of microcredit to individual entrepreneurs. Egypt 
has introduced new legislation to facilitate the involvement of investment funds in the 
microfinance industry. 
Further efforts are needed to promote the non-bank financial sector in North Africa. 
To boost microfinance in the region, regulatory frameworks need to be reviewed and 
the financial infrastructure upgraded. In addition, financial literacy amongst 
entrepreneurs needs to be strengthened. Private equity and venture capital markets 
also remain shallow in the region, with a limited product range and investor base. 
Moreover, the leasing and factoring industries in North Africa are small. In the region, 
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leasing is most prevalent in Tunisia. Most leasing firms are banks or bank-related 
institutions, reflecting their easy access to deposit funding. 
Figure 6.6. - Market Capitalisation of Listed Domestic Companies 
(% of GDP, 2016) 
 
Sources: WBG Development Database. 
Notes: * IMF (2017a), 2017 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report for Algeria, IMF Country Report 
No. 17/141. 
 
Capital markets in the region have experienced significant growth but still have room 
for improvement. Tunisia’s capital market is growing, with a large number of equity 
listings in recent years. The continuing development of Casablanca Stock Exchange 
makes Morocco a regional financial centre and Africa’s third most important capital 
market after Johannesburg and Lagos. Conversely, market capitalisation is particularly 
low in Algeria, where only four listed companies exist (Figure 6.6.). Fixed-income 
markets in the region are dominated by government securities, although corporate 
bond trading is growing rapidly. Corporate bond trading thus represented 25% of the 
Moroccan bond market in 2017. 
The region has the top financial centre in Africa - Casablanca - which is ranked 33rd 
worldwide. Since it was created in 2010, the Casablanca Finance City (CFC) financial 
hub has helped enterprises, financial companies, multinationals, etc. to develop their 
activities in Africa. The CFC status and label give members access to advantages 
including tax incentives, exchange control facilitation measures and other procedures 
for doing business. To date, CFC has thus attracted 144 companies operating in 46 
African countries. The cumulative amount of investments by CFC members in Africa is 
nearly EUR 2.7bn (MAD 30bn). 
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6.4. Regulatory Reforms to Strengthen Financial Stability Make Progress 
Regulation of the financial sector is converging, albeit slowly, towards best 
international standards. Banking supervision has improved across the region over the 
past few years, owing to the strengthening of risk-based bank rating systems and 
adoption of internationally accepted prudential standards. Authorities remain 
committed to preserving financial stability by further strengthening regulation and 
supervision as well as the macro prudential framework. Central banks in North Africa 
have gained the necessary independence and built up the required expertise to 
supervise the banking sector. In terms of prudential norms, Basel III is being 
implemented in Egypt and Morocco (Table 6.8. below) and other countries are taking 
steps to comply with it. 
Table 6.8. - Financial Sector Regulation 
  ALGERIA EGYPT MOROCCO TUNISIA 
Supervisory authority Central Bank of Algeria 
Central Bank 
of Egypt 
Bank Al-
Maghrib 
Central Bank 
of Tunisia 
Implementation of Basel regulation I III III II 
Leverage ratio ceiling No No No No 
Minimum risk-based regulatory capital ratio 9.0% 11.3% 12.0% 8.0% 
Single borrower maximum share   25.00% 20.00% 25.00% 
Bank resolution framework No No No   
Deposit insurance protection system No No Yes Yes 
Number of professional bank supervisors   460 36 22 
 
Source: IMF, 2014; WBG, Bank Regulation and Supervision Database, 2012; Fitch. 
Likewise, the region’s central banks have beefed up the regulatory framework on 
capital. Egypt’s banking law, for example, provides for minimum capital of EGP 1.5bn 
(EUR 71m) compared to EGP 500m (EUR 24m) previously, whilst the minimum capital 
adequacy and liquidity ratios are expected to reach 12.5% and 100% respectively in 
2019. In Algeria, public banks’ capital has been gradually increased since 2009. 
Although public banks’ capital comfortably exceeds the regulatory threshold, the 
Government nevertheless increased the capital of three of these banks in 2015 and 
2016. 
The countries in the region continue to step up their anti-money 
laundering/combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures. According to the 
Basel AML Index 2017, this region is ranked highest on the African continent in terms 
of anti-money laundering. North African countries also work in close cooperation with 
GAFIMOAN (Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force) to correct 
existing failures and implement AML/CFT action plans. 
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At the same time, the banks must strengthen their supervisory capacity in order to 
comply with international standards and deal with the emergence of new risks. The 
countries must reinforce their supervisory capacity and make it sufficiently risk-based. 
The initiatives taken by certain central banks to promote regulatory harmonisation with 
other central banks in the region are welcome (IMF, 2016; IMF 2017a; IMF 2017b; IMF, 
2018). 
6.5. Conclusion 
North African countries have demonstrated their ability to evolve and transform 
themselves in a sometimes difficult environment. The macroeconomic situation 
should continue to benefit from the implementation of economic and social reforms in 
the majority of countries, as well as the maintenance of political stability and ongoing 
efforts towards regional integration. The geographical position gives the region a 
considerable advantage in attracting foreign direct investment. 
Financial inclusion is progressing in the region. Non-bank financial institutions and 
capital markets are still at an early stage of development and account for only a small 
share of total assets of the financial sector in a number of countries. However, central 
banks have put in place financial inclusion strategies and more specifically SME-focused 
policies to facilitate their access to financial services. The growing development of 
mobile banking should also improve financial inclusion over time. 
Constituting the vast majority of enterprises in North Africa, microenterprises and 
SMEs still need to have better access to financial products and services. SME lending 
in North Africa could benefit from reformed secured transaction frameworks and 
better credit information. Capacity building for banks to strengthen their credit risk 
assessment would help those interested in lending to SMEs, without putting financial 
stability at risk. Moreover, efforts to build capacity for SMEs to improve their 
transparency would help to overcome information asymmetries and facilitate access 
to finance for SMEs. Further steps to improve access to finance through regulatory 
reforms include the establishment of modern secured transaction laws and more 
efficient collateral registries and the introduction of credit guarantee schemes to 
alleviate collateral constraints. 
Access-to-finance constraints in North Africa build a rationale for intervention by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Limited availability of long-term funding, 
unsophisticated financial markets and the need for specific assistance in several 
countries in the region undermine firms’ access to finance. Moreover, banks’ large 
exposure to government debt in some countries may crowd out the provision of credit 
to the private sector (see chapter 7). 
IFI interventions can help to enhance the availability of long-term funding, equity 
finance and well-targeted guarantee schemes. Banks in the region often provide long-
term lending with loans backed by credit lines from IFIs or national development banks. 
Moreover, the depth of private equity and venture capital markets remains insufficient 
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in the region and the product range and investor base too limited. Intermediate IFI 
investment in equity funds and support for microfinance can contribute towards 
promoting private sector development and diversification of financial markets in the 
region. IFIs can also help to encourage banks to build SME lending capacity through 
well-targeted guarantee schemes. 
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7. Ready for the Recovery? How Crowding Out by Public 
Debt Affects Lending to the Private Sector across 
Africa 
Vivian F. de O. Schmidt1 and Sanne Zwart2,3 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
• With the economic recovery in Africa underway, banks’ role as financial 
intermediaries is as important as ever. However, the recent economic 
slowdown resulted in increased public debt on banks’ balance sheets, 
higher interest rates on sovereign paper in many African countries and 
failing banks. 
 
• Higher public debt holdings and interest rates could hold back banks’ 
lending to the private sector, which is a cause for concern as public debt 
levels are likely to remain high in the coming years. However, more insight 
is needed to understand the extent to which a country’s banking sector 
will be able to support the recovery and the role played by banks’ holdings 
of sovereign paper. 
 
• A stylised index is constructed to provide a quantitative assessment of the 
extent to which public debt crowds out lending to the private sector. The 
index allows for comparisons across countries and over time, leading to a 
deeper understanding of the drivers of crowding out. Besides considering 
the supply of public debt and the demand for private credit, the index 
explicitly assesses banks’ behaviour towards lending to the private sector 
and lending in general, including pricing considerations. 
 
• According to the index, crowding out has increased throughout Africa 
during the period 2014-18, and its prevalence is elevated in Ghana, Niger, 
Tanzania and Zambia.  
 
• On average, the higher supply of public debt was initially the main factor 
behind the increase of crowding out, but has now been taken over by 
banks’ decisions towards lending. In 2018, the economic recovery and 
higher demand for private credit also started to push up the index in many 
countries.  
                                                          
1 Researcher, European Investment Bank. 
2 Senior economist, European Investment Bank. 
3 The authors would like to thank Sanja Blatt, Claudio Cali, Nina Fenton, Andreas Kappeler, Barbara Marchitto, Farshad 
R. Ravasan, Ricardo Santos, Robert Schmitz and Christoph Weiss for their valuable comments on earlier drafts, and 
Morgan Ferriter and Nathalie Gilson for editorial support. The editorial closing date was 30 June 2018. However the 
views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment 
Bank. All remaining errors remain the authors’. 
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• Additional analysis indicates that when growth picks up further, the 
extent of crowding out could reach elevated levels in several more 
countries. Importantly, the impaired capacity to lend to the private sector 
would in turn make it less likely that sustainably higher growth rates can 
be attained. 
 
• Facilitating lending to the private sector by reducing the extent of 
crowding out could be achieved in various ways. Bringing down the 
financing needs of governments through fiscal consolidation and 
structural reform is key to free up space on banks’ balance sheets. In 
addition, continuing the broadening of the investor base for government 
paper by, for example, developing local bond markets, would also reduce 
pressure on banks to hold large amounts of public debt. Enhancing banks’ 
capacity to assess risk and monitor their clients would reduce the 
perceived risks and facilitate financial intermediation. Finally, helping 
clients to identify and present bankable projects would also raise lending 
to the private sector. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Bank lending to the private sector is crucial to sustain the firming of economic 
activity. Most African countries, including non-resource intensive ones, experienced a 
difficult period recently, with lower growth rates and a deterioration of public finances. 
Banks have faced challenging lending conditions and a rise in non-performing loans, 
which led to more numerous collapses and interventions by public authorities. At the 
same time, the larger funding needs of governments and the lower private demand for 
credit caused a shift in banks’ balance sheets towards sovereign paper. As economic 
activity has started to recover, the need for sustainable lending to support economic 
growth is increasing, and the question arises as to whether the banks are ready to step 
up their role as financial intermediaries. 
Banks’ rising exposure to the sovereign holds back other lending activities. Notably, 
banks are exposed to the sovereign through the sovereign debt on their balance sheets. 
Banks can use these exposures for various purposes, including investment, liquidity 
management and credit risk mitigation. At the same time, these sovereign debt 
holdings are essential for the operationalisation of monetary and fiscal policy. 
However, high yields and “risk-free” sovereign debt can intensify the crowding out of 
credit to the private sector.  
The severity of public debt crowding out is assessed by a stylised index which is used 
to analyse trends over time and across countries, while also providing insights into 
the underlying drivers. Rising public debt, lower private demand for credit and the 
increasing share of government securities on banks’ balance sheets are closely related, 
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and understanding how each of them affects banks’ lending activity is rather complex. 
Scholars have estimated crowding out in various ways (Bouis, forthcoming; Fayed, 
2012; Shetta & Kamaly, 2014), but the various contemporaneous effects and the 
disentangling of causes and reactions have proved daunting. Hence, a different 
approach is followed here: an index has been developed to gauge the Severity Of 
Crowding Out (SOCO). The SOCO index is based on annual data and aggregates three 
sub-indices which assess (i) the supply of public debt, (ii) the availability of investment 
opportunities and (iii) the state of banks’ balance sheets. The SOCO index adds to the 
literature in three ways: it shows the severity of crowding out over time and across 
countries; it allows for drilling down to understand the underlying factors; and besides 
including the usual explaining variables it specifically captures banks’ lending decisions.  
The remainder of the chapter considers the question posed in the title from various 
angles. The next section focuses on the nascent economic recovery and recent 
domestic credit developments. The subsequent section discusses the deterioration of 
public finances during the last few years and how this is affecting banks’ balance sheets 
and lending conditions. The extent of crowding out of lending to the private sector is 
then assessed based on the SOCO index. The last section presents conclusions. 
7.2. The Economic Recovery Has Started, and Bank Lending to the 
Private Sector is Slowly Picking Up  
Many countries in Africa were hit hard by the global financial crisis and the collapse 
in commodity prices. Until 2009, Africa enjoyed a prolonged period of strong economic 
expansion, supported by an improving business and macroeconomic environment, 
high commodity prices and highly accommodative global financial conditions. 
However, the tightening global financial conditions caused a growth slowdown in 2011-
12. The subsequent cautious rebound was ended by the decline in oil and other 
commodity prices. Moreover, these external strains were compounded by domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances, electricity shortages and droughts, and in the case of 
northern Africa by the Arab Spring. As a result, the growth rate fell from an average of 
6% during 2005-08 to just over 3% during 2014-17 (Figure 7.1., Panel A). The growth 
slowdown was widespread, but it hit commodity exporters particularly hard. In some 
countries growth held up well, supported by ongoing infrastructure investment and 
solid private consumption in oil-importing countries, but overall only seven countries 
recorded average annual growth above 6% over the last four years (Djibouti, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania). 
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Figure 7.1. - The Recovery Has Started, but Lending to the Private Sector is Lagging 
A. Real GDP growth in per cent 
B. Domestic credit to the private sector by 
banks in per cent of GDP 
  
Source: IMF WEO Database April 2018; World Bank World Development Indicators Database (Panel B 
only); authors’ calculations. 
Note for Panel A: Libya is excluded due to data limitations; 2018 is a forecast. 
  
The global financial crisis hit financial sectors in Africa at different times. The 
repercussions of the global financial crisis for northern Africa were rather synchronised 
with those in advanced countries (Moriyama, 2010; Rocha, Arvai & Farazi, 2011). 
However, in sub-Saharan Africa, the impact was distinctly different from that 
experienced by advanced and many other merging and developing countries and 
regions (IMF, 2011; ADBG, 2009; Allen & Giovannetti, 2011). The first wave of the 
financial crisis, characterised by the rapid spread of financial turmoil in the United 
States to other developed economies and some emerging markets via closely 
interconnected financial systems, left sub-Saharan Africa comparatively unscathed. 
South Africa was an exception, on the back of high integration in international financial 
markets and its large banking sector (with assets equal to 125% of GDP): the country 
went into recession in 2008/09 for the first time in 19 years. Other countries were much 
less affected due to weak integration of the region’s underdeveloped financial markets, 
virtually no exposure to assets immediately affected by the fallout, and only limited 
reliance on capital inflows. However, the second wave of the turmoil, when disorder in 
the financial sector began to have an impact on the real economy, had profound 
consequences for financial sectors on the continent. Nigeria went through a full-blown 
banking crisis (10 banks closed in 2009/10), and financial stability only returned once 
the central bank injected USD 1.7bn (0.6% of GDP) to ensure liquidity and enforced 
leadership changes in eight local banks. 
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Growth bottomed out in 2016, but the recovery is tepid. In 2016, economic activity 
contracted in seven countries, including Angola and Nigeria, while growth in South 
Africa came to a standstill. Growth picked up in 2017 as oil production rebounded and 
a good rain season boosted agricultural production, and the recovery continued in 
2018. Nevertheless, the current growth rate of about 3% is just in line with population 
growth, and stronger growth is needed to improve living conditions across the 
continent. Moreover, economic performance differs widely across countries, and the 
below-trend growth of the two largest economies in the region, Nigeria and South 
Africa, weighs on prospects for the region. 
Banks’ capacity to support private sector activity is crucial for a sustainable recovery. 
Bank credit to the private sector peaked around 2009 when it reached some 37% of 
GDP (Figure 7.1., Panel B). The subsequent decline was modest in northern Africa and 
has been more than offset by recent credit growth. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, the 
drop in bank lending to the private sector was more pronounced. Notwithstanding 
some recent improvement during 2014-16, it remains about a quarter below its 2009 
level. In both regions, the volume of bank loans to the private sector is smaller than in 
Latin America and the Caribbean and in South Asia, where it stands at 45% of GDP. 
Economic growth typically goes hand-in-hand with an expanding banking sector, but, 
crucially, depressed bank lending could hold back growth. Hence, to support the 
economic recovery, banks would need to have the capacity to step up lending to the 
private sector.  
7.3. The Deterioration in Public Finances is Affecting Banks’ Balance 
Sheets and Lending Conditions 
7.3.A. BANKS HOLD LARGER AMOUNTS OF PUBLIC DEBT THAN BEFORE THE CRISIS 
Public debt has increased substantially across the continent since 2008. High growth, 
better public financial management and debt relief led to a significant reduction in 
public debt relative to GDP in the early 2000s (Figure 7.2., Panel A). However, in 2008 
public debt accumulation started to outpace economic growth, and especially during 
2015 and 2016 public-debt-to-GDP ratios deteriorated substantially. The recent fall in 
commodity prices in particular affected the debt position of commodity exporters, but 
also that of many other countries in the region: more than 80% of African countries 
recorded an increase in the public-debt-to-GDP ratio during 2014-17 (Figure 7.2., Panel 
B) and the increase was more than 10 percentage points of GDP for more than half of 
those countries. About 37% of African countries had high or distressed public debt 
levels as of June 2018 according to the IMF and the World Bank, and rating agencies 
have downgraded many of them over the past few years4.  
                                                          
4 Of those countries which, based on their low income per capita and limited capacity to access international financial 
markets on a durable and substantial basis, are eligible for concessional financial resources under the IMF’s Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust, the share is somewhat higher, namely around 40%. 
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Figure 7.2. - Public Debt Has Been Growing Rapidly until Recently in Most Countries 
A. Public debt in per cent of GDP 
B. Public-debt-to-GDP ratio, number of 
countries by 2014-17 change in 
percentage points 
  
Source: IMF WEO Database April 2018; authors’ calculations. 
Note: Libya and Somalia are excluded due to data limitations; 2018 is a forecast.  
 
The financing of public debt has shifted towards domestic sources. The importance of 
domestic debt has been growing since 2013, reflecting the decline in concessional 
external borrowing and countries’ wish to develop domestic debt markets (IMF, 2017). 
Moreover, international bond issuances came to a standstill during the crisis and only 
resumed, albeit cautiously, recently. Banks remain the main holders of domestic debt 
(although the share of central banks’ holdings has declined due to legal limits), but the 
investor base has been broadening with the rise of non-banking institutions (e.g. from 
the pension and insurance sector) and domestic debt markets progressively opening 
up to non-resident investors (Unctad, 2016).  
Banks have raised their holdings of public debt in recent years. As a share of GDP, 
banks’ holdings of public debt increased on average from 8% in 2008 to 12% in 2017 
(Figure 7.3., Panel A). In almost 80% of the countries, banks increased their holdings 
over the last three years. The GDP-weighted average is structurally higher than the 
simple average as banks in some of the larger countries, in particular Algeria and Egypt, 
hold large amounts of sovereign paper. These countries are also driving the decline 
observed in 2017. Banks’ holdings of public debt have increased faster than their 
balance sheets, and they now account for around 19% of banks’ assets compared to 
some 14% in 2008 (Figure 7.3., Panel B). During the last three years, this share has 
increased in around three-quarters of the countries, and in a quarter government 
paper now accounts for more than 25% of banks’ assets. 
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Figure 7.3. - Public Debt Holdings of Banks 
A. Public debt holdings in per cent of GDP 
B. Public debt holdings as share of total 
assets 
 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics database; IMF WEO Database April 2018; authors’ 
calculations. 
Note: Panel A covers 46 countries; Panel B 40; missing data approximated by last available observation. 
Public debt will remain high in the medium term, providing limited room in banks’ 
balance sheets for lending to the private sector. Debt levels have continued to rise on 
average, with some pronounced increases in several countries. For all countries, a 
sizeable decline in the debt burden crucially depends on improvements in fiscal stance 
and growth performance, which highlights the importance of prudent fiscal 
management and the implementation of structural reforms. Both in turn require 
political commitment and time to bear fruit. Although the improved macroeconomic 
conditions would make debt securities more attractive for foreign investors, this effect 
is probably outweighed by concerns over debt sustainability in the context of tightening 
global financial conditions. Therefore, a major shift from domestic to foreign financing 
sources is unlikely soon, which implies that local banks will continue to hold large 
amounts of government paper. 
7.3.B. BANKS INCREASED THEIR SOVEREIGN DEBT HOLDINGS FOR VARIOUS REASONS 
At any point of the economic cycle, banks use public debt securities for several 
purposes (BCBS, 2017). Sovereign securities can be useful for banks’ balance sheet and 
liquidity management, as they are usually the most liquid assets (although the extent 
to which they are liquid varies widely among countries and maturities). Banks also hold 
such securities to meet regulatory liquidity requirements, while legislation often 
provides for more favourable capital treatment or even requires a share of assets to be 
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held in government paper. Banks can also hold sovereign debt as part of their role as 
primary dealers or market-makers for such exposures.  
Various reasons can explain the recent build-up of public debt holdings by banks 
during the economic slowdown. The downturn reduced the number of good 
investment opportunities. At the same time, the increased offering of sovereign debt 
(combined with fewer foreign investors) has been providing a way for banks to make a 
return on their assets. The relative attractiveness of investing in private sector or 
government securities is determined by their relative (risk-adjusted) interest rates, and 
the high interest rates on government paper have been a decisive factor for many 
banks to increase their debt holdings, particularly during an economic slowdown. In 
some countries, banks’ purchases of government securities have been facilitated by 
the central bank refinancing operations of commercial banks (e.g., in Gambia and 
Togo), with banks taking advantage of the spread between interest rates on 
government debt and refinancing rates (IMF, 2017). Sometimes, some form of financial 
repression leads to banks holding larger amounts of public debt than they would have 
preferred.  
7.3.C. LARGE PUBLIC DEBT HOLDINGS AND THE ASSOCIATED HIGH INTEREST RATES 
COULD MAKE CROWDING OUT MORE SEVERE  
The rise in public debt and the higher public debt holdings of banks can have various 
macroeconomic implications. An economic slowdown is in general associated with a 
reduction in bank lending, reflecting limited investment opportunities and a diminished 
ability of banks to raise market funding (Agarwal, Duttagupta & Presbitero, 2017). 
Higher issuance of public debt would further reduce lending to the private sector by 
providing a potentially attractive alternative investment. Government borrowing also 
affects private lending through higher lending rates, which is observed throughout 
Africa. Alternatively, administrative controls can limit the impact on interest rates 
(Reinhart, Kirkegaard & Sbrancia, 2011), but with the consequence that banks are no 
longer able to reflect risks fully in the price, which in turn also hampers lending. Kenya 
is a case in point, as a well-intended interest rate cap on loans and a floor on deposits 
have been in place since September 2016, holding back lending activity. Finally, higher 
public debt levels and increasing public debt holdings by banks increase risks, including 
systemic risks, but so far these risks have remained manageable (Box 7.1.). 
 
Box 7.1. - Rising Public Debt and Higher Holdings by Banks Increase Risks 
Taking on more public debt holdings can be optimal for a bank with a profit-
maximising perspective, but could also reduce its performance and stability. When 
banks become more exposed to the sovereign, this could raise risks related to credit, 
interest rates and refinancing - especially if the increased public debt holdings reflect 
a deterioration of public finances. 
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A weakening of the sovereign can affect banks through the following channels 
(BCBS, 2017): 
• Direct exposure: arrears, or even non-payments, could inflict losses, 
weakening banks’ balance sheets. 
• Collateral: a lower value of sovereign collateral used by banks could raise 
funding costs and liquidity needs. 
• Sovereign credit rating: as the sovereign rating is often a ceiling for other 
entities in the economy, a downgrade of the sovereign could precipitate 
downgrades of banks. 
• Government support channel: implicit and explicit government guarantees 
are worth less, raising funding costs. 
• Macro-economy: unanticipated, higher inflation could generate losses, 
while the smaller fiscal space and the weaker sovereign make an economic 
downturn more likely, thereby increasing borrowers’ riskiness and banks’ 
fragility. 
 
The interconnectedness of banks and sovereigns could also lead to a negative 
feedback loop. When public financing needs increase, banks’ willingness to invest in 
sovereign debt helps to absorb the shock. However, if banks subsequently reduce 
their lending to the private sector (for example because of a worse risk-return profile 
or the impact of the above channels), this could worsen economic conditions and 
ultimately the fiscal position. If problems are so large that banks require public 
financial support, this would further erode the sovereign’s creditworthiness. 
Although debt levels have increased considerably in several countries, the 
increased financial sector risks have been managed rather prudently so far. 
Government arrears have increased in many countries, while many sovereigns have 
been downgraded. These developments compounded the effects of the growth 
slowdown, and financial sector vulnerabilities have increased. Nevertheless, bank 
failures have only become somewhat more numerous, and their repercussions on 
the overall stability of the financial sectors have been limited. A case in point is 
Mozambique, where the government’s default on commercial debt triggered large 
rating downgrades. Interest rates on domestic public debt reached 20% in the first 
quarter of 2018, while economic growth dropped substantially from over 7% during 
2011-15 to just over 3% during 2016-17. The central bank had to take control of two 
banks with problems, but its interventions were successful in containing the 
potential fallout and maintaining overall financial stability.  
  
In its broadest sense, crowding out refers to reduced lending to the private sector 
due to sovereign debt holdings. Its severity tends to increase when the supply of public 
debt increases, as it could then lead to higher interest rates and/or a reduced capacity 
of banks to provide credit. The increase in the supply of government securities - that 
are widely perceived to be risk-free - to finance budgetary deficits usually results in 
rising interest rates. To the extent that the increase in supply is met by higher demand 
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by banks, this reduces the appetite and resources that banks have available to lend to 
the private sector. These effects tend to occur simultaneously, which makes it difficult 
to disentangle them. Crowding out hampers private sector activity, and the effect on 
longer-term growth will be most pronounced if governments use the obtained 
resources for non-productive purposes. 
Given the various reasons banks have to increase their public debt holdings, assessing 
the extent of the related crowding out requires careful analysis (Shetta & Kamaly, 
2014). If banks have excess liquidity, there is not necessarily any effect on banks’ 
lending activities. If liquidity is not abundant, the low risk of sovereign lending could 
(theoretically) allow banks to take more risk and increase lending to the private sector. 
The opposite can also happen if banks are discouraged from lending to the risky private 
sector given the limited additional return. According to this “lazy bank model”, higher 
public debt holdings will thus crowd out private sector lending. 
A simple analysis provides some tentative evidence of crowding out and highlights 
the need for a more thorough examination. In many African countries, the increase in 
local currency-denominated public debt during 2014-17 occurred simultaneously with 
a decline in credit to the private sector as a share of banks’ assets and as a share of GDP 
(Figure 7.4.). The shift in banks’ asset composition away from private sector credit is 
statistically more significant than the reduction in private sector credit relative to GDP 
(note of Figure 7.4.). This negative relationship confirms research on recent private 
credit growth in Africa (Bouis, forthcoming). The various ways of assessing the impact 
on private credit (e.g. considering the relative composition of the balance sheet, 
changes in credit relative to GDP or growth of nominal lending) together with the many 
contemporaneous developments (e.g. a reduction in GDP growth, an increase in 
interest rates and inflation, and changes in exchange rates) highlight the complications 
of conducting an empirical analysis. 
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Figure 7.4. - An Increase in Local Currency-Denominated Public Debt often Occurs 
Simultaneously with a Decrease in Credit to the Private Sector  
A. Change in credit to the private sector 
as share of assets, 2014-17 
B. Change in credit to the private sector 
relative to GDP, 2014-17  
 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics database; IMF WEO Database April 2018; authors’ 
calculations. 
Note: In panel A, the trend line has a coefficient of -0.23 with a standard error of 0.12 (10% significance 
level); in panel B the coefficient is -0.11 with a standard error of 0.08 (around 20% significance level). The 
R2 coefficients of determination are 0.13 and 0.06. The analysis is based on 26 countries due to data 
limitations and the removal of outliers. 
7.4. The SOCO Index Points to more Severe Crowding Out Throughout 
Africa 
7.4.A. THE EXTENT OF CROWDING OUT CAN BE ASSESSED WITH A STYLISED INDEX 
With the economic recovery underway, it is important to gain a better understanding 
of the extent to which crowding out is occurring in individual African countries. 
Growth is picking up, and banks will need to increase financial intermediation to sustain 
the recovery. When banks’ capacity to do so is limited, growth could remain tepid. 
Given the large differences between countries, crowding out will be more of a concern 
in some countries than in others. 
To analyse the Severity of Crowding Out for individual countries across Africa, a 
stylised SOCO index is developed. A vast literature analyses the causes and impact of 
public debt on private lending (see Box 7.2.). However, while some studies undertake 
an in-depth analysis of a single country and others perform a cross-country analysis, no 
study simultaneously assesses the extent of crowding out in various countries. Doing 
so would require a uniform methodology that provides sufficient room for country-
specific developments, building upon commonly used indicators such as institutional 
quality or business conditions and the level of financial intermediation, but also upon 
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multiple measures for both the supply of public debt and the demand for credit, as 
single measures only tell part of the story. This approach is followed for the SOCO index, 
which can be calculated annually for the years 2014 to 2018 for the 39 African countries 
for which sufficient data is available. 
 
Box 7.2. - Estimating Crowding Out of the Private Sector by Public Debt:  
Approaches and Findings 
Various approaches have been followed to estimate the extent of crowding out. In 
order to measure the degree of crowding out of private credit by government 
spending in individual economies, researchers have examined the impact of public 
debt on interest rates. Nonetheless, since credit markets rarely reach equilibrium 
solely through changes in interest rates, estimating changes in the quantity of credit 
may give a more precise indication of the effect of rising government borrowing. 
Therefore, several economists have approached the problem by regressing the 
amount of credit to the private sector or its growth rate on government borrowing, 
while controlling for relevant variables such as the level of financial intermediation, 
institutional quality, GDP, lending and inflation rates, as well as other relevant prices, 
such as commodity prices in the case of natural resources-dependent economies. 
Given the complicated nature of the issue, all approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages. Using credit-to-GDP instead of the growth rate of lending as 
dependent variable avoids issues related to inflation, but instead makes the 
assessment lean more towards explaining financial deepening. In addition, specific 
variables that may capture the demand and supply of credit to the private sector, 
such as interest rates and proxies for investment needs, are often not included, 
probably due to data limitations. However, including these variables and proxies, as 
well as those related to banks’ balance sheets, is essential for understanding how all 
the factors come together.  
Empirical evidence indicates that increased public debt can lead to crowding out 
of private sector lending. Various studies provide empirical evidence on the negative 
effect of government borrowing on private lending. According to research 
conducted with data of 60 developing countries from 1975 to 2006, one additional 
dollar borrowed by the government reduces private credit by 1.40 dollar (Emran & 
Farazi, 2009). The findings of a study conducted with data of 27 sub-Saharan 
countries over the period 1980-2000 support the crowding-out hypothesis, 
suggesting a 1 percentage point increase relative to broad money in government 
borrowing decreases private sector lending by 0.15 percentage points of broad 
money (Christensen, 2004). More recent research for sub-Saharan Africa finds that 
a 1 percentage point increase in banks’ exposure to the government is associated 
with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in the annual growth of credit to the private 
sector (Bouis, forthcoming).  
Banking in Africa: Delivering on Financial Inclusion, Supporting Financial Stability 
 
© European Investment Bank, October 2018  175 
Country-specific studies also find evidence of crowding out in Africa. For example, 
in Egypt a 1 pound increase in government borrowing was found to reduce private 
credit by approximately 4 pounds during the period 1998-2010, which was assumed 
to be the result of “lazy banks” which prefer to invest excess liquidity in low risk 
return investments (Fayed, 2012). For Kenya, a study using data from 1966 to 2014 
provides evidence on the crowding out effect of private sector lending if government 
debt rises persistently, with a 1% increase in government debt as a share of GDP 
reducing credit to the private sector by 0.143 percentage points the following year 
(Makambi, Muhindi & Nduku, 2017).  
 
The SOCO index aggregates 12 indicators related to the supply of public debt, the 
demand for private credit and banks’ lending decisions. The choice of indicators was 
guided by empirical findings in the literature on the key determinants of crowding out. 
The selected indicators capture either cross-country or country-specific elements so 
that the SOCO index allows both for a comparison across countries and over time. The 
construction of the indicators is done in such a way that spurious impact of inflation 
and exchange rate developments is avoided. The index is built following a standard 
approach: the 12 indicators are standardised and divided into three groups; three sub-
indices are computed as the unweighted average of each group’s indicators; the 
unweighted average of the sub-indices constitutes the SOCO index (Figure 7.5.). The 
three sub-indices and their underlying indicators are as follows (the appendix contains 
the details): 
• Supply of public debt: Most researchers measure the supply of public debt by 
including the level of public domestic debt in their regressions (Ali, Ahmad & 
Ur-Rahman, 2016; Anyanwu, Gan & Hu, 2017; Christensen, 2004), implicitly 
assuming that the supply is exogenous and independent of (equilibrium) 
interest rates. The SOCO index follows this approach by including the level of 
local currency-denominated public debt in per cent of GDP, but in addition also 
includes its growth rate to have a full picture of the financing needs of the 
public sector and hence the amount of sovereign debt potentially supplied to 
domestic banks. Changes in access to external financing sources are gauged by 
the difference between the growth rate of foreign currency-denominated 
public debt in USD and the growth rate of local currency-denominated public 
debt. This indicator gauges the pressure on domestic banks to finance public 
debt. In addition, the real return on government securities is included as a 
fourth indicator to assess the return, and hence attractiveness, of holding 
public debt. 
• Credit demand by the private sector: In the literature, the demand for private 
credit is captured by general business conditions and by macroeconomic 
developments (Fayed, 2012; Anyanwu, Gan & Hu, 2017). An economy’s 
regulatory environment and rule of law can be important determinants of 
private credit demand and thus investment. A similar approach is followed by 
the SOCO index, which includes the World Bank’s Doing Business distance to 
frontier as a proxy for the ease of doing business and hence the demand for 
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investment (the Doing Business indicator also covers the ease of access to 
credit). The change in the distance to frontier is included as well to indicate 
whether conditions improved or worsened, which would point to a likely 
increase or decrease in credit demand. Similarly, high current GDP growth 
would point to rising levels of investment and a higher demand for credit, and 
the same holds for next year’s expected growth. 
• Banks’ lending decisions: Very often, this part of the analysis is the least well 
developed, as many researchers focus only on credit provided by the banking 
system to the private sector without putting this in the broader context from 
the banks’ perspective (Fayed, 2012; Ali, Ahmad & Ur-Rahman, 2016). The 
SOCO index expands on the literature by explicitly evaluating the extent to 
which banks’ balance sheet size, risk preferences and profitability affect the 
amount of private credit provided. Overall financial sector development and 
access to credit are captured by credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. 
The change in banks’ asset composition and total asset growth are used to 
measure banks’ behaviour towards lending to the private sector and lending in 
general. The spread between the lending rate and the T-bill yield is an 
indication of the attractiveness of lending to the private sector compared to 
investing in government paper. 
Figure 7.5. - The SOCO Index, its Sub-Indices and the Underlying Variables 
 
The SOCO index provides an assessment of the relative extent of crowding out across 
countries and over time. To evaluate developments in the last few years, the SOCO 
index is calibrated over a long period, namely 2004-13, that captures both episodes of 
rapid economic expansion and slowdown. For each indicator, the value is transformed 
into a score from 0 to 1 based on the quintiles5 of the 2004-13 data in such a way that 
higher scores are associated with a higher extent of crowding out. Hence, the index 
                                                          
5 Using quintiles ensures that for countries with complete 2004-13 data, no threshold is uniquely associated with a 
single observation, which improves robustness. 
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assesses the relative extent of crowding out compared to the calibration period but 
does not provide an absolute assessment of the extent. Nevertheless, the SOCO index 
provides an assessment of how the severity of crowding out has evolved over time and 
how a country performs relative to its peers. In particular, the average score of 0.5 
during 2004-13 and the maximum score of 1 provide references for interpreting the 
result.  
7.4.B. THE EXTENT TO WHICH PUBLIC DEBT CROWDS OUT LENDING TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR HAS INCREASED IN MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
The extent of crowding out has increased in Africa. In 2014 and 2015, the SOCO index 
- covering 39 countries - was slightly below its 2004-13 average of 0.5 (Figure 7.6., Panel 
A). However, in each of the subsequent years it was higher. In 2018, based on the 
available data at mid-year, the SOCO index stood at 0.53. The increase is quite 
substantial given the number of countries and their different economic situations. 
Figure 7.6. - The Extent of Crowding Out in Africa Has Increased According to the 
SOCO Index 
A. The Severity Of Crowding Out index B. The three sub-indices  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on publicly available data. 
Note: 0 indicates low severity; 1 high severity; 0.5 is the average for 2004-13. 
Initially, the increased supply of public debt increased the severity of crowding out, 
but since 2016 banks’ lending decisions have become the main driver. The sub-index 
measuring the supply of public debt increased rapidly between 2014-16, driven by the 
increase in local currency-denominated public debt, but came down in 2017 
(Figure 7.6., Panel B), as the pace of debt accumulation slowed down while access to 
external financing improved. The sub-index characterising banks’ lending decisions 
contributed the most to the rise of the SOCO index. Banks shifted their asset 
 178   © European Investment Bank, October 2018 
composition somewhat towards public securities, but more importantly balance sheet 
growth was very low or even negative. The demand for private credit has remained 
broadly stable, reflecting the combination of a gradual improvement in business 
conditions and a decline in growth. Interestingly, with the recovery underway, the 
demand for private credit index started to rise in 2018. 
The SOCO index points to increased levels of crowding out for many countries. The 
severity of crowding out is higher in 2018 than in 2014 for 25 out of 39 countries 
(Table 7.1.). Ghana, Niger, Tanzania and Zambia stand out as countries where crowding 
out is most severe. These countries, as well as Burkina Faso, Egypt, Kenya and 
Mozambique have seen considerable increases in recent years that have pushed up the 
SOCO index to elevated levels.  
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Table 7.1. - The Extent of Crowding Out across Africa according to the SOCO Index 
Country 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 5.5% 
growth 
scenario 
7% 
growth 
scenario 
Algeria 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.46 0.46  0.56 0.60 
Angola 0.40 0.40 0.54 0.48 0.42  0.54 0.58 
Benin 0.56 0.65 0.60 0.65 0.65  0.65 0.69 
Botswana 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.50  0.54 0.58 
Burkina Faso 0.46 0.60 0.67 0.56 0.65  0.65 0.69 
Burundi 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.33  0.46 0.50 
Cameroon 0.44 0.48 0.40 0.46 0.50  0.56 0.60 
Chad 0.35 0.52 0.42 0.50 0.35  0.46 0.50 
Comoros 0.34 0.15 0.33 0.39 0.47  0.55 0.59 
Djibouti 0.53 0.53 0.65 0.40 0.53  0.53 0.58 
Egypt 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.63  0.67 0.71 
Equatorial Guinea 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.42  0.54 0.58 
Eritrea 0.49 0.41 0.51 0.42 0.40  0.48 0.52 
eSwatini 0.38 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.54  0.67 0.71 
Gabon 0.42 0.44 0.48 0.35 0.46  0.56 0.60 
Ghana 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.75 0.69  0.67 0.71 
Guinea-Bissau 0.56 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.58  0.63 0.67 
Kenya 0.48 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.65  0.67 0.71 
Lesotho 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.48  0.60 0.65 
Madagascar 0.44 0.25 0.50 0.40 0.44  0.48 0.52 
Mali 0.60 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.60  0.65 0.69 
Mauritius 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.50 0.56  0.65 0.69 
Morocco 0.54 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.52  0.60 0.65 
Mozambique 0.54 0.42 0.56 0.54 0.65  0.75 0.79 
Namibia 0.63 0.48 0.65 0.56 0.63  0.73 0.77 
Niger 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.69 0.71  0.75 0.79 
Nigeria 0.48 0.48 0.33 0.44 0.52  0.65 0.69 
Rwanda 0.58 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.58  0.54 0.58 
Senegal 0.42 0.58 0.67 0.52 0.52  0.52 0.56 
Seychelles 0.58 0.71 0.65 0.44 0.52  0.60 0.65 
Sierra Leone 0.48 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.44  0.50 0.54 
South Africa 0.46 0.40 0.54 0.50 0.48  0.60 0.65 
South Sudan 0.57 0.62 0.30 0.35 0.63  0.76 0.80 
Sudan 0.55 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.35  0.44 0.48 
Tanzania 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.75 0.71  0.71 0.75 
Togo 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.52 0.54  0.58 0.63 
Tunisia 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.35  0.46 0.50 
Uganda 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.63  0.65 0.69 
Zambia 0.56 0.56 0.75 0.63 0.71  0.77 0.81 
Africa 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.53   0.60 0.64 
Note: The intensity of the blue highlighting increases with the SOCO index, with the thresholds being 0.60, 
0.70 and 0.80. In the two growth scenarios, GDP growth and expected growth are both set to either 5.5% 
or 7%, while all other indicators are kept at their 2018 values. 
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Due to the way the SOCO index is constructed, the drivers of the recent increase can 
be analysed for individual countries. Especially for the four countries with the highest 
SOCO scores in 2018 and large increases in the preceding years, this analysis is useful 
to understand the underlying factors (Figure 7.7.). In all these countries, the supply of 
public debt has been making a large contribution in recent years, confirming that 
governments’ high funding needs are weighing on financial intermediation. Indeed, in 
all countries the resulting gradual increase in the contribution of banks’ lending 
decisions has been driving the overall increase. Importantly, the severity of crowding 
out remains high even though the contribution of the supply of public debt has receded 
to earlier levels. In Ghana and Niger, additional pressures have been coming from 
higher demand for credit.  
Figure 7.7. - Drivers of the Rising SOCO Index for Countries with the Highest Scores 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on publicly available data. 
With the current conditions, a sustained recovery is likely to increase the extent of 
crowding out. In many countries, the subdued economic growth of recent years has 
held back demand for private credit, resulting in relatively low values of the second 
sub-index. Assuming that growth picks up to some 5.5% or 7% (e.g. due to external 
developments), which for most countries is achievable given past growth rates and 
population growth, and that, although unlikely, all other conditions remain the same, 
the SOCO index would increase for almost all countries (Table 7.1.). In particular, 
countries which already have high SOCO scores and where growth is subdued would 
see a pronounced increase in the severity of crowding out. Countries affected include 
again Ghana, Niger, Tanzania and Zambia, but also Egypt, eSwatini, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Namibia and South Sudan. These scenarios highlight the need for fiscal 
consolidation, continued broadening of the investor base for public debt, and ensuring 
that banks are aware that their financial intermediation is essential to support 
sustainable growth. 
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7.5. Conclusion 
The SOCO index shows that the severity of public debt crowding out private lending 
has been rising throughout Africa and is high in several countries. The severity of 
crowding out is higher in 2018 than in 2014 for 25 out of 39 countries. On average, the 
supply of credit to the government was initially the main driver of the increase, but has 
now been taken over the banks’ decisions towards lending. In 2018, the recovery and 
the increased demand for private credit has started to push up the index as well. 
Ghana, Niger, Tanzania and Zambia stand out as countries where crowding out is most 
severe. The SOCO index makes it possible to analyse the underlying drivers, which are 
found to differ considerably between countries. 
The economic recovery is underway, but in many countries the banking sector could 
struggle to perform its role as financial intermediary during this crucial period. Banks 
in several countries are so exposed to the sovereign that they have only limited capacity 
to gear up lending substantially and support an economic revival. Further analysis 
based on the SOCO index shows that, should growth pick up further to some 5.5% or 
7%, the extent of crowding out would reach elevated levels in several more countries. 
Importantly, the impaired capacity to lend to the private sector would in turn make it 
less likely that such growth rates are attained. 
In many countries, the public finances situation will continue to weigh on banks’ 
balance sheets. The still high government deficits in various countries together with a 
very gradual reduction in public debt indicate that banks’ balance sheets will continue 
to have a high share of public debt. Even if deficits were to decrease soon, refinancing 
of the various international bonds that will start maturing from 2021 onwards could 
continue to put pressure on banks’ balance sheets.  
Lending to the private sector could be facilitated in various ways. Bringing down 
government financing needs through fiscal consolidation and structural reform is key 
to free up space on banks’ balance sheets. Continuing the broadening of the investor 
base for government paper would also help in this regard, in particular fostering the 
development of local bond markets (IMF, 2018). In addition, enhancing banks’ capacity 
to assess risk and monitor their clients would reduce the perceived risks and facilitate 
financial intermediation. Finally, helping clients to identify and present bankable 
projects would also increase lending to the private sector.  
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Appendix: Details of the Severity Of Crowding Out (SOCO) Index 
The indicators are constructed according to the definitions in Table 7.2. 
Special care is given to the public debt indicators to ensure that the local currency-
denominated and foreign currency-denominated public debt add up to the total. In 
case of data inconsistencies, the share of foreign currency-denominated debt is applied 
to the total public debt, after which the level of local currency-denominated debt is 
obtained. The change in access to external debt is calculated such that changes in the 
exchange rate do not affect the value of the indicator. To calculate the real yield on the 
(one year) T-bill, the average of past and future inflation is used, as half of the maturity 
period is in the current year and half in the next year. The indicators for banks’ balance 
sheets are standardised such that inflation is filtered out. The lending rate is the annual 
average of the short-term lending rate to businesses, or the closest publicly available 
alternative. 
Missing values before 2014 are left blank. From 2014 onwards they are approximated 
by the first or last available value, or the average if values for the preceding and 
subsequent year exist (if both the level and growth rate are needed, the growth rate is 
approximated and the level is subsequently derived). For public debt, these 
approximations are performed on the raw data; whilst for the other indicators, at the 
last step of their derivation in order to account for the strong correlation in the 
underlying series.  
The quintiles are derived from the available (non-approximated) data from 2004-13. 
For cross-country indicators all data is pooled and the quintiles are identical for all 
countries; for country-specific indicators each country has different quintiles as they 
are based on the data of each country. Using quintiles ensures that for countries with 
complete data, no threshold is uniquely associated with a single observation, which 
improves robustness. For indicators for which less than five data points exist for the 
period 2004-13, the average of all countries’ quintiles is used. In case of a positive 
correlation with crowding out, values below the first quintile are attributed a score of 
0, those below the second but above the first quintile are assigned a score of 0.25, and 
so on until a score of 1 for the highest quintile. In case of a negative correlation, the 
scores are assigned in reverse order. An exception is the change in distance to frontier, 
as based on the three observations available before 2014 the quintiles cannot be 
constructed. Hence, the mean is used as a threshold and values below the mean are 
assigned a score of 0.25 and those equal or above a score of 0.75. 
The definitions of the Doing Business indicator typically change every couple of years, 
and the thresholds thus have to be adapted as well. The adaptation of the thresholds 
is possible as for those years in which the definition changes, both the old and the new 
distance to frontier measures are provided. The new threshold is then set such that the 
share of countries with a lower new distance to frontier measure is equal to the share 
of countries with an old distance to frontier measure below the corresponding old 
threshold.  
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Table 7.2. - Definitions of Indicators 
Indicator Reference Formula 
Correlation 
with SOCO 
index 
Supply of public debt 
Outstanding local 
currency-denominated 
public debt 
Cross-
country 
 
↑ 
Growth of local 
currency-denominated 
public debt 
Country-
specific 
 
↑ 
Change in access to 
external debt 
Country-
specific 
 
↓ 
Real yield T-bills Cross-country 
 ↑ 
Demand for private credit 
Business conditions Cross-country 
 
↑ 
Change in business 
conditions 
Country-
specific 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖
− 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖−1 ↑ 
GDP growth Cross-country 
 
↑ 
Expected GDP growth Cross- country 
 
↑ 
Banks’ lending decisions 
Financial sector 
development 
Cross-
country 
 ↓ 
Change in balance 
sheet composition 
Country-
specific  
 
↓ 
Growth of balance 
sheet size 
Country-
specific  
 
↓ 
Interest rate margin Cross-country  
 
↓ 
Source: T-bill yields from African Financial Markets Initiative appended by data from the IMF Monetary 
and Financial Statistics (MFS) database; Doing Business distance to frontier from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business database; banks’ claims on private sector and balance sheet data from the IMF MFS database; 
lending rates from central bank websites appended by data from the IMF MFS database; other variables 
from the IMF World Economic Outlook database April 2018, if necessary complemented by data from IMF 
reports to derive local currency-denominated and foreign currency-denominated debt shares. 
Note: Debt, GDP, claims and assets are expressed in national currency unless indicated otherwise. 
  
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑−1𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑−1 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑,𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 (𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑,𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 (𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑−1 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑
𝑇𝑇−𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 −
𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 + 𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑+1𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙2   
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑  
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑
− 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑−1
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑−1  
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑+1 − 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑
 
𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵′𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓
𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑
 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓
𝑑𝑑
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑  −  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑−1𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑−1  
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃,  𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑
−
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑−1
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃,  𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑−1 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 
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8. The State of Bank Recovery and Resolution Laws in 
Africa 
Alan Bainbridge1, Simon Lovegrove2 and Jack Prettejohn3,4 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
• Improving recovery and resolution laws in Africa would help to bring 
down funding costs and facilitate financial intermediation. 
• Benchmarking the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes shows that the state of recovery and resolution laws 
varies considerably across countries and whilst recovery and resolution is 
generally more developed on the continent than originally anticipated 
there remains scope for improvement.  
• Requiring banks to prepare recovery and resolution plans which would 
subsequently need to be approved by regulators and maintained would 
be an important step forward. Similarly, introducing a well-defined 
recovery floor would also reduce uncertainty for investors as they would 
have a clear understanding of how their investment may be affected in a 
crisis management scenario. 
8.1. Introduction 
In general, financial intermediation benefits from strengthening recovery and 
resolution frameworks. An adequate recovery and resolution framework facilitates 
private sector lending by reducing uncertainty and creating a more equal playing field 
among banks. In Africa, strengthening the framework will in particular have beneficial 
effects on funding costs through supporting banks’ access to international debt 
markets, credit ratings and correspondent banking relations. 
The Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes are 
aimed at facilitating orderly resolution and maintaining the continuity of failed 
banks’ vital economic functions without exposing taxpayers to losses flowing from 
bank failure, and have become international standards. A recent study undertaken by 
Norton Rose Fulbright LLP benchmarks recovery and resolution laws in Africa against 
the Key Attributes to identify gaps. The Key Attributes relate to, e.g. the scope of laws, 
the resolution authority, resolution powers, aspects of cross-border cooperation, 
                                                          
1 Partner, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP. 
2 Head of Financial Services Knowledge - Global, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP. 
3 Associate, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP. 
4 The authors would like to thank the European Investment Bank for its valuable comments on earlier drafts. Sanne 
Zwart provided editorial assistance. The editorial closing date is 30 June 2018. However the views expressed in this 
chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment Bank or Norton Rose 
Fulbright. All remaining errors remain the authors’.  
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recovery and resolution planning and access to information. The study covers 17 
countries throughout the continent. 
8.2. Further Developing Bank Recovery and Resolution Laws would Help 
to Sustain the Economic Recovery in Africa   
Financial intermediation will be supported if funding costs come down due to further 
improvements in recovery and resolution frameworks. There are important reasons 
as to why it is important to develop and articulate a credible approach to recovery and 
resolution and how this affects funding costs. There is ample literature on this. For 
example in 2013 a member of the Board of Governors of the United States Federal 
Reserve Board, Daniel Tarullo, explained the reasons at a conference for systemically 
important financial institutions (Tarullo, 2013). 
First, a credible recovery and resolution framework reduces uncertainty. Unless 
creditors and counterparties have well-grounded expectations as to how they will be 
treated in a resolution setting, they may need to charge a premium to compensate for 
the additional uncertainty associated with the disposition of their claims, which can 
lead to a mispricing of risks. In some cases, particularly in periods of increasing stress 
in the financial system, they may be unwilling to deal with certain firms altogether. 
Parties that have short-term lending to or contractual arrangements with these firms 
may “run” as those loans or contracts lapse, thereby potentially crippling the ongoing 
business of the firm and creating adverse effects in other parts of the financial system.  
Second, a credible framework creates a more equal playing field among firms. If 
creditors and counterparties do not believe that a firm can be successfully resolved, 
they may not price in the potential for losses that should be incorporated in their 
dealings with large firms. Investors and other market actors who think that the 
prospects for orderly resolution are low may assume that the firm will be rescued by 
the government and the moral hazard in these markets will continue. 
The Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) has set out features for effective resolution of 
financial institutions. A year after Mr Tarullo’s speech the FSB published its Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes (“Key Attributes”), which have become the 
international standards for resolution regimes (see Box 8.1.). The Key Attributes were 
produced in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, adopted by the FSB in October 
2011 and subsequently endorsed by the G20 a month later in November 2011. The FSB 
added additional guidance to the Key Attributes in October 2014.   
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Box 8.1. - FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes 
The Key Attributes (FSB, 2014) aim at facilitating orderly resolution and 
maintaining the continuity of failed banks’ vital economic functions without 
exposing taxpayers to losses from bank failures. The Key Attributes set out twelve 
essential features that should be part of the resolution regimes of all jurisdictions. 
Each essential feature is further described in the Key Attributes, and when taken 
together they comprise 35 components in total. The essential features relate to:  
  
1. Scope 
2. Resolution authority 
3. Resolution powers 
4. Set-off, netting, collateralisation, segregation of client assets 
5. Safeguards 
6. Funding of firms in resolution 
7. Legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation 
8. Crisis management groups 
9. Institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements 
10. Resolvability assessments 
11. Recovery and resolution planning 
12. Access to information and information sharing. 
 
The Key Attributes prescribe a range of resolution tools to facilitate the objectives. 
Resolution authorities should have the power to take control of distressed banks and 
appoint administrators to restore to viability as much of the bank’s business as 
possible (FSB, 2014). The continuation of critical banking functions is essential. The 
Key Attributes set out several options for resolution authorities to ensure that a 
bank’s essential functions are continued, including procuring third party services or 
establishing bridge institutions. Cross-border cooperation is also an important issue. 
For the African context, these issues are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
The Key Attributes are guiding principles for many African countries, but in varying 
degrees. South Africa is the only country in Africa to be a member of the G20 and 
the FSB and is therefore committed to implementing the framework contained in 
the Key Attributes5. Many other countries on the continent are part of an FSB 
Regional Consultative Group (“RCG”) which has been established so that financial 
authorities from FSB member and non-member countries may exchange views on 
vulnerabilities affecting their financial system and on initiatives to promote financial 
                                                          
5 The National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa published a position paper, the Resolution Framework for 
Financial Institutions, on 13 August 2015, which provides a proposed updated framework for bank resolution in South 
Africa. The position paper was intended to solicit public comment in preparation for a Special Resolution Bill. However, 
a draft of the Bill has not yet been made publicly available. 
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stability6. However, the moral suasion and peer pressure that the FSB applies to its 
members to implement international standards like the Key Attributes may be 
significantly less on non-FSB members.  
 
 
Turning the current economic recovery in Africa into sustained strong growth 
requires a stable and strong financial sector, and bank recovery and resolution laws 
play an important role in this regard. The IMF notes that structural reform needs to 
continue in order to reduce market distortions and shape an environment that fosters 
private investment, and points out that “improving the resolution framework for 
banks” would be among the measures that could encourage exposure to the private 
sector (IMF, 2018). In terms of reducing funding costs of African banks, it will in 
particular have beneficial effects through supporting banks’ access to international 
debt markets, credit ratings and correspondent banking relations. 
For the time being, save for the largest pan-African banking groups, funding by local 
banks tends to be focused on locally sourced deposits. However, to the extent that 
long-term growth in local economies drives appetite amongst local banks to access 
international debt capital markets to facilitate that growth, the question to be posed is 
whether the status of the recovery and resolution regime could impact accessibility to 
those markets, particularly considering questions of bail-in and the comparative 
position of debtholders in a resolution versus insolvency scenario.  
To the extent that debt capital markets begin to play a more significant role in the 
funding cycle for local banks, the relevance of rating agencies and any impact on 
pricing of that funding may become more relevant. It is not particularly clear the 
extent to which rating agencies are influenced by the existence or absence of a 
recognisable recovery and resolution regime in a jurisdiction when allocating a credit 
rating to local banks or even to a sovereign. However, it is noteworthy that on previous 
occasions rating agencies reviewing the banking sector elsewhere have expressly 
stated that one of their considerations is the protection offered to senior creditors by 
subordination of bail-inable securities. In addition, the presence of a government 
support framework as well as the ability and propensity of the government to provide 
support has been listed among the factors considered by rating agencies. Access to 
international debt capital markets is one of the key drivers for seeking a rating and 
therefore the impact of the views of rating agencies will really only be relevant to the 
extent that local banks seek to turn more regularly to the international debt markets. 
                                                          
6 There are two RCGs covering Africa, namely the FSB RCG for the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) and the FSB 
RCG for sub-Saharan Africa. Membership of the MENA group includes financial authorities from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia. Membership of the sub-Saharan group includes financial authorities from Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania, as well as the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and 
the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). 
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The drivers for the ongoing withdrawal of correspondent banking services to a 
number of emerging market countries have been well documented by both the IMF 
and the FSB. The availability of such services in Africa has been tested over the last few 
years as the largest international groups have continued their “de-risking” strategies in 
relation to certain jurisdictions. Although the latest correspondent bank due diligence 
questionnaire produced by the Wolfsberg Group7 does not touch directly on recovery 
and resolution, the development and implementation of a recovery and resolution 
regime may bring a number of benefits to the relevant country and its banks, including 
potentially facilitating alignment with international best practice across a number of 
areas, including those covered by the correspondent bank due diligence questionnaire 
used by international banks to determine their provision of these services. 
8.3. The State of Bank Recovery and Resolution Laws: an In-Depth Study 
across the African Continent 
Earlier this year, working with offices and correspondent law firms across Africa, 
Norton Rose Fulbright LLP undertook a review8 concerning the state of recovery and 
resolution laws for banks in selected African jurisdictions against the Key Attributes9. 
Geographically, the review undertaken was wider than those countries in the FSB 
MENA group and the sub-Saharan group and included coverage of Zambia, Uganda, 
Lesotho and Zimbabwe among others (in total 17 countries were assessed). One of the 
outputs from the study was to assign an overall grading to each jurisdiction that was 
reviewed10 against each of the essential features of the Key Attributes (including the 
sub-components).  
                                                          
7 The Wolfsberg Group due diligence questionnaire was designed to satisfy the Financial Action Task Force’s 
recommendation that for cross-border correspondent banking additional due diligence requirements must be 
undertaken. 
8 State of bank recovery and resolution laws in Africa (May 2018) – A Norton Rose Fulbright LLP comparative guide and 
report. The guide and report can be found here:  
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/167329/state-of-bank-recovery-and-resolution-laws-
in-africa 
9 When conducting our study colleagues and local law firms were also provided with the FSB’s Key Attributes Assessment 
Methodology for the Banking Sector (October 2016).  
10 The study and its findings are those of Norton Rose Fulbright LLP. Institutions reviewing the state of recovery and 
resolution regimes in Africa may come to different conclusions.  
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Figure 8.1. - Recovery and Resolution Regimes Compared to FSB Key Attributes 
(overall alignment with FSB Key Attributes in per cent) 
 
Source: Norton Rose Fulbright LLP review of recovery and resolution frameworks. 
The study finds that recovery and resolution regimes across Africa vary widely when 
compared against the Key Attributes. Overall Morocco, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Kenya were found to have highly developed (60%+) regimes (Figure 8.1.). Countries 
such as Tunisia, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Angola had an average-high level of 
development (50%-59%), Algeria, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa11, 
and Uganda had low-average development (40%-49%) and Lesotho had a low level of 
development (0%-39%). 
                                                          
11 As the recovery and resolution regime currently stands. See footnote 5. 
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Quantifying how recovery and resolution frameworks relate to a country’s 
development is very difficult, if not impossible. This is not the place for an extensive 
analysis of the relationship between the review’s results and GDP per capita, but at first 
glance, at least for Africa, there appears not to be any link. However, the impact of not 
having an effective recovery and resolution regime can be significant. For example, the 
European Commission impact assessment for the proposed Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive mentioned that between October 2008 and October 2011, the 
Commission approved EUR 4.5 trillion (equivalent to 37% of EU GDP) in state aid 
measures to financial institutions, of which EUR 1.6 trillion (equivalent to 13% of EU 
GDP) was used in 2008-2010. As the Commission noted expenditure on this scale was 
not sustainable from a fiscal point of view and imposes a heavy burden on present and 
future generations.  
African countries are not alone in having deficiencies in their resolution regimes, 
although the extent is relatively large. Only a subset of FSB jurisdictions home to global 
systemically important banks have implemented bank resolution regimes with 
comprehensive powers broadly in line with the Key Attributes (FSB, 2017). The 
regulatory powers most often lacking are bail-in and powers to impose a temporary 
stay on the exercise of early termination rights. In light of the FSB’s findings it may be 
that the lack of progress of some of the countries in the FSB MENA group and the sub-
Saharan group may be viewed less critically. 
The systematic assessment of recovery and resolution frameworks brought several 
broader patterns to the fore. The findings are grouped in eight themes based on the 
authors’ view of the most significant areas (Figure 8.2.) and deal with topics ranging 
from general issues like the existence of a defined resolution regime to more detailed 
factors related to protection of creditors and directors and cross-border issues. These 
themes and country-specific findings (Table 8.1.) are discussed in more detail below. 
Figure 8.2. - Recovery and Resolution Regimes  
 
Source: Norton Rose Fulbright LLP review of recovery and resolution frameworks. 
 
1) Existence of a defined 
resolution regime 2) Independence of resolution authorities 
and scope of the 
resolution regime
3) Local branches of 
overseas banks
4) Recovery and 
resolution plans
5) Resolution triggers
6) Resolution authority 
powers
7) Protection for 
creditors and directors
8) Cross-border 
cooperation 
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Table 8.1. - Extent of Alignment FSB Key Attributes in Specific Jurisdictions  
 Defined 
resolution 
regime 
Scope of 
regime 
Branches of 
overseas 
banks 
Recovery 
plans 
Resolution 
triggers 
Resolution 
authority 
powers 
Protection 
of creditors/ 
directors 
Cross-border 
cooperation 
High 
Algeria 
Botswana 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Egypt 
Kenya 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Algeria 
Botswana 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Algeria 
Angola 
Egypt 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Ghana 
Togo 
Tunisia 
  
High-
Moderate  
Algeria 
Angola 
Botswana 
Ghana 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
 
Kenya 
Morocco 
Nigeria 
 
Egypt 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
Angola 
Egypt 
Kenya 
Mauritius 
Nigeria 
Tunisia 
Zimbabwe 
Moderate 
Angola 
Lesotho 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
South Africa 
Tunisia 
Lesotho 
Zimbabwe    
Angola 
Kenya 
Mozambiqu
e 
 
 
Algeria 
Ghana 
Lesotho 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Low-
Moderate    Tanzania  
Algeria 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
Uganda 
Egypt 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
South Africa 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Zambia 
Botswana 
Low Egypt  
Angola 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
South Africa 
Tunisia 
Algeria 
Angola 
Botswana 
Egypt 
Ghana 
Lesotho 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Morocco 
 
Algeria 
Angola 
Botswana 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
South Africa 
 
Source: Norton Rose Fulbright LLP review of recovery and resolution frameworks. 
Note: Assessments of compliance are based upon expert judgement. The overall level of compliance is 
determined by an average level of compliance across applicable attributes of resolution regimes.  
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1) Existence of a defined resolution regime 
African governments and banking sector regulators alike have taken the issue of bank 
recovery and resolution seriously. All of the African countries reviewed in the study 
had a defined resolution regime except for Lesotho12. Governments and banking sector 
regulators13 recognise the need for greater oversight and powers in order to mitigate 
the impact of a disorderly banking collapse or more broadly of a significant stress event 
in the local banking sector. In this respect it is telling that a country with a well-
developed financial sector like Mauritius is reviewing its current regime with the 
assistance of the IMF to address a lack of clarity. 
The existence of a defined resolution regime enables depositors and investors on 
international capital markets to assess their risk exposure. This is especially the case 
for regimes in which the roles and powers of banks, resolution authorities and 
supervisors and governments are identified, and a clear hierarchy of claims exists. A 
defined resolution regime also enables rating agencies to more accurately assess the 
credit risk of banks14, further assisting depositors and investors, and potentially 
increasing the willingness of other banks to operate using correspondent banking 
services. 
2) Independence of resolution authorities and scope of the resolution regime 
As the FSB itself recognises in its Key Attributes, adequate independence and 
accountability is important to safeguard against undue political or industry influence. 
This is a relevant consideration for investors as they will want to have comfort that 
there is a predictable and transparent framework for decision-making that would apply 
in a stress scenario and that ensures there is fair and equitable treatment of claims. A 
lack of independence and accountability can undermine the benefits which would arise 
through the existence of a defined resolution regime. 
  
                                                          
12 Local counsel reported that Lesotho does not have a resolution regime. However, they confirmed that where 
Lesotho’s central bank is of the opinion that a bank’s business is being conducted in an unsafe or unsound manner or 
that it is in an unsound financial condition, it may require the bank to take such measures as it considers necessary to 
rectify the situation. 
13 It is worth noting that the Central Bank of Nigeria hosted the training workshop on “Crisis Management and Banking 
Resolution” in Abuja Nigeria on 16-20 January 2017. The workshop was organised with the technical support of the 
Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa and was part of the activities of 
the Community of African Banking Supervisors, a joint initiative of Making Finance Work for Africa and the Association 
of African Central Banks. 
14 In some cases it may provide for an upgrade of ratings. For example on 16 November 2017 Moody’s Investors Service 
placed on review for upgrade the ratings assigned to the subordinated Tier-2 point of non-viability securities and/or 
related programme components of DBS Bank Ltd, DBS Group Holdings Ltd , Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp and United 
Overseas Bank Limited. The rating action was driven by Moody’s opinion that Singapore banks’ subordinated Tier-2 
contractual point of non-viability securities would represent a lower credit risk score once the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore introduced an enhanced bank resolution regime.  
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The relevant jurisdiction’s central bank tends to fulfil the role of resolution authority 
in most countries15. Examples are Mozambique, Morocco, Ghana and Botswana. On 
the important question of independence and accountability, almost all jurisdictions 
were confident that the resolution authority was sufficiently independent and 
accountable in the fulfilment of its resolution role even though in many cases 
appointment to the board of a central bank was a political decision16. Some jurisdictions 
like Tanzania argued that an important safeguard was the fact that the resolution 
regime provided for judicial review. One jurisdiction, Morocco, went further noting that 
new draft legislative measures were being introduced to enhance the central bank’s 
independence. Such draft measures included the central bank governor not seeking or 
taking instructions from the government.  
3) Local branches of overseas banks 
Respondent jurisdictions reported that their resolution regime generally applied to 
holding companies, subsidiaries and local branches of overseas banks. The latter 
being within the scope of the resolution regime was fairly unsurprising as the 
jurisdictions covered in the review reported that these branches had to be licensed 
with the host central bank before conducting any business.  
Extending the resolution regime to local branches of overseas banks is noteworthy 
but perhaps of limited application. The key benefit of retaining resolution powers over 
local branches of foreign firms is to support a resolution carried out by a foreign home 
authority (for example, by ordering a transfer of property located in its jurisdiction to 
a bridge institution established by the foreign home authority; FSB, 2014). It would be 
a more exceptional case for a resolution authority to take measures on its own initiative 
(for example, where the home jurisdiction is not taking action or acts in a manner that 
does not take sufficient account of the need to preserve the local jurisdiction’s financial 
stability). 
4) Recovery and resolution plans 
It is surprising to find that banks are not generally required to prepare recovery and 
resolution plans17. Although there are some notable exceptions to this (for instance 
Kenya) it does point to a potentially systemic weakness in the recovery and resolution 
                                                          
15 The Financial Stability Institute has noted that in most cases central banks are the primary resolution authority (FSI, 
2018). It also noted that this is especially true in cases where the central bank is the primary micro-prudential supervisor 
for banks. When central banks are the micro-prudential supervisor of banks, it is also the authority in charge of resolving 
banks in almost 90% of cases. 
16 The appointment process is usually political: for example, the current Governor of the Bank of England was appointed 
by Her Majesty the Queen on the “advice” of then Prime Minister David Cameron. He was advised by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, who oversaw the appointment process, and, as with other public appointments, consulted the Deputy 
Prime Minister. In addition, in January 2018 the US Senate approved the appointment of Jerome Powell as the new 
chair of the Federal Reserve System. The BBC reported on 24 January 2018 that the appointment marked the end of a 
decades-long tradition that saw Presidents stick with the Federal Reserve chair who was in charge when they took 
office. 
17 However, this problem is not limited to Africa. For example, in October 2017 the Bangladesh Institute of Bank 
Management published a research paper “Addressing Disaster Risk by Banks: Bangladesh Perspective” noting that 78% 
of banks in Bangladesh do not have a disaster recovery plan in place. 
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regimes in the region. Having recovery and resolution plans in place for banks that 
could impact local financial stability in the event of their failure is an important risk 
mitigation strategy for regulators. Such plans facilitate ongoing review of resolvability 
issues for the bank concerned, taking account of its specific circumstances and 
reflecting its specific complexity, interconnectedness, level of substitutability and size. 
Without this discipline in the system, it may be more difficult for local regulators to 
address issues quickly in the event of a sudden stress in the system. 
Whilst the existence of a resolution regime is critical to being able to conduct a 
resolution, having a plan for how this regime would be used for each bank is clearly 
of almost equal importance. Though recovery and resolution plans are usually private, 
knowing that these have been developed adds credibility to the resolution regime for 
depositor and investor creditors, rating agencies and correspondent banks. 
Even if a recovery and resolution plan is required by a resolution authority it still 
needs to be effective. The European Banking Authority (“EBA”) considered that in 
order to be effective, a recovery plan needs clear governance arrangements, both in 
terms of the processes and procedures that govern its development, maintenance, 
implementation and execution (EBA, 2016). Whilst noting that clear improvements had 
been made to the recovery plans of EU banks, the EBA argued that improvements were 
still required, not least involving local management more in developing and updating 
group plans. This may be of relevance to pan-African banks. 
5) Resolution triggers 
Clear identification of the actual triggers18 allowing resolution powers to be invoked 
is important from a market and creditor certainty perspective. Although all 
jurisdictions except Lesotho reported that they had a clear trigger and effective 
arrangements for a bank’s entry into resolution, there were instances where the lack 
of definition around one or more trigger events could give rise to interpretation issues 
coming into play which could possibly create further doubt about the institution 
involved or, ultimately, lead to an unnecessary resolution. 
The lack of a recovery and resolution plan may delay a resolution authority in 
triggering its powers. The authority needs to identify whether the relevant statutory 
thresholds have been met, followed by an examination of credible recovery options 
and their possible impact and feasibility. A decision to trigger resolution has two 
aspects (Huertas, 2016): a determination that the bank meets the criteria for entering 
resolution, and the selection of the resolution strategy and tools to be employed. 
According to Huertas these two decisions need to be taken together, stating that “it 
                                                          
18 For international papers on triggers generally see for instance the Financial Stability Board paper, Recovery and 
Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Recovery Triggers and Stress 
Scenarios (July 2013) and the Bank for International Settlements’ Guidelines for identifying and dealing with weak banks 
(July 2015). 
 196   © European Investment Bank, October 2018 
makes no sense to make a determination that a significant bank should enter resolution 
unless the authorities have a resolution plan in mind and are ready to execute it.”  
The timing of triggers is critical. Entering resolution at the end of a business day after 
payment systems and other financial market infrastructures have completed 
settlement greatly simplifies resolution. However, entering into resolution in the 
middle of a business day will create significant settlement risk and reduce the 
possibility that stabilisation measures will be successful. In drawing up resolution plans, 
authorities and banks need to think through what needs to be accomplished during and 
after a “resolution weekend” in order to avoid significant adverse effects on the 
economy. 
6) Resolution authority powers 
It is important that a resolution authority has a full suite of available powers in order 
to conduct a resolution that is adequate in the circumstances of any particular bank 
failure. Not surprisingly, most jurisdictions permit resolution authorities to access such 
information from a bank necessary for the preparation for, and conduct of, resolution. 
In some cases the power granted is very broad. It may be that the very broad nature of 
some of the information gathering powers granted may assist both the bank and the 
resolution authority in overcoming obstacles to data sharing, including confidentiality 
and secrecy requirements which can sometimes be a significant hindrance. 
Most jurisdictions reported that their resolution authority has powers to control the 
actions of the relevant bank. For example, even where the resolution regime is less 
developed the resolution authority has important discretionary powers. For instance 
in Algeria the resolution authority has powers to impose an administrative penalty, 
issue cease and desist orders, and prohibit the bank from such transactions it deems 
necessary. In Zimbabwe, the resolution authority has powers to place a bank under 
curatorship whereby a curator will manage the affairs of the bank for a definite or 
indefinite period.  
The ability to establish a bridge bank has been a valuable instrument for resolution 
authorities outside of Africa. Bridge banks operate a failed bank until a buyer is found 
and transfer to it the assets and liabilities of the affected bank. Responses to the study 
show that a significant number of resolution authorities have the power to establish a 
bridge bank. In some cases the power is explicitly provided for in legislation. South 
Africa reported that under its current regime the central bank can transfer a bank’s 
shares and/or assets to a bridge bank or private purchaser although this is subject to 
ministerial consent. In Egypt the central bank previously merged four distressed banks 
into a bridge bank which is now undergoing a privatisation plan. In other cases (for 
example Botswana and Namibia), it is arguable that the power to establish a bridge 
bank can be inferred from existing legislation (although this has so far not been tested). 
In such cases, however, the absence of an express legislative authority could give rise 
to legal challenges if and when the relevant resolution authority were to seek to rely 
on its wider discretionary powers. On reflection, those countries may seek to revisit 
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this issue and consider whether the introduction of specific legislation could avoid 
potentially protracted legal arguments at the point of resolution if the resolution 
authority were to seek to invoke a bridge bank solution19. 
A more fragmented picture emerged as regards bail-in power, confirming the findings 
of the FSB’s recent review among its members20. While some countries in Africa simply 
do not have any bail-in powers (for example Mauritius), other countries (for example 
Algeria) have a power that is only contemplated where it is included in a resolution plan 
approved by the resolution authority. Arguably, bail-in of a bank’s debtholders is a 
more likely route in many instances. The absence of a regularised approach across 
many jurisdictions in Africa suggests that this is an area where resolution authorities 
may look to develop their position more definitively through legislation to ensure that 
they can be certain of having a valuable resolution tool available to them in the event 
of a stress scenario in their banking system (see also Restoy, 2018).  
Most jurisdictions reported that their resolution regime has an effective mechanism 
for contractual stays upon resolution action being taken. This is an important power 
in that it reduces the risk of triggering chains of early contractual terminations and 
realisation of collateral, which can have an immediate effect on financial markets and 
financial stability (as seen in connection with the failure of Lehman Brothers). However, 
banks in Africa face a number of challenges, not least the fact that the scope of the 
relevant rules, where implemented, differs across jurisdictions in the region, and as 
always with regulatory rules there will be questions of interpretation that need to be 
considered on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis. In addition, timing for compliance 
with the relevant rules may differ across jurisdictions and be tight. 
Addressing issues simultaneously might be most effective. Generally speaking, to 
reduce the problem that resolution tools like bail-in may be unworkable in a given 
situation, authorities may also adopt a parallel work stream when developing/refining 
their resolution tools with the aim of improving insolvency procedures. 
7) Protection for creditors and directors 
Although respect for creditor hierarchy is provided for in many jurisdictions, there 
are usually no rules regarding compensation for those losing out. Most jurisdictions 
noted that their resolution regime is silent as regards compensation available where 
creditors are worse off under resolution than insolvency (for example Algeria, Angola, 
Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria,). This is an area where countries may seek to 
develop a more investor-friendly approach. Introducing a recovery “floor” might go 
some way towards incentivising support from investors and creditors in a resolution 
                                                          
19 Inserting a specific bridge bank power into legislation has been observed in other non-FSB jurisdictions. For example, 
in the case of Argentina “while authority to employ the bridge bank and the open bank process is broadly derived from 
existing legislation, the use of those tools should be formalised in regulation to specifically address conditions for their 
use.” (IMF, 2016). 
20 The FSB stated that “powers most often lacking in FSB member jurisdictions are bail-in and powers to impose a 
temporary stay on the exercise of early termination rights” (FSB, 2017). 
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scenario where they have comfort that they could not be put in a worse position than 
if the bank were to go into liquidation.  
An important component of increasing investor rights in the event of a 
disadvantageous resolution will be the rules or principles that guide the valuation of 
the failing bank. Valuation before resolution is critical to the resolution process since 
it informs the resolution authority’s decision as to whether the conditions for 
resolution are met and, if so, which resolution tools should be used. Valuation after 
resolution is also important as it establishes whether the no-creditor-worse-off 
safeguard has been breached by the resolution action and whether any compensation 
is payable to creditors and shareholders21.  
In relation to the important area of safe harbours for the bank board, most 
jurisdictions reported that a bank’s directors and officers are potentially protected 
from liability for decisions taken by the resolution authority. This is usually based on 
the principle that the resolution authority assumes the management, control and 
conduct of the affairs and business of the bank.  
8) Cross-border cooperation  
With the emergence of pan-African banking groups, and more generally African 
banks’ increasing presence across several countries, cross-border cooperation of 
resolution authorities is becoming more important. As per the Key Attributes, if a 
jurisdiction is home to a bank that is required to undertake recovery and resolution 
planning and has operations in foreign jurisdictions that are material to the group, the 
home resolution authority should establish or undertake reasonable efforts to 
establish appropriate and proportionate arrangements for cross-border cooperation 
and coordination with the relevant host resolution authorities to support the process 
of recovery and resolution planning. The home resolution authority should seek to 
establish a cross-border coordinating forum (e.g. a crisis management group, which 
would sit alongside any existing supervisory college) with a mandate to cover cross-
border recovery and resolution for the bank.  
In this context, even where legislation is silent on the issue, jurisdictions in Africa 
reported that cooperation arrangements with overseas resolution authorities are 
permitted. Outside of membership of international bodies however, it remains unclear 
to what extent resolution authorities in most of the countries have active cooperation 
arrangements with other countries in place. The lack of legally binding cooperation 
arrangements places too much emphasis on trust between resolution authorities and 
would be severely tested under crisis conditions. 
Cross-border supervision needs to catch up with the increased internationalisation of 
African banks. Over the last decade Africa has seen a rise in domestic and regional 
                                                          
21 From an EU perspective the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive is supplemented by various so-called Level 2 
measures which include regulatory technical standards on valuation for the purposes of resolution and on valuation to 
determine difference in treatment following resolution under the Directive. 
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banks that have sought to challenge the dominance of international banking groups. In 
a much cited IMF report published in 2015 there were seven major pan-African banks 
which had a presence in at least ten African countries, with three headquartered in 
Morocco, two in Togo and one each in Nigeria and South Africa (IMF, 2015). The growth 
of pan-African banks offers a number of opportunities and benefits, not least increasing 
economic integration within Africa more generally and improving competition, 
financial inclusion and greater economies of scale. However, the IMF also warned that 
the expansion of pan-African banks may increase systemic risks in the region. The study 
suggests that the IMF comment in 2015 that “cooperation on cross-border supervision 
has started22, but enhanced collaboration is critical” remains broadly true today for the 
region. 
However, the lack of progress with cooperation arrangements may not be confined 
to Africa and appears to be a wider problem. According to the FSB in 2017, significant 
work remained to be done to put cooperation arrangements in place and remove any 
impediments to the sharing of resolution-related information between relevant 
resolution authorities (FSB, 2017). Data privacy and bank secrecy laws were highlighted 
as sometimes making information sharing difficult.  
8.4. Conclusion 
The study finds that the state of recovery and resolution laws varies considerably 
across the continent. Overall Morocco, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya were 
found to have highly developed recovery and resolution regimes when compared 
against the Key Attributes. Countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and 
Angola follow. Algeria, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda 
have low-average development, while Lesotho has a low level of development. 
Several important messages emerging from the study could help make recovery and 
resolution frameworks more conducive to private sector lending. Although the main 
components of the FSB’s Key Attributes are present in a number of the African 
countries looked at, the absence in many regimes of the need to prepare and maintain 
approved recovery and resolution plans (and update these regularly to reflect the 
current state of the bank), together with the absence in most cases of any recovery 
“floor”, potentially present the most substantial challenges in a situation which is often 
fast moving. The result is ultimately that, without additional strengthening of the 
existing frameworks, some African countries would continue to look to (unpredictable) 
emergency legislation in a case of stress. 
  
                                                          
22 For example, Bank Al-Maghrib (Central Bank of Morocco) has improved its coordination (through, e.g. joint on-site 
supervision missions) with several sub-Saharan regulatory and supervisory agencies (e.g. the BCEAO and the 
Commission Bancaire in West Africa) 
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9. Financing Infrastructure in Africa1 
David Ashiagbor, Rodrigo Deiana, Andreas Kappeler, Arthur Minsat and 
Thang Nguyen-Quoc2 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
• Infrastructure investment in Africa stood at approximately USD 63 billion 
or 3.5% of the continent’s GDP in 2016. Financing for infrastructure 
development in Africa is highly dependent on the contributions of 
national governments, which account for 42% of total infrastructure 
financing. IFIs can play an important role in covering riskier segments of 
infrastructure projects and crowding in private investors. 
 
• Annual infrastructure investment needs in Africa are estimated to range 
between USD 68 and 152 billion over the coming decade. These amounts 
would cover both maintenance and replacement costs as well as the 
construction of new infrastructure assets. Needs are particularly high in 
energy and transport. New needs arise from rapid urbanisation, 
population and economic growth as well as making infrastructure 
resilient to climate change.  
 
• Key constraints to infrastructure financing in Africa include a perceived 
lack of well-structured bankable investment opportunities, 
underdeveloped financial markets, and regulatory barriers and 
weaknesses in the enabling policy environment. 
 
• Promoting the involvement of institutional investors, including domestic 
pension funds, is key to addressing Africa’s investment gaps. However, 
these investors are constrained by limited experience and capacity to deal 
with infrastructure as an asset class. Many countries have made progress 
in removing regulatory barriers to infrastructure investment by 
institutional investors.  
 
                                                          
1 The authors would like to thank Arnaud Floris and Yves Kra for research support and comments on the section on 
mobilising private investors (9.5.C.); Yosra Elchinnawy and Clémence Pougué Biyong (OECD) for research support; Kei 
Yoshizawa (JICA) for inputs into the box on Quality Infrastructure Investment (Box 9.2.); Nomfundo Ngwenya (Ntsele 
Insights) for inputs into the box on the Johannesburg Development Agency (Box 9.3.); and Giulia Gaspari (EIB) for 
valuable contributions to the box on China’s infrastructure financing activities in Africa. 
2 Arthur Minsat is Head of the Africa Unit at the OECD Development Centre and Rodrigo Deiana and Thang Nguyen-
Quoc are Junior Policy Analysts at the OECD Development Centre. Andreas Kappeler is an economist at the European 
Investment Bank. David Ashiagbor is Coordinator for Making Finance Work for Africa at the African Development Bank 
Group. 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment 
Bank, the OECD or MFW4A. All remaining errors remain the authors’. 
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• Financial instruments that seem particularly promising for attracting 
private investors include risk mitigation instruments and debenture 
structures. African countries should make the best use of existing 
experience in establishing infrastructure as an asset class.  
 
• Promoting quality infrastructure development can contribute to inclusive 
and sustainable growth. Infrastructure investments should ensure a 
reliable supply of basic services, while promoting safety, job creation, 
local empowerment through technology and knowledge transfer, and 
climate change mitigation. All of this should occur within the framework 
of national strategies to provide wider social and economic benefits. 
 
9.1. Introduction 
An adequate supply of infrastructure services has long been viewed as a key 
ingredient for economic development. A comprehensive review of the linkages 
between infrastructure and economic growth shows a positive contribution of 
infrastructure development to aggregate income. In particular, an increase in physical 
capital as well as in the provision of infrastructure services such as transport, power 
supply and telecommunications can lower production costs and increase productivity 
(Calderón and Servén, 2014; European Commission, 2014). Under the right conditions, 
infrastructure development can play a major role in promoting growth and equity and, 
through both channels, help reduce poverty (Bhattacharya et al., 2016).  
Physical infrastructure investment can be defined as investment into the physical 
structures from which goods and services are produced that enter directly as 
common inputs into many economic activities. They primarily have the characteristics 
of networks - typically transport, water and sewerage, energy and communications. A 
broader definition also covers social infrastructure, including the education and health 
sectors (Wagenvoort et al., 2011). 
Without adequate infrastructure, Africa’s economies cannot realise their full 
potential. Inadequate infrastructure - mainly energy, transport, telecommunications, 
water and sanitation, and irrigation - has contributed to the continent’s low economic 
performance, low intra-African trade (11.9% of total trade in 2017) and weak 
integration into global value chains (Juma, 2015). The poor state of infrastructure in 
sub-Saharan Africa reduces firm-level productivity by as much as 40% (Ondiege, 
Mbabazi Moyo and Verdier-Chouchane, 2013).  
Meeting the infrastructure needs would have a catalytic impact for Africa’s 
development. Bringing Africa’s infrastructure on a par with best performers on the 
continent could boost GDP growth by an additional 2.2% per year (Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010). Hulten (1996) found that the efficiency of infrastructure has a larger 
impact on economic performance than the total stock. For example, over 25% of the 
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growth differential between Africa and East Asia could be explained by the difference 
in effective use of infrastructure. Mauritius and South Africa partly owe the strong 
performance of their manufacturing export sectors to investments in world-class 
infrastructure (Ncube, 2017). From a sample of 45 sub-Saharan African countries, 
Kodongo and Ojah (2016) find that increasing investments in and access to 
infrastructure has a positive effect on growth. Specifically, a 10% increase in public 
gross fixed capital formation can raise GDP per capita growth rates by up to 
0.74 percentage points, with the effect being strongest for low and lower-middle 
income countries. 
Infrastructure development also has a long-run impact on economic development. 
Investment in transport infrastructure leads to stronger economic growth and higher 
living standards, according to a study conducted for five middle-income African 
countries (Damijan and Padilla, 2014). The study also indicates that more transparent 
processes for budgeting and project selection (i.e. stronger institutions) and higher 
shares of FDI in infrastructure projects (i.e. lower financing from public budgets) lead 
to greater long-term sustainability and positive socio-economic spillovers. 
Understanding infrastructure quality as a multidimensional concept in Africa’s 
infrastructure development is key to ensuring the strongest social, environmental and 
economic impact (Box 9.2.). 
The objective of this chapter is to present African policymakers with a number of 
options for how infrastructure development can be financed. The chapter also looks 
at what the most appropriate contribution by development partners can be, with a 
particular focus on development finance institutions. For the purposes of the analysis, 
infrastructure is narrowly defined as physical “economic infrastructure” - assets that 
have a direct impact on economic activity. The chapter builds on previous studies 
looking at the financing gap in Africa. In doing so, it also combines multiple data sources 
to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the sources and modalities of financing 
Africa’s infrastructure development.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: section 2 presents infrastructure 
targets for Africa according to different development agendas and studies. Section 3 
will provide a snapshot of recent financing trends, taking a close look at the sources, 
actors and destinations of infrastructure investment in Africa. Section 4 will build on 
this to analyse infrastructure needs, investment requirements and the financing gap 
for the whole continent. Section 5 provides recommendations on possible financing 
mechanisms, instruments and actors to bridge this financing gap. The final section sums 
up the findings and policy recommendations. 
9.2. Africa’s Infrastructure Development Targets 
Infrastructure development represents an important part of the objectives set for 
Africa’s development. According to the OECD, more than 80% of the SDGs rely on 
infrastructure development in some form (Egler and Jurik, 2017). In Agenda 2063, 
drawn up by the African Union and enshrining the continent’s development aspirations 
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over the coming five decades, Goal 10 consists of building “world-class infrastructure 
that criss-crosses Africa”. This goal is one of the pillars of “an integrated continent, 
politically united, based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s 
renaissance”. The infrastructure development objectives are designed to help Africa 
accelerate its integration and growth by facilitating trade and the adoption of new 
technologies. Intra-African trade stood at 11.9% in 2017 and is expected to increase to 
50% in 2045 with the combination of world-class infrastructure and trade openness 
(AUC, 2015). Complementing Agenda 2063, the Programme for Infrastructural 
Development of Africa (PIDA) sets out a common roadmap for African governments 
and investors to develop cross-border infrastructure, thus promoting trade and growth 
and creating more jobs on the continent. Initiatives such as the 2017 Lomé Declaration3 
establish more concrete steps and priorities to achieve infrastructure development 
targets.  
Sectors that attract the most attention in infrastructure development goals are 
transport, energy, water and e-connectivity. Table 9.1. summarises all infrastructure 
development targets set by Agenda 2063 and the corresponding indicators.  
  
                                                          
3 Declaration of the First Ordinary Session of the African Union Specialized Technical Committee on Transport, 
Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, Energy and Tourism held in Lomé, Togo, on 13-17 March 2017. See 
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/iwaf2017/Documents/AU-1st-STC-Lome-Declaration-en.pdf.  
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Table 9.1. - Goal 10 in Agenda 2063 “World Class Infrastructure that Criss-Crosses 
Africa” 
Field Priority area Target indicators 
Transport 
· Connect all African capitals and 
commercial centres through the African 
High Speed Train Network (AHSTN);  
· PIDA transport corridors;  
· Improve the efficiency and connections 
of the African aviation sector;  
· Implement the Yamoussoukro 
Declaration, aimed at deregulating air 
services and promoting transnational 
competition;  
· Strengthen the African port and 
shipping sector as regional and 
continental assets. 
· The African skies will be open to all 
African Airlines 
· 80% preservation (maintenance and 
rehabilitation) ; 20% development 
(upgrading and new construction) 
· 50% increase in electricity generation to 
serve industrialisation and private 
consumption  
Energy 
Harness all African energy resources to 
ensure modern, efficient, reliable, cost-
effective, renewable and 
environmentally friendly energy for all 
African households, businesses, 
industries and institutions. 
 
· Reach 100% urban electrification and 95% 
rural electrification   
· Develop an additional 7,000 megawatts a 
year of new power generation capacity 
(about half through multipurpose water 
storage schemes) 
ICT 
Develop an information society where all 
governments, businesses and citizens 
have access to reliable and affordable 
ICT services by : 
· Increasing broadband penetration and 
connectivity;  
· Providing access to ICT for children in 
schools 
· Providing venture capital for young ICT 
entrepreneurs and innovators  
· Broadband accessibility is increased by 
70% 
· Digital broadcasting will be the norm  
· Mobile universal coverage: every 
adult/youth will have access to a mobile 
phone 
· 50% of population within 25 km of a fibre 
backbone  
· Fibre to home/premises internet 
penetration rate (10%) 
Water 
· “Africa Water Vision 2025,” which 
promotes, equity, sustainability and 
efficiency of water resources 
· Framework for action: Strengthening 
governance of water resources; 
Improving water wisdom; Meeting 
urgent water needs; Strengthening the 
financial base for the desired water 
future. 
 
· Reach 100% access in both urban and 
rural areas 
· Increase water productivity of rain-fed 
agriculture and irrigation by 60% 
· Increase size of irrigated area by 100% 
Source: AUC (2015) and NPCA, AUC, AfDB (2017). 
Agenda 2063 and its PIDA Priority Action Plan are not the first initiatives to set goals 
and targets for Africa’s infrastructure development. It is worth highlighting that the 
African Union approved the PIDA, emphasising the value of ownership and the explicit 
buy-in from all African countries, as a prerequisite for the proper prioritisation and 
implementation of infrastructure projects and programmes. Bilateral and multilateral 
investors also help define targets for helping African governments and businesses to 
build and improve their infrastructure, often quantifying the investment needed. For 
example, the World Bank defined targets for building and improving Africa’s 
infrastructure over ten years (2006-15). The targets included increasing the continent’s 
power generation capacity by 7,000 megawatts a year, developing connections 
between capitals, ports, border crossings and intermediary cities with a good quality 
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road network and providing global systems for mobile voice signal and public access 
broadband to 100% of the population (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). 
9.3. Recent Financing Trends, Modalities and Key Investors in African 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure financing in Africa represented 3.5% of GDP in 2016. Only five countries 
assigned more than 4% of their GDP to infrastructure spending (Kenya, Malawi, Togo, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe). In absolute terms, South Africa stands out with USD 5.8 billion 
(2% of GDP) spent on infrastructure in 2016. This country alone spends almost as much 
as the rest of southern Africa combined. 
African national governments and bilateral/multilateral institutions are the main 
source of infrastructure finance in Africa. In 2016, the contributions from national 
governments represented 42% of total infrastructure financing, at over USD 26 billion 
(Figure 9.1.). The contributions of institutions and governments to infrastructure 
financing varied between 2012 and 2016. China plays an important role in the 
continent, with its investments ranging from 15% to 26% of the total between 2012 
and 2016 (see Box 9.1.).  
Figure 9.1. - Total Infrastructure Financing in Africa 
(USD bn, 2012-2016) 
 
Source: ICA, 2017. 
Note: Bilaterals and multilaterals include contributions from the BRICs, RDBs, G20, World Bank, African 
Development Bank (AfDB), European Commission, European Investment Bank (EIB), Development Bank of 
Southern Africa, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB), Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), 
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), 
and Saudi Fund for Development (SFD). 
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Private capital has played a very limited role in financing Africa’s infrastructure. In 
2016, private flows reached USD 2.6 billion, representing only 4% of total infrastructure 
investment on the continent (ICA, 2017). Total private flows to infrastructure are 
significantly lower than Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributions, which 
amounted to USD 13.7 billion in 2016 and USD 128.3 billion over the period 2007-16. 
Investment in public infrastructure projects with private participation (PPI) have also 
remained limited. Only in 2012, thanks to exceptionally high PPP inflows for greenfield 
projects in four African countries (South Africa: USD 5.7 billion; Morocco: USD 1.9 
billion; Zambia: USD 1.6 billion; and Senegal: USD 1.4 billion) did these investments 
surge to a level close to ODA (Figure 9.2.).  
Figure 9.2. - ODA and Private Participation in Infrastructure in Africa 
(USD bn, 2007-16) 
 
Source: the World Bank PPI database and OECD-DAC database. 
Note: PPI measures the investment in public infrastructure projects in which the private sector has at least 
a 20% participation.  
 
ODA’s ability to mobilise private funds for infrastructure projects is very weak. 
Between 2012 and 2015, private capital mobilised by ODA and invested in 
infrastructure projects was USD 8.7 billion (around 11% of the total private sector 
mobilisation by ODA). Private funds mobilised by ODA increased to reach the second-
highest level in 2013, at USD 2.5 billion, with the help of three water and sanitation 
projects in Angola, Kenya and Ghana.  
In absolute terms, public investment is highest in North and East Africa (Figure 9.3.). 
In the past decade, a number of East African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mauritius and Rwanda have significantly increased public investment to address 
bottlenecks, especially in the electricity and transport sectors. Many investments are 
in large projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the East African Power 
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targeted areas. For instance, transport infrastructure in Morocco is supported by the 
Industrial Acceleration Plan 2014-20 with a USD 2.2 billion fund (AUC/OECD, 2018).  
West African countries attract the highest share of private investment into 
infrastructure (Figure 9.3.). Several West African countries have made strides in 
improving the business environment, according to the WEF Global Competitiveness 
indicators. Good examples are the Ohada Treaty and Uniform Acts’ reforms to attract 
private investment in infrastructure. In 2014, the Konan Bédié Bridge in Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, was completed and co-funded by various private companies, led by the 
Bouygues Group. In 2016, Azura IPP was the first fully privately funded company to 
offer power generation in Nigeria by virtue of raising USD 190 million in equity plus 
USD 686 million in debt (BCG/AFC, 2017). 
In southern Africa, public spending accounts for the bulk of infrastructure 
investment. Public funding represents 60% of infrastructure investment in South Africa 
and 72% in the rest of the region. This share is the highest among the five African 
regions. In South Africa for example, the government has actively invested into 
infrastructure to attract businesses and develop business clusters (AUC/OECD, 2018). 
Figure 9.3. - Sources of Financing and Destination Regions 
(2016)  
 
Source: ICA, 2017. 
Note: The graph excludes the unallocated amount of infrastructure investment of USD 1.4 billion. Bilaterals 
and multilaterals include contributions from the BRICs, RDBs, G20, World Bank, African Development Bank 
(AfDB), European Commission, European Investment Bank (EIB), Development Bank of Southern Africa, 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Kuwait Fund 
for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), OPEC Fund for 
International Development (OFID), Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), and Saudi 
Fund for Development (SFD). 
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4 For instance, China is backing the South Atlantic Inter Link (SAIL) (USD 0.5bn), the first submarine cable linking Africa 
and South America (Brazil).  
5 Doraleh multi-purpose port (USD 590m) and Tadjourah port (USD 90m) in Ethiopia. Bagamoyo port in Tanzania is a 
flagship project set to be the largest and most modern port in Africa, including a 34 km road between Bagamoyo and 
Mlandizi linking the port to Tanzania’s internal railway network and Zambia’s railway network. 
Box 9.1. - China’s Infrastructure Financing Activities in Africa 
China is an important financier of infrastructure in Africa. Chinese financing of infrastructure 
in Africa has fluctuated substantially over recent years. In 2016, China invested USD 6.4 billion 
into infrastructure in Africa, compared to USD 20.6 billion in 2015 (Figure 9.4.). In 2016, China 
provided roughly 10% of total infrastructure financing in Africa. Chinese companies are 
backing ports, connectivity projects, submarine cables4, hydropower plants, highways, 
telecommunications and railways. Infrastructure projects in Africa with Chinese involvement 
tend to be implemented by Chinese contractors.  
 
Figure 9.4. - Infrastructure Investment Commitments for Africa by Chinese Investors 
(USD bn) 
 
Sources: ICA, 2017. 
 
 
Investment in infrastructure in Africa by China is set to remain substantial, also because 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will cover Africa. The inclusion of Africa in the BRI 
can help China to ensure the supply of natural resources for boosting its growing 
economy and secure access to markets for its products. The maritime silk road 
component of BRI is intended to go past the coast of East Africa, where several ports are 
being built5. Moreover, port projects are planned on the coasts of Central and West 
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9.4. Infrastructure Gaps and Financing Needs in Africa 
Low investment in infrastructure over an extended period of time has translated into 
poor infrastructure quality in Africa (ICA, 2016; Calderón and Servén, 2010). On 
average, infrastructure in African countries ranks 98th based on a sample of 137 
countries included in the World Economic Forum’s World Competitiveness Index 
database (Figure 9.5., Panel A below). Infrastructure quality is particularly poor in East 
and Central Africa, based on the countries included in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index Database (WEF, 2017). Electricity stands out as the 
sector with the poorest quality assessment (see Figure 9.5., Panel B below). The quality 
of infrastructure scores worse than overall competitiveness. Investment in 
maintaining, upgrading and rehabilitating infrastructure therefore remains important 
for many countries on the continent. Moreover, understanding infrastructure quality 
as a multidimensional concept in Africa’s infrastructure development is key to ensuring 
the strongest social, environmental and economic impact (Box 9.2.). 
  
                                                          
6 Kribi Deep Sea Port (USD 0.5 – 1bn), Cameroon’s first deep-water port, which will help China access the resource-rich 
Congo basin. Abidjan Port (USD 400m), Côte d’Ivoire. 
7 Central and East Africa: Chad Rail Network (USD 5.6bn), Libreville - Port-Gentil Road Project (USD 0.6bn), Grand Bassam 
highway, Côte d’Ivoire. West Africa: the Standard Gauge Railway remains the most prominent project backed by 
Chinese financing. The “Uganda leg” of the Standard Gauge Railway is planned to connect the country to the Indian 
Ocean through the Port of Mombasa. China is also backing the Madaraka Express Railway and the 32-berth Port of Lamu 
(USD 25bn), the starting point of the so-called LAPSSET - Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport Corridor 
comprising railway lines to South Sudan and Ethiopia, a crude oil pipeline, international airports, resort cities and a 
multipurpose dam along the Tana river. The Entebbe-Kampala express highway in Uganda, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti 
railway (USD 490m) and TAZARA railway in Tanzania. 
Africa6. Some of the ports are also planned to be connected to Africa’s hinterland by road 
and railways7. China also intends to revitalise the 1,900 km-long Tanzania-Zambia railway 
built in the 1970s, at that time already with the help of China (Breuer, 2017).  
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Figure 9.5. - Infrastructure Quality Rank out of 137 Countries 
      Panel A: Infrastructure and Institutional Quality     Panel B: Infrastructure Quality by Sector 
 
Sources: World Economic Forum 2017, World Competitiveness Indicators. 
Note: Higher rank indicates poorer infrastructure quality. 
                                                          
8 For further information on the PIDA Job Creation Toolkit, see http://www.au-pida.org/job-creation-and-pida-projects/   
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Box 9.2. - Quality as a Multidimensional Concept in Africa’s 
Infrastructure Development 
A more selective, sustainable and long-term oriented approach to infrastructure is 
making its way in the global debate, as also embodied in SDG Objective 9.1: “Develop 
quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and cross-
border infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a 
focus on affordable and equitable access for all.” 
Quality Infrastructure (QI) can be defined as infrastructure addressing five elements: 
economic efficiency, resilience against natural disasters, safety, environmental and social 
sustainability, and contribution to society and the economy. This means that QI 
investments should align with long-term country strategies for economic development in 
a way that improves the flow of services, builds local capacity and drives job creation 
(Runde, 2017). In spite of the challenges, measuring impact is also very important. In this 
respect, NEPAD and GIZ have devised the PIDA Job Creation Toolkit to estimate the 
employment effects of PIDA infrastructure projects as a proxy for support to the local 
economy8. 
QI investment entered the global debate during Japan’s presidency of the G7 in 2015. 
Both the G7 and G20 summits in 2016 committed to promoting investment in quality 
infrastructure in Africa. The G7 drew up the Ise-Shima Principles for Quality Infrastructure 
Investment (QII). The G20 launched the Initiative on Supporting Industrialisation in Africa 
and LDCs, which looks at building resilient infrastructure among other interventions. 
Finding a nexus between the G7 and G20 principles for QII and the priorities for Africa 
enshrined in Agenda 2063 and the PIDA Priority Action Plan remains difficult.  
QI approaches should integrate short-term priority projects with long-term 
development policies and outcomes. An example of such an approach is the Japan 
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Figure 9.6. - Definition and Determinants of Infrastructure Investment Gap 
 
Source: EIB. 
 
Infrastructure investment gaps are typically defined as the difference between 
investment needs and actual investment (Figure 9.6.). Data on actual infrastructure 
investment are not readily available but can be estimated based on existing macro and 
project-level data. Investment needs, that is how much countries should be spending 
on infrastructure, are determined by the need to maintain the infrastructure stock, 
new needs deriving from changes in income levels and the economy’s structure, and 
future needs deriving from mega trends including technological, demographic and 
climate change (AUC/OECD, 2018). The relevance of these determinants can 
substantially change over time, with far-reaching implications for infrastructure needs. 
Moreover, the long life cycle of infrastructure projects, often beyond 30 years, requires 
an assessment of infrastructure needs far into the future, which further complicates 
the task of quantifying needs.  
Determinants
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• Geography
• Income level
• Economic structure
Existing Infrastructure
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International Cooperation Agency’s (JICA) Corridor Development Approach, which focuses 
on cross-border transport infrastructure networks (JICA, 2018). These networks can 
facilitate intra-regional trade and promote regional development. Through this approach, 
JICA finances infrastructure assets that integrate regions and countries, fostering local 
economic activities. A second aim is to attract private investment, notably FDI, which in 
Africa follows the prospective creation of regional markets, a better business environment 
and better infrastructure (AUC/OECD, 2018). 
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Africa’s needs for investment in urban infrastructure are substantial and increasing 
(Lall et al., 2017). Between 2015 and 2030, Africa’s urban population is expected to 
grow at a rate of approximately 3.5% annually. This will increase the total urban 
population by about 332 million over the same period (UNDESA, 2018). Urbanisation is 
often uncontrolled, putting an additional strain on urban infrastructure. Rapid 
urbanisation, compounded by social and environmental challenges, creates enormous 
investment needs in terms of sustainable urban infrastructure in Africa. 
Making best use of available financing for infrastructure projects requires a deep 
understanding of Africa’s infrastructure context and needs:  
• Energy: Infrastructure quality in the electricity sector is particularly poor 
(Figure 9.5.). Infrastructure investment needs in electricity amount to up to 
6.6% of GDP over the coming decades (Table 9.2.). The share of the population 
with access to electricity in 2016 reached 42.8% in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
almost 100% in North Africa. This compares to 85% across all low and middle 
income countries, according to the World Bank WDI database. Frequent 
electricity outages force companies in many countries to rely on expensive 
electricity from generators, increasing costs and disrupting operational 
efficiency. On average, firms in sub-Saharan Africa experience 8.5 electricity 
outages per month, according to the WBG Enterprise Surveys. Electricity 
production has expanded but remains at the same per capita level as in 2007 
reflecting strong population growth (WEF, 2017). With the current investment 
trends, it will take Africa until 2080 to achieve full access to electricity (UNEP, 
2017; Sy and Copley, 2017).  
• Africa’s enormous potential in renewable energy can help address its energy 
shortage crisis: 325 days of strong sunlight, 15% of the world’s hydropower 
potential and good potential in wind and geothermal energy (AfDB, 2017). In 
Morocco, the NOOR solar power plant project will increase the share of 
renewable energy in the electricity mix up to 42% by 2020. These projects will 
contribute to addressing energy crises in the region. Therefore, investments 
that drive the transition to a low carbon economy play an important role. 
• The IEA estimates that “increasing the electrification rate in sub-Saharan Africa 
from around 30% today to 70% in 2040 would cost USD 205 billion in capital 
investment”. It would depend on a combination of on-grid, mini-grid and off-
grid access in urban and rural areas. This sum is less than one-fifth of total 
power sector investment in the region. Achieving this level of investment 
requires steadily improving the investment conditions for electricity access-
related projects, while rapidly increasing capacity and ensuring effective 
coordination among the various actors involved (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2016: 
220). 
• Roads: Poor transport infrastructure holds back intra-regional trade activity, 
undermining firms’ competitiveness. In fact, the cost of trading is about 
1.5 times higher for landlocked than for coastal countries (AfDB, 2017). Roads 
are the main mode of transport in Africa, carrying 80% of goods and 90% of 
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passengers, yet only 53% of roads are paved (AfDB, 2014). Apart from the 
importance of strategic regional transport corridors, only one third of Africans 
living in rural areas are within two kilometres of an all-season road. 
• Rail: The large number of landlocked countries and small-sized economies in 
Africa necessitates the development of an efficient rail network. Most of the 
rail lines are low-speed and small-scale and carry low axle loads. Passenger 
services account for only about 20% of rail traffic in Africa (EXIM Bank, 2018). 
• Ports: Africa has around 90 major ports, stretching along a coastline of 
30,725 km. African ports currently handle only 4% of global container traffic. 
African ports also suffer from underdeveloped hinterland infrastructure (EXIM 
Bank, 2018). 
• Airports: Although Africa has over 4,000 airports and airfields, a significant 
number of them do not meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
standards. Only one in four airports has paved runways. Intra-African air 
transport growth has been subdued, partly due to underdeveloped 
infrastructure. In 2015, African airlines carried 79.5 million passengers, 
representing 2.2% of total air passenger transport (EXIM Bank, 2018). Recent 
commitments to liberalise air transport and travel, such as the Single African 
Air Transport Market and removal of visa requirements, can pave the way for 
improvements in airport infrastructure thanks to increased air travel. Air traffic 
in Africa is expected to grow at above the world average rate, by 5.9% annually, 
according to Boeing’s Current Market Outlook 2017-2036. 
• Urban transport: Rapid urbanisation requires substantial investments in public 
urban transport to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth. 
African cities are physically fragmented and dispersed, with a lack of 
connective infrastructure. Local promoters and the private sector should be 
supported in exploring wider mobility and public transport concepts. These 
start from an effective main backbone, for example Bus Rapid Transits or light 
rail systems where appropriate, complemented by reforms to the public 
transport system, including route optimisation and institutional and technical 
organisation and management (Lall et al., 2017).  
• Water: Infrastructure investment needs in water and wastewater treatment 
amount to up to 4.1% of GDP over the coming decades (Table 9.2.). Africa’s 
water resources are abundant, but owing to an absence of water storage and 
irrigation infrastructure, they are grossly underutilised. Over 300 million 
Africans do not have access to clean drinking water, and over 700 million live 
without access to good sanitation, according to ICA. Each year, Africans spend 
an average of 40 billion hours collecting water. A high level of hydrological 
variability in many African countries makes investments in water storage and 
irrigation particularly important.  
• ICT: Infrastructure investment needs in ICT amount to up to 1.4% of GDP over 
the coming decades (Table 9.2.). Access to the internet can play an important 
role in promoting skills, entrepreneurship and SME development. However, 
only 15% of households in Africa have internet access, compared to more than 
two thirds in Central Asia (AfDB, 2018). The availability of broadband is even 
more limited.  Flows of private investment into ICT in Africa have benefited 
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only a small number of countries, where the required infrastructure is already 
well-developed. 
Table 9.2. - Infrastructure Investment Needs 
(% of GDP) 
   Total Transport Electricity Water  ICT 
AfDB (2018) 6.9 1.9 2 2.7 0.3 
Global Infrastructure Hub (2018) 6.9 2.1 2.2 1.3 1.3 
Woetzel et al. (2016) 3.1 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.6 
 
Source: Woetzel, J., Garemo, N., Mischke, J., Hjerpe, M., and Palter, R. (2016). Bridging Global 
Infrastructure Gaps. McKinsey & Company; AfDB (2018), African Economic Outlook 2018: Chapter 4 - 
Financing Africa’s infrastructure: New strategies, mechanisms, and instruments; Global Infrastructure Hub 
(2018) Global Infrastructure Outlook - Infrastructure investment need in the Compact with Africa 
countries, June 2018. 
Note: Procedures, assumptions, coverage and time-span vary substantially across the studies included in 
Table 9.2. The estimates should therefore be interpreted cautiously.   
Infrastructure investment needs in Africa are huge, with estimates ranging from USD 
68 to 152 billion (3.1% of GDP and 6.9% of GDP) over the coming decades (Table 
9.2.)9.  These amounts cover both maintenance and replacement costs as well as the 
construction of new infrastructure assets. Infrastructure investment needs reflect a 
limited infrastructure capital stock in place, which is of poor quality. Moreover, new 
needs arise from rapid urbanisation, population and economic growth as well as 
making infrastructure resilient to climate change. Current infrastructure investment of 
USD 62.5 billion or 3.5% of GDP in 2016 (see section 9.3.), implies a considerable 
investment gap of up to 11.5% of GDP, according to the studies included in Table 9.2. 
9.5. Bridging the Financing Gap  
9.5.A. REGULATORY REFORMS AND CAPACITY IMPROVEMENTS FOR AFRICA’S PUBLIC 
SECTOR  
Policy interventions can address weak government capacity and low levels of 
domestic resource mobilisation, which hamper public sector investment in 
infrastructure. Furthermore, there is an imbalance between the largely centrally 
financed projects and the sub-national dimension of the beneficiaries of such projects. 
Two policy actions could help solve these issues. Firstly, greater and better 
coordination between levels of government could improve local governance and result 
in more efficient public investment and use of infrastructure assets (AUC/OECD, 2018). 
Secondly, improving domestic resource mobilisation through increased tax compliance 
                                                          
9 Estimating infrastructure investment needs is challenging, as they are unobservable and highly state- and time-
dependent. The complexity of estimating infrastructure needs is reflected in the broad range of methods used in the 
literature. Most studies in the field are based on projected GDP growth and country-level elasticities of infrastructure 
spending to growth. Such studies are highly dependent on the assumptions underlying projected GDP growth. In 
contrast, simulations based on global models often lack country-specific characteristics and priorities. Referring to 
declared policy objectives is a straightforward way to capture infrastructure needs, but this approach is highly 
dependent on the way these policy objectives are set. 
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and more efficient tax administration systems could help governments finance 
infrastructure projects more freely (OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2017). 
 
 
Improved and better tailored regulatory frameworks can create a more favourable 
environment for private and institutional investors, helping governments achieve the 
objectives of the Dakar Agenda for Action10. Specific policy reforms include: 
• Adopting the PIDA Model Law for infrastructure investment. Presented at the 
African Union Summit in January 2018, this initiative devised by UNECA and 
                                                          
10 See https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-
Documents/The_Dakar_Agenda_for_Action__DAA__-
_Moving_Forward_Financing_for_Africa%E2%80%99s_Infrastructure.pdf  
Box 9.3. Central and Local Government Coordination: 
The Case of the Johannesburg Development Agency 
There are three critical components for successful infrastructure development: adequate 
financing, institutional capacity to deliver and the state’s responsiveness to the needs of 
citizens or infrastructure users. Coordination between national and local government 
could significantly enhance all three components. 
Administrative bottlenecks can constrain local infrastructure development and reduce 
the ability of local institutions to finance their operations. The Johannesburg 
Development Agency (JDA) manages capital projects in the city of Johannesburg. In 2016-
17, it undertook 91 projects with a budget of ZAR 1.7 billion (around USD 124 million). To 
date, approximately 40% of the JDA’s work has been funded by the City of Johannesburg, 
but the agency also charges development fees to fund its operations. By relying on such 
fees, the JDA often finds itself with very limited cash flow whenever projects are slowed 
down due to poor planning and administrative burdens by the local administration. 
Securing more direct funding from the central government has allowed the JDA to plan and 
implement projects circumventing bureaucratic bottlenecks. Today, the agency receives 
capital expenditure grants from the National Treasury and the National Departments of 
Transport and Human Settlements.   
Consultations and collaboration with the private sector and civil society can increase the 
outreach and impact of local infrastructure development projects. The JDA has also 
effectively mobilised funds from the private sector: for every ZAR 1 million invested by the 
JDA, private investors have put ZAR 18 million into the inner city of Johannesburg since 
2001. Moreover, the JDA’s mandate allows the agency to support local small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) through public procurement, awarding contracts worth 30% of its 
procurement budget to SMEs. Finally, the JDA has engaged in partnerships and 
consultations with the local private sector and civil society to receive feedback on 
infrastructure projects that it carries out or that are needed by the community. 
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NEPAD aims to harmonise investment frameworks across the continent. The 
Model Law introduces regulations specifically tailored to infrastructure 
investment. Greater legal homogeneity will result in more policy certainty for 
investors. 
• Enacting regulations allowing pension funds (both African and international) 
to invest in infrastructure projects across Africa. If required, DFIs or 
governments can put in place guarantee systems or absorb greater risk (see 
also section 9.5.E.).  
• Building public sector capacity for infrastructure project preparation. As a 
critical phase (which includes feasibility studies, contract negotiations, project 
management) of a project’s life cycle, adequate design and preparation 
capacity is vital to generate the bankable projects investors are looking for.  
• Improving procurement rules to reward and promote competitiveness. 
Governments should improve their contract awarding procedures and their 
criteria to reward quality, competitiveness and efficiency, rather than merely 
rewarding low costs. They should also better prepare public investment 
projects and enhance transparency, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 
• Tailoring investment modes to local institutional capacity and project types.  
o Public-private partnerships (PPPs) can increase the efficiency of the 
design and implementation of projects, thus creating substantial 
savings. However, PPPs require careful public involvement and 
expertise. The PPP model used in Morocco’s solar power station in 
Ouarzazate provides a good example of ways to engage key players 
(see Climate Policy Initiative, 2012).  
o Governments can opt for modes of governance for infrastructure 
projects other than PPPs. These can range from direct delivery, where 
governments fully manage all aspects of a project, to procurement for 
specific phases and operations, to privatisation, where governments 
only retain their regulatory role. More complex project governance 
requires empowering regulators and ensuring that an independent 
judiciary can handle disputes (Kappel, Pfeiffer and Reisen, 2017). 
• Strengthening the intellectual property rights regime to promote 
infrastructure investment. This is particularly valid for green infrastructure: in 
African markets very few climate mitigation and adaptation technologies are 
protected under IP regimes (OECD, 2015a). 
9.5.B. CONSTRAINTS TO PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY 
African governments, donors and other multilateral development organisations 
together finance almost all of the continent’s infrastructure today (see Section 9.3.). 
To satisfy their infrastructure investment needs, African countries would greatly 
benefit from attracting financing from other sources, including private investors.  
Although infrastructure investment opportunities are plentiful across developing 
countries, investors are not fully seizing them. The infrastructure sector presents 
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specific risks to private investors, and since private participation in infrastructure 
delivery is a relatively recent form of procurement in many countries, governments do 
not necessarily have the experience and capacity needed to effectively manage these 
risks. They often require support to increase their capacity to procure project 
components in line with internationally recognised, best practice procurement 
principles.  
Three sets of constraints generally limit infrastructure financing in Africa:  
• First, from the demand side, there is a lack of well-structured bankable 
investment opportunities, especially due to higher perceived risk, market 
fragmentation and information asymmetries. Sub-national governments, 
particularly smaller cities, face challenges in developing local infrastructure due 
to the smaller size of infrastructure projects and limited capacity of local 
officials.  
• Second, underdeveloped financial markets and regulatory barriers limit the 
supply of funding, especially for local long-term finance. For example, the 
banking sector in Africa does not cater for infrastructure investments. Bank 
loans with long maturities are very rare (20-year loans are available in only six 
of the 24 African countries included in a 2009 World Bank cross-country 
analysis). Interest rates are excessively high (in three of these six countries the 
loan interest rate was above 20%). Infrastructure-related bonds are issued in 
only a few countries, with various levels of success (Irving and Manroth, 2009). 
• Third, the overall business environment can undermine infrastructure 
investment due to the lack of capacity, transparency and an enabling policy 
environment.  
9.5.C. ATTRACTING PENSION FUNDS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
Pension funds can play a major role in financing infrastructure in Africa (Samuels and 
Danso, 2017a). The need to invest and diversify portfolios for pension funds is high. 
Assets under management grow at close to 30% per annum in some countries like 
Nigeria. In sub-Saharan Africa, less than 10% of the population is covered by pension 
plans, reflecting an enormous need to scale up pension fund and investment 
opportunities for them (Stewart and  Yermo, 2009).  
Projects presented to African institutional investors and pension funds, but also other 
national and international investors today, often do not meet all their requirements. 
Sometimes, this even includes project proposals from countries with sophisticated 
financial markets, such as South Africa. Key barriers to stronger involvement of 
institutional investors and pension funds in financing infrastructure investment in 
Africa include:  
• Uncertainty: High uncertainty continues to undermine the willingness of 
pension funds to engage in infrastructure projects. The risk premium is also 
significantly higher, with a required internal rate of return of 16-20%, 
compared to 11-15% elsewhere (Samuels and Danso, 2017b). One reason is 
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that the reported success rate of African projects (i.e. reaching financial close 
and ability to provide services) is on average only 20%, compared to 46% in 
advanced economies. Moreover, the ability to price risks appropriately does 
not always meet international standards.  
• Mismatch between demand and supply: A mismatch exists between demand 
and supply of infrastructure financing, depending on the maturity and quality 
of infrastructure assets. Most of the demand for infrastructure finance is for 
new infrastructure assets (greenfield). This includes the higher risk initial 
development phase of projects, including construction before revenues are 
established. However, as a result of their strict investment strategies, pension 
funds and other institutional investors are mainly interested in investing in low-
risk infrastructure projects that are already operating and evidencing profits 
with steady revenues (brownfield) (Samuels and Danso, 2017a). 
• Fragmentation: In many African countries, fragmentation of the financial 
market is a major issue, with assets split across dozens of small banks, 
insurance firms and pension funds. Small pension funds may not be able to 
cope with the minimum ticket size of many infrastructure projects. 
• Regulation: Regulation is often perceived as the main obstacle to investment 
in infrastructure by African pension funds. However, reforms in some key 
markets now allow pension funds to invest in the asset class, albeit with some 
restrictions. In Nigeria for example, pension funds have been allowed to invest 
up to 5% of assets under management in infrastructure funds and 15% in 
corporate infrastructure bonds since 2012. Nonetheless, as of March 2018, 
only 0.09% was invested in infrastructure bonds or funds (PenCom, 2012, and 
PenCom, 2018). Even in South Africa, with its sophisticated financial markets, 
few pension funds have experience in investing in infrastructure. The low levels 
of investment in these asset classes may reflect regulatory barriers such as a 
ban on direct equity stakes and limitations on cross-border investments.  
Unrestricted access of pension funds to new asset classes and markets which 
are also unfamiliar to regulators, entails risks, as the global financial crisis has 
clearly shown. The majority of African regulators have demonstrated a 
willingness to work with the industry to gradually open up new investment 
options whilst protecting system stability.  
• Capacity building: A strategic and timely approach to planning and proposing 
infrastructure opportunities is needed to attract pension funds as investors. 
Pension funds, regulators and other stakeholders must be empowered with the 
right information which enables them to evaluate if and how infrastructure fits 
within their investment strategies and objectives. Moreover, they require 
sufficient availability of investable assets and appropriate vehicles through 
which to invest. However, until recently, there has been little effort to 
understand the specific risk appetite, regulatory regime and return 
expectations of African pension funds.  
9.5.D. FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS FOR MORE PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT 
Successfully crowding in private investors in infrastructure financing in Africa 
requires the availability of effective financing instruments. Some of the characteristics 
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of these financing instruments may be unfamiliar to investors due to the specific nature 
of project finance. In project finance, lending arrangements are based solely on the 
cash flow generation of the project. Structures for sharing risks amongst financiers, 
managers and the public sector are allocated on the basis of who can bear them best. 
Liability is limited to the contributed equity capital (OECD, 2015b).  
Table 9.3. - Taxonomy of Instruments and Vehicles for Infrastructure Financing 
Asset 
Category Instrument Examples 
Fixed Income 
Bonds 
Project Bonds 
Municipal, Sub-sovereign bonds 
Green Bonds, Sukuk Bonds, Diaspora Bonds 
Loans Direct/Co-Investment Lending, Syndicated Project Loans 
Mixed Hybrid Subordinated and Convertible Loans/Bonds, Mezzanine Finance 
Equity 
Listed Shares, YieldCos (contracted tariffs for power generation) 
Unlisted Project Equity, PPP 
 
Source: OECD (2015b), Infrastructure Financing Instruments and Incentives, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
The OECD has developed a taxonomy of instruments for infrastructure financing, 
covering debt, equity and hybrid instruments (Table 9.3.). Debt instruments can take 
the form of direct loans held on the balance sheets of financial institutions or may be 
structured for resale. Equity finance refers to all financial resources that are provided 
to firms in return for an ownership interest. They are crucial in the financing of 
infrastructure investments as the providers of risk capital to initiate a project or 
refinancing. Listed equity shares are indirect participation rights, with limited ability to 
influence management. Instead, unlisted equity often confers direct ownership, 
control and operation of the corporate entity or project asset. The attractiveness of 
equity instruments also depends on other features, such as availability of exit options. 
Hybrid instruments such as mezzanine finance are debt instruments with, at times 
optional, equity-like participation in projects.  
Not all of the instruments included in the OECD taxonomy meet the economic, 
institutional and social characteristics of African countries. Substantial institutional 
and economic differences across African countries are one reason. Advanced financial 
instruments such as hybrid debt funds, syndicated loans and listed infrastructure equity 
funds may require further financial market deepening as well as strengthening of the 
institutional environment and collaboration with international institutions in a number 
of African countries to be successful. Moreover, perceived risks of institutional 
investors in Africa may be higher than elsewhere, because in many African countries 
experience with infrastructure as an asset class is still limited.  
Learning from the experience of other African countries and international investors 
active in the region in using novel financing instruments is a viable approach. For such 
new financial instruments to meet the needs of private investors, they should be 
developed in close collaboration with finance experts, investors and project developers 
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in the country. Also, country-specific economic and institutional circumstances have to 
be taken into account. 
The experience of some African countries, including Nigeria and South Africa, 
suggests that risk mitigation instruments can be useful in crowding in private 
investors. The long-term nature of infrastructure projects combined with important 
institutional and political uncertainty in many African countries and a lack of expertise 
of infrastructure as an asset class imply high perceived risks for private investors. 
Moreover, under current economic projections, many countries will not be able to 
sustain current levels of public investment (AUC/OECD, 2018). Finally, currency risks 
often impede investment in (cross-border) infrastructure in Africa. The public sector 
can kick-start private infrastructure investment through effective financing and risk 
mitigation instruments. The following instruments seem to be particularly useful in 
crowding in private investors: 
• Guarantees: Guarantees may be particularly effective in overcoming the high 
risks associated with the initial phase of infrastructure projects. Guarantees 
may also help to attract investors from abroad: OECD pension funds are 
required by law to hold assets rated at least A-, which is well above the rating 
of many sovereigns in Africa (Samuels and Danso, 2017b).  
• Debenture structures: Debenture structures can eliminate the elevated risks 
associated with the initial phase of a project. Governments buy debentures or 
convertible bonds to finance a project. After construction and after some of 
the initial risks have subsided, the government can sell the bond to private 
investors. Thereby government interim finance is used at the time that it is 
most expensive for the private sector. Investors, against a reasonable price of 
the debenture structure, can benefit from any upside risks in the projects, if 
bonds are convertible. MDBs can support such initiatives by providing short-
term, flexible loans for governments to buy debentures or convertible project 
bonds (AfDB, 2018).  
• Project puttable bonds: These bonds are designed to mobilise pension and life 
insurance funds as well as sovereign funds. They finance long-term investment 
funds from the beginning to the closing of a project, avoiding the refinancing 
risk. An MDB can provide a put option against a guarantee premium. After a 
predefined period, the private investor has the option to sell the bond to the 
MDB, on the condition that the projects do not meet predefined specific 
minimum conditions. Such bonds can also make greenfield projects attractive 
for institutional investors (AfDB, 2018). 
• Diaspora bonds: Dedicated institutions and investment projects can attract 
savings from the diaspora. Morocco has quite successfully enacted policies to 
handle investment issues for its diaspora, particularly for the housing sector 
(see OECD, 2017). Likewise, Ghana has established a new dedicated unit to 
handle investment issues for its diaspora (UNIDO, 2013). Mauritius has set up 
a Diaspora Scheme to encourage diaspora members to return and invest in the 
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country. Ethiopia and Nigeria have created diaspora-indexed bonds, but 
subscriptions remained limited. 
• Infrastructure asset market: To support the creation of an infrastructure 
market, IFIs could sell existing infrastructure assets to institutional investors 
from host countries. This process would help to jumpstart the required 
transformation in the investment ecosystem of the main sources of 
institutional investment (Samuels and Danso, 2017a; AfDB, 2018). 
9.5.E. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CAN CROWD IN LONG-TERM INVESTMENT 
Official Development Finance (ODF) remains an essential tool to finance investment 
gaps in infrastructure. First, it is still an important source of finance for infrastructure 
development in Africa, averaging USD 13 billion a year between 2009 and 2016. ODF is 
particularly important for aid-dependent governments and sectors where domestic 
resource mobilisation capacity is weak and private sector contributions are insufficient. 
Moreover, development partners can provide seed capital as they have a higher 
tolerance of risk associated to high initial investment. They can pursue operations with 
higher quality standards and impact criteria, which may positively affect project 
outcomes and improve the local environment. 
ODF can support the policy framework and institutional capacity to provide an 
enabling environment for infrastructure development. Almost 20% of ODF for 
infrastructure in developing countries was allocated to improving the policy framework 
relating to infrastructure sectors in 2014, particularly energy (Miyamoto and Chiofalo, 
2016). For example, development partners can help strengthen regulatory authorities, 
share expertise in financial and operational restructuring of state-owned enterprises, 
and support capacity building of municipalities in sustainable use and management of 
water resources.  
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) also remain key players in financing 
infrastructure. Globally, MDBs’ commitments to infrastructure more than doubled 
between 2005 and 2014 at a compounded annual growth rate of 10%. MDBs play a 
central role in the recently established Global Infrastructure Forum, designed to help 
bridge the financing gap and achieve the goals of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for 
financing sustainable development (UN, 2015). Other relevant initiatives include the 
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), which provides both financial 
and technical support to central and local governments to increase private sector 
involvement in infrastructure development. 
A large number of initiatives by MDBs are underway to increase the stock of 
infrastructure in Africa. In Africa, the AfDB identifies infrastructure as a major pillar of 
its High 5 strategy, especially in energy. USD 34 billion was invested in energy sector 
operations, while over USD 440 million was approved in 2016 alone for regional 
transport and ICT projects. Other facilities such as the Infrastructure Consortium for 
Africa (ICA) and Africa50 facilitate and mobilise infrastructure investment across the 
continent. The EIB has, through its External Lending Mandate, invested EUR 3 billion 
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into infrastructure in Africa between 2015 and 2016. Moreover, North Africa benefits 
from the new EIB Economic Resilience Initiative. 
Donors can use development finance to attract additional private finance into 
infrastructure development projects. Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and 
MDBs have already initiated and scaled up 167 funds and facilities for blended finance 
interventions between 2000 and 2016. Among them, more than 39 funds and facilities 
have already integrated affordable and clean energy development as one of their 
objectives, 36 have prioritised clean water and sanitation, and 41 have supported 
industry, innovation and infrastructure (OECD, 2018).  
Development partners have broadly taken three approaches to blended finance 
(OECD, 2018): 
(1) Governments and bilateral aid agencies typically provide grants and other 
forms of concessional financing for blended finance. MDBs finance and 
manage blended finance funds and facilities. The World Bank Group’s “cascade 
approach”, for example, prioritises blending to cover the finance needs of 
development projects.  
(2) The process of lending is in itself an intermediary step towards unlocking 
further private finance for development projects. For instance, the EIB has, 
through the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, unlocked for each euro 
invested a total of EUR 18.1 of new infrastructure investment (EIB, 2018).  
(3) Other private sector-oriented DFIs take a pathfinder and market leader role, 
especially in countries where there are few alternative sources of financing. 
By doing so, they reduce uncertainty and accelerate market development. 
While blended finance offers potential, a survey of existing facilities shows that 
blended finance transactions will have to adapt to local contexts to ensure 
long-term sustainability and effectiveness.  
ODF can also support infrastructure development through various instruments. 
Guarantees remain an important tool, but they do not solve the issue of low project 
bankability (50% of projects fail at the preparation stage). Development partners can 
also directly target specific project phases and shield investors from risks associated to 
high initial investments. Direct financing of project design, preparation and 
implementation, or technical assistance to support these, can help create more 
bankable projects, attracting private investors and benefiting local economies. 
Repayment of (at least part of) these costs can help “recycle” this initial financing.  
9.6. Conclusion 
Low investment in infrastructure over an extended period of time has translated into 
a lack of key infrastructure and poor infrastructure quality in many African countries. 
On average, African countries rank 98 out of 137 countries in terms of infrastructure in 
the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index. Best performers include 
Mauritius (ranked 40th), Seychelles (50th) and Morocco (54th). Various studies estimate 
infrastructure needs in Africa to range between 3.1% and 6.9% of the continent’s GDP. 
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Africa’s infrastructure deficit is a major impediment to the continent’s growth because 
it hinders domestic private development, deters FDI and limits the provision of 
economic and social services. Moreover, it is important to understand infrastructure 
quality as a multidimensional concept to ensure the strongest social, environmental 
and economic impact. 
Three key constraints limit infrastructure financing in Africa. On the demand side, 
there is a perceived lack of well-structured bankable investment opportunities, 
especially due to higher levels of real and perceived risk and of market fragmentation. 
Underdeveloped financial markets and regulatory barriers also limit the supply of 
financing. Moreover, the overall business climate undermines infrastructure 
investment due to the lack of capacity, transparency and an enabling policy 
environment. This also applies to public infrastructure investment, which would benefit 
from strengthened government capacity and domestic resource mobilisation. 
To meet infrastructure investment needs, African countries must attract more 
private capital. Currently, African governments, donors and other multilateral 
development organisations together provide over 85% of financing for the continent’s 
infrastructure. If financing from China is included this share increases to 96%. 
International and domestic institutional investors have specific requirements and 
limited experience in financing infrastructure projects in Africa. Crowding in private 
investors requires a strategic and timely approach to planning and proposing 
infrastructure opportunities to donors and investors. African countries can learn from 
each other and international investors active in the region in implementing new 
financial instruments that seem to be able to attract private investors. Such 
instruments include risk mitigation instruments, convertible bonds, and creating an 
infrastructure investment market with the support of international financial 
institutions.  
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) can play a key role in upgrading Africa’s 
infrastructure and crowd in private investors. MDBs’ global and multi-sector expertise 
in infrastructure projects and their flexibility in terms of investment horizon, financial 
structuring and contract renegotiation can be viable means of crowding in private 
investors. Well-targeted guarantees or subsidies alongside the use of co-financing 
could help to implement viable projects in vulnerable countries. Infrastructure 
investment platforms have further extended the practice of co-financing, whereby 
MDBs, DFIs and private lenders join forces and coordinate where possible to support 
infrastructure investments. Moreover, DFIs and MDBs can often provide technical 
assistance to increase the quality and impact of projects along the project cycle and to 
make them bankable and attractive for private investors.  
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Afterword1 
Boosting the Financial Sector for Sustainable Development in 
Africa 
The European Investment Bank has been active in Africa since 1963, and is among the 
leading financiers on the continent, supporting private and public sector projects. In 
2017, 51 projects in a variety of sectors were supported with over EUR 3bn of funding 
(Figure 1.). Around 56% of these projects focused directly on the financial sector. 
Operations in other sectors help to create the conditions for inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth and private sector development, which in turn complements the 
EIB´s financial sector-focused operations.  
Figure 1. - EIB Lending for New Projects Signed in 2017 in Africa 
(EUR) 
 
 
 
The EIB’s financial sector operations target two complementary objectives: 
promoting financial sector development and enhancing access to finance. 
Achievement of these objectives will boost the prospects of private sector 
development, contributing to the elimination of poverty and to sustainable 
                                                          
1 This chapter was drafted by Tim Bending, Claudio Cali, Nina Fenton, Andreas Kappeler and Sónia Leonardo. The authors 
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Investment Bank. All remaining errors remain the authors’. 
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development, in line with EU priorities for the region and the Sustainable Development 
Goals. 
On top of its own resources, the Bank finances projects in Africa under the External 
Lending Mandate (ELM) and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Investment Facility 
(ACP-IF), a revolving fund established under the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement 
(Cotonou). The EIB also mobilises third-party donor financing from EU member states 
and others, and works with private sector partners, International Financial Institutions 
and other financiers to support projects across Africa. With these resources, the EIB 
employs a wide range of financial instruments in support of the financial sector, 
tailoring its support to reach final beneficiaries with different needs and facing different 
constraints.  
Channelling Funds to Private Enterprises through Intermediated 
Lending  
As this publication has highlighted, private enterprises across Africa struggle to access 
finance for productive investment, particularly at longer tenors. Smaller, younger 
firms and innovative companies are often the most affected. Many of the affected firms 
are likely to grow, innovate, and sustain and create employment if they can access 
appropriate finance. The EIB supports financial intermediaries reaching out to African 
private sector firms. Most of the intermediaries are local or regional banks, financial 
institutions or funds, and many receive support such as Technical Assistance (TA) 
alongside an EIB loan. This means that these operations help to strengthen both the 
firms receiving funding and the local and regional financial sectors. 
• Intermediated lending to support access to credit for SMEs and mid-caps is the 
largest single activity for the EIB in Africa. This lending takes place principally 
through credit lines to local banks, sometimes in local currency. The banks on-
lend these funds to eligible clients, providing much-needed long-term funding 
for private businesses. Such credit lines are also an important way to help 
strengthen local banking sectors, helping local banks to expand into the SME 
segment and to under-served markets. New credit lines provided in 2017 will 
enable local banks to provide around 5 000 loans to African SMEs and mid-caps. 
The average tenor of these loans is expected to be almost five years - a 
significant increase relative to typical loan durations available in local markets. 
Beneficiary companies are expected to sustain over 160 000 jobs.  
• Credit lines to microfinance institutions enable the EIB to channel funds to 
even smaller enterprises. EIB lending to microfinance institutions in Africa in 
2017 is expected to support over 44 000 micro-entrepreneurs. Whenever 
possible, the EIB makes these investments in local currency, removing the 
foreign exchange risk facing both the institutions and end borrowers. This is 
particularly important when targeting the under-served: the poor and the 
smallest micro enterprises tend to do most of their business in domestic 
markets, and can least afford to deal with the risks of hard currency exposure. 
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The ability to provide such local currency loans has been a key factor in enabling 
the EIB to extend its outreach in countries where this was previously limited, 
including through recently signed operations in Mali and Senegal.  
• Participation in equity funds enables the EIB to reach a further set of high-
potential firms. The investee companies of private equity funds supported by 
the EIB in 2017 are expected to create almost 25 000 jobs. The underlying 
businesses supported are often at an early stage or moving into innovative 
industries or new markets, and they are generally perceived as risky. As a result, 
these firms often struggle to access appropriate and affordable funding from 
banks, even though they may have high potential for scaling their businesses, 
generating revenue and employment, and providing goods and services to local 
consumer markets. EIB participation in private equity funds helps them to 
support these firms. It also helps to deepen and strengthen young or nascent 
equity markets. Many of the funds supported by the Bank invest in high tech, 
tech-enabled or innovative industries. The EIB’s ability to engage with these 
funds has been enhanced in particular by the risk-absorption capacity of the 
Impact Financing Envelope (IFE). This special envelope was established under 
the ACP-IF to support projects expected to generate high development impacts, 
but which could not usually go ahead because of their risk profiles. As an 
example, in 2017 the Bank signed an EUR 8m equity stake, using IFE resources, 
in Cepheus Capital, an Ethiopian-based growth fund. Run by two experienced 
Ethiopian partners, the Fund plans to invest in around 12 businesses in sectors 
such as telecommunications and Information and Communications Technology, 
helping them to diversify and grow by accessing new African markets. 
Moreover, it will provide patient capital in a country where even shorter-term 
loan financing is scarce.  
Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for Financial Sector 
Development 
Advisory and TA services play a vital complementary role alongside finance in 
enabling EIB projects to go ahead, to be successful and to be sustainable. In financial 
sector-focused operations, TA is often used to address gaps in the capacity of the 
intermediaries and the enterprises they support. This enhances the impact of these 
operations for both clients and the financial sector. In 2017, the EIB approved almost 
EUR 15m for 15 TA operations in Africa.  
The EIB also supports selected capacity building initiatives at sector level. For 
example, the EIB is working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to support 
financial sector development across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Under an agreement 
signed in early 2018, the EIB provided EUR 3m to support IMF capacity development 
activities up to the end of 2020. Activities supported range from identifying gaps in 
financial sectors with the goal of designing a TA roadmap to strengthening the 
reporting on financial sector statistics in targeted countries. The IMF and the EIB will 
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also launch a joint online course on financial intermediation and inclusion under this 
initiative. As part of its TA work in Southern Africa, the Bank has joined forces with the 
Frankfurt School of Finance to provide capacity building through banking training 
courses for the staff of EIB financial sector clients. In addition, by working with local 
universities and establishing a Banking and Finance Academy, the Bank aims to make 
banking and finance courses readily available in targeted countries. 
Creating the Conditions for a Thriving Private Sector 
The EIB’s investments in infrastructure and essential services in Africa support private 
sector development and hence inclusive and resilient growth and sustainable 
development. In 2017, the Bank signed 23 new infrastructure projects in Africa for a 
total of EUR 1.5bn, all of which helped the countries to tackle constraints to social and 
private sector development. For example, 13% of enterprises in SSA identify access to 
electricity as the main constraint to their development (World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 
various years). Addressing this challenge, five EIB energy projects signed in 2017 are 
expected to achieve clean and renewable generation capacity of almost 
3 000 GWh/year - sufficient to supply 1.9 million households. The EIB is also helping to 
tackle gaps in transport infrastructure: seven road and urban transport projects were 
signed in 2017. The widening of the busy Mombasa port access is expected to benefit 
the users of up to 38 000 vehicles a day and bring considerable safety improvements, 
179 000 passengers a day are expected to benefit from rapid transit bus services and 
around 22 000 vehicles a day will drive on improved roads.  
As in the financial sector, TA resources often play vital role in complementing EIB 
infrastructure financing, including under the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund. 
Donors to the Trust Fund, which was initiated in 2007, include the European 
Commission and several EU Member States. Over the past decade, the fund has 
supported more than 85 infrastructure projects, and each euro provided has unlocked 
EUR 18.1 of new infrastructure investment. 
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